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Abstract 
This is a Marxist critique of social democratic analyses and strategies in an era of 
transition in the global political economy which is made through the examination 
of the ideas and prescriptions of an influential social democratic thinker, Stuart 
Holland. Holland develops his political economies and strategies in three phases: 
the national, the 'European multilateral or international' and the 'European 
regional'. Each is criticised in turn from the standpoint of the theory of bloc 
imperialism. 
Holland does not apply classical Marxist propositions of economic and political 
analysis. He is eclectic or pluralist in his analytical theories. A primary weakness 
of his approach is that he fails to develop a class approach to the state, to 
monopoly capitalism, to the British political economy or to the European political 
economy. Holland's under-theorisation of the state within monopoly capitalism 
results in an over-estimation of its capacities in relation to the system. A class 
understanding of the capitalist state infers that it is limited in relation to what it 
can do in restructuring capitalism. 
A key flaw in his perspective is that capitalism has entered a 'new mode of 
production' in which the struggle of multinationals against states predominates. 
Instead of viewing MNCs and states as an integrated whole, a contradictory 
unity, he perceives them as two independent forces. Consequently, he rejects the 
alternative perspective of capitalism as a system of inter- imperialist rivalries. 
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Introduction 
The origins of this thesis lie in my studies in International Political Economy and 
European Studies made under Prof Phil Cerny and Prof David S. Bell at Leeds 
University in the late 1990s. They emphasised the changes taking place in the 
European and global political economy that were problematic from the standpoint 
of Marxism. Primarily these changes took the form of the nation-state being 
absorbed into webs of economic and political interdependence and integration 
that in turn were reshaping the national political economy of states. Furthermore, 
these changes influenced how the nation-state could act both domestically and 
overseas in the global political economy and were impacting on the political 
strategies that political parties could pursue. 
The subject of the study, Stuart Holland was suggested to me by David Bell as a 
means for exploring these issues. Stuart Holland, a left social-democrat, had 
written extensively on national, European and global issues (See Appendix A for 
biographical details). I discovered that he shared perspectives with many in 
radical political economy about global capitalism (e. g. the role of MNCs). He 
provided an excellent opportunity, therefore, to investigate the problems made 
plain to me by my studies. My primary interest in Holland is therefore in the 
theories and concepts that he utilised to explain the changes that have taken place 
in the national and European political economies over the last fifty years. The 
implications that his theories had for social democracy are drawn out and 
compared in terms of ideas and concepts but social democracy's development in 
itself plays a secondary role to the examination of those ideas and concepts. 
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Moreover, Holland was not purely an academic he was also a strategist for left 
social-democracy, he had be influential at various levels within European social 
democracy. ' This further provided a link between theory and practice: Holland's 
theories and concepts gave shape to his strategies and his policy prescriptions. 
Thus Holland provided an ideal representative or exemplar of both a trend in 
radical international political economy and radical, social -democracy that might 
help me elaborate a Marxist response to the issues in the global political economy 
that intrigued me. The added bonus was that as Holland was such a prolific writer 
his ideas were readily accessible in the public domain. 
The reader will not find me having made extensive empirical researches into 
Holland's archives. This was not necessary. Holland's principal ideas and 
concepts that he used in his political economy and strategies were readily 
accessible in his many published texts. Thus this thesis is both an exegetical and 
critical theoretical evaluative exercise. It subjects to severe criticism selected 
pivotal texts of Stuart Holland. Furthermore, the method of my critique has not 
been to refer to historical data necessarily, but to look at the internal consistency 
of Holland's ideas and to highlight flaws, omissions, inconsistencies and 
contradictions and to utilise the studies of others to present an alternative 
theoretical understanding of the issues. In a sense, in my debates with Holland I 
am seeking a "paradigm" which best explains the totality of political, social and 
economic relations of global capitalism from the standpoint of historical 
materialism or Marxism. 
' See Appendix A. 
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My initial premise had been that as Holland was a 'socialist'; because he 
sometimes used what appeared to be Marxist concepts and claimed, at times, his 
analysis was based on class, and because others classified him as Marxist. 
However, I found that the deeper I went into his theories and strategies the less I 
was convinced of this and the move convinced was I that a Marxist reply to his 
analysis was necessary. Therefore I had to revise my judgement of his positions 
and start afresh to construct my own theories which I held to have more 
consistency in terms of Marxism or historical materialism. By 'consistency' I 
mean explaining the totality of phenomena from within an historical materialist 
point of view without having to resort to non-materialist, i. e. philosophically 
idealist explanations. 
Therefore, my aim in this thesis is to summarily outline Holland's perspectives 
and prescriptions and then subject them to a Marxist critique. 
Out of this process of analysis there emerged an alternative to Holland's 
interpretation of the phenomena of the global political economy. I sought a 
consistent Marxist explanation or theory for the same phenomena that he 
interpreted. There is, therefore, a synthetic element in the thesis that runs through 
it. This element is the combination of various concepts into what I have termed as 
the 'theory of emergent bloc imperialism'. The concept of bloc imperialism (in 
the European context) sets out to examine the process and the conditions whereby 
individual national imperialisms embarked upon the formation of bloc 
imperialism in Europe, post- I 945. The concept of 'bloc imperialism' as applied to 
European integration is not new; notable early contributions to it were made by 
-9- 
Ernest Mandel (1970 and 1978) and Nabudere (1977 and 1979); however it is 
only recently that the theory has gone through new developments (especially in 
the work of the Carchedis: 1999,2001,2002). Bloc imperialism as a concept, 
although commonly used in Marxist discourse, has not been fully investigated in 
terms of its economic, social and political implications. The political and class 
characteristics and properties of it have yet to be fully been teased out; this thesis 
is a contribution to that task. More research on this, beyond this thesis, remains to 
be done. The thesis is a contribution to using this theory to contextualise the 
critique of an individual political theorist and to illustrate the flaws in the social- 
democratic perspective on regionalism. The critique of Holland's analysis and the 
elaboration of the theory of bloc imperialism develop side by side by in the text 
and are intended to do so. It is from the basis of the theory that I can criticise 
Holland's national and European political economy, from consistent historical 
materialist positions without lapsing into frameworks that utilise non-Marxist 
principles or philosophically idealist concepts. 
Plan of Chapters 
Chapter One of the thesis outlines the background, the literature review, 
rationale, research aims and hypotheses, analytical framework, argument in brief, 
theoretical approach, evaluation criteria, methodology and sources of the thesis. 
There is a short review of some relevant literatures. This presents a review of two 
important areas within Holland's political thought: social democracy and 
international political economy. The selection of these two topics was seen as 
important to an understanding of the context of Holland's writings. 
- 
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Chapter Two adumbrates the major differences between what I consider to be 
Marxism and Holland's theories and concepts. It sets out the origins and 
theoretical roots of the perspective that I regard as Marxism; a Marxist theory of 
monopoly capitalism, the multinational monopoly firm, the relation between the 
state and monopoly capitalism, a theory of economy crisis, of imperialism, the 
social and political aspects of the theory of imperialism, and the theory of bloc 
imperialism. I then compare and contrast Holland's theories against this summary 
of relevant Marxist thought to draw out where they differ. The chapter concludes 
with an evaluation of Holland's theory of monopoly capitalism. 
Chapter Three discusses what I have termed Holland's national political economy 
and strategy. It elaborates Holland's political economy and national strategy and 
then subjects both to criticism. In particular I am critical of Holland's concept of 
a 'new mode of production' in the 1950s and 1960s. I discuss the role of the 
financial capital and monopolies in the British economy. I highlight what I term 
the 'dual' nature of the British political economy; and the British state's 
relationship with MNCs. I evaluate Holland's strategy related to his political 
economy: this is divided into two sections; one discussing the scope and limits of 
state capitalism and the other is the consequences for Holland's public enterprises 
when competing in the global market. I then comment on Holland's concept of 
British state's relation to monopoly capitalism. Holland's thought on parliament 
and the Labour Party are given some consideration. In the light of the analysis 
made, the next focus is the question of whether a socialist strategy is viable in a 




are possible in such a context. Lastly I conclude my examination of Holland's 
political economy and strategy by summarising my criticisms, chief among 
which is that Holland has not acknowledged British imperialism in his analysis. 
Chapter Four has as its themes Holland's political economy of the European 
integration process and his European international strategy. Holland abandoned 
his national strategy for a multilateral or international strategy. I summarise his 
political economy and strategy then I subject both to scrutiny. The critique is 
divided into two parts. The first part examines Holland's theory of the European 
Community (EC) and more generally the European integration process; within 
that I look at Holland's use of Marxist tools of analysis and his closeness in 
method to neo-Grarnscianism; Holland's method of analysis is criticised. This is 
followed by an application of the theory of emergent bloc imperialism to the 
analysis of European integration. The question of the nature of the EC is then 
discussed. I then comment on Holland's partial representation of its policies. This 
is followed by a critique of Holland's portrayal of the EC's political dynamic i. e. 
the motive forces behind the process. Next, I discuss the role of the nation-state 
in the European integration process. Holland's concepts of the relation between 
nation-states and national capital and of the 'national bourgeoisie' are questioned. 
This is complemented by a discussion of the relevance of some recent research 
on MNC operations within the EC/ European Union (EU). Then I examine 
Holland's discussion of the conditions under which a European 'state' might 
emerge. Holland's multilateral strategy is then evaluated and criticised and this is 
followed by the conclusion. 
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In Chapter Five I summarise Holland*s ideas on regional political economy and 
strategy. They are then subject to a critique mainly from the standpoint of the 
concept of bloc imperialism. Holland's policies are regarded as a variety of 
ýstrategic rationale' policy and as complementary to the ideas of big business. 
Holland's policies on Social Europe, Monetary Union, Competitiveness Policy 
and the Japanese model of flexibility are subjected to analysis and criticism. 
Holland's political strategy is also discussed with a particular focus on the idea of 
EU state-building and the implications of his ideas for European social 
democracy. 
Chapter Six presents my conclusions and draw out some of the research 
implications. My main conclusions are that I consider Holland's analyses to be 
seriously flawed from the standpoint of Marxism and that his social democratic 
strategies are not viable from a 'socialist' standpoint. Holland's account of the 
global capitalist economy is found to be lacking in a number of significant areas. 
His rejection of an approach based on historical materialism weakens: (i) his 
class analysis of the state, (ii) the social relations that structure economic and 
political development, and (iii) his ability to develop strategies that can realise 
the goal of socialism i. e. the reorganisation of political power so that it expresses 
the power of the working class. There is a discussion of some of the further lines 
of research implied by the theory of bloc imperialism. 
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A Note on Some Key Terms used in the Thesis 
It might be helpful to clarify some terms used in the thesis to avoid 
misunderstanding. I use the term 'political economy' in the classical political 
economy sense to signify the understanding of the structure of the relations that 
exist between state and the economy and their interactions. By strategy I 
understand the plan devised to achieve a specific objective. Strategies are 
specifically related to po I itical -economic analysis. 
2 By 'socialist' I mean a 
political philosophy that seeks to replace capitalist power by that of the working 
class; by 'social democracy' I understand the political philosophy that replaces 
the goal of working class power by the seeking of reforms within capitalism. I 
recognise that these are contested concepts but this is the sense I have used them 
in the text. 
' See: Looker and Coates (1983). 
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Chapter One: Backjzround, Rationale, Research Aims and Hypotheses, Anal3lical 
Framework, Arpument in Brief, Theoretical Approach, Evaluation Criteria, 
Methodology and Sources. 
In this introductory chapter I set out the background to the thesis outlining briefly 
some of the political problems, particularly for 'left ý3 political thinkers, which are 
associated with developments in global capitalism. Next, the reasons for choosing 
Stuart Holland as a focus for the examination of these issues are elaborated. A 
brief review of literatures relating to social democracy and international political 
economy along with an outline and clarification of my theoretical approach to the 
topic, which is Marxism, is made to provide a context of the basis of this critique. 
The research aims, hypothesis, analytical framework and a brief outline of the 
argument made in the thesis are then explained. Following that, the methodology, 
sources and the evaluative criteria are discussed. 
1.1 Background 
The changes in global capitalism over the last fifty years with the scientific and 
technological changes, the changes in transport, the steady liberalization of trade, 
investment and finance across the globe, the rise of the multinational firm, the 
growth of international organisations, regimes and regional blocs, the increased 
networks within which national governments work, the spread of commercial 
culture, and global communications have bedazzled the humble bystander 
3 The terrn 'left' is an ambiguous term. It is a 'catch-all' term used to describe very different 
political parties on the left of the political spectrum under capitalism. In this thesis I will use it as 
a broad term to refer to those who seek to advance political and economic refon-n under 
capitalism and those who wish to advance to socialism beyond capitalism. 
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(Berger 2000; Held 2000, introduction; McGrew 2000; Cox 1997). He or she is 
not alone. Academics from a wide range of disciplines have disputed and debated 
its origins, nature and consequences (Held, McGrew et al 1999; Hirst 1999; 
Berger 2000; Rupert and Smith 2002). Within politics, the various interpretations 
of these changes have resulted in questions being raised about the viability of 
existing political strategies across the political spectrum. Questions have been 
raised about the nation-states capacity to both manage its own economy and the 
consequent political issues that arise from that (Berger 2000; Paul 2003; Held 
1988; Hirst 1999). A wide variety of strategies have been advanced to address the 
various political and economic problems that have arisen in the new politico- 
economic context e. g. progressive nationalism (Bienefeld 1994), supranational 
federalism (Haesler 2004), cosmopolitan democracy (Held 2002: Sakamoto 
1995) and global Keynesianism (Kohler 1999; Holland 1994b). 
It can be argued that left-wing political academics and strategists have been in 
deep debate over the powers of the state, for a long time, in the contemporary 
age. The relevance and feasibility of strategies focused at various levels, either 
national, European or global, have been proposed and debated for the last forty or 
fifty years (e. g. Mandel 1970; Rowthom 1971; Murray 1975; Radice 1975; 
Coates 1980; Cox 1987; Held 1988; Held and McGrew 1993; Panitch 1994; 
Cerny 1996; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Garrett 1998; Luard 1990; Burnham 
1997; Martell 2001; Strange 2002a; Beitel, 2005). Some left political strategists 
have asserted that due to economic developments globally, especially in the fields 
of trade, production and finance, the premises of building a left political strategy 
on the basis of the nation-state have been undermined by the structural 
- 16- 
constraints imposed by international capitalism; others have disagreed (Coates 
1980; Radice 1984; Garrett 1998; Garrett and Lange 1991). Some have argued 
from the same assumption, of the nation-state's insufficient resources to meet 
powerful, global economic forces, that the new arena of political strategy should 
be regional, e. g. Europe, specifically the European Union, again there have been 
there who have disagreed (Bieler and Morton 2001; Van Apeldoorn 2001; Hettne 
1995; Coates 1986; Palmer 1986; Strange 2006; Thompson 2002; Ladrech 2000). 
1.2 Rationale: The significance of this thesis: Stuart Holland - Left Social 
Democratic Political Economies and Strategies and the Changes within Global 
Capitalism 
This returns us to Stuart Holland. Donald Sassoon has pointed out how Holland 
was 4supremely aware of globalism and interdependence' in his writings 
(Sassoon 1997, p. 703). The relevance of Holland is that he sought to 
comprehend the changes in capitalism and their implications for strategy within a 
theoretical framework which embraced a variety of intellectual sources and ideas 
(including Marxism) and which is traditionally described as 'left social 
democratic' (Tsakalotos 1991, Chap. 1). Holland constructed strategies for left 
social -democracy in the post-"embedded liberal" era 
4 and recommend state- 
managed competition in the new global capitalism (Wickham-Jones 1996, pp. 54- 
58). He can be regarded as an influential left social -democratic theorist 
5 in a 
period of transition for social democracy (Wickham-Jones 1996, p. 58; 
Featherstone 1988, p. 65, Callaghan 2000, p. I 10; Callaghan 2003a; Callaghan 
4 'Embedded liberalism' essentially was the welfare state combined with elements of market 
capitalism and restricted trade and capital movements with other nations. See: Ruggie (1982). 
5 His influence can be viewed in the Appendix on Stuart Holland. 
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6 2003b; Perry Anderson 1994, pp. 1-22). He proposed national and regional 
Keynesian and state capitalist strategies. Eventually he was to dismiss the nation- 
state as no longer having the capacity to deal with the global markets and capital 
and called for a po I itical -economic strategy based on the European Union 
(Holland 1992a, 1993a). He proposed 'socialist' or state capitalist projects with 
the intention of managing capitalism and promoting economic growth. He wrote 
of the 'socialist' transformation of capitalism and 'socialist planning and 
workers' control' (Holland 1976a; chap 6 and chap. 10); he maintained he gave a 
ýclass analysis of European integration' (Holland 1980, chap. 5). Reviewers of 
Holland's work in the 1970s regarded Holland as a central thinker within the 
'left' (Skidelsky 1976a; Ryan 1975; See also Appendix A). 
So Holland, through his writings which claimed to be from a left social 
democratic or 'socialist' perspective, provides a convenient opportunity to enter 
into a debate with a representative of left social democracy about how to analyse 
the changes in global capitalism and to discuss the political strategies open to the 
left. Moreover, through his works on Europe he provided the chance to engage in 
the class analysis of why such events are occurring in the contemporary European 
political economy. Thus the framework of ideas that he develops to interpret the 
phenomenon is intriguing: how did this representative of social democracy 
interpret the changes and why? What were the emphases he placed on the 
changes? Why were some elements of capitalism chosen for highlighting and 
analysis rather than others? These were the things that interested the author. 
6 Holland's positioning within 'left social democracy' is open to debate (See: Wickham Jones 
2004); however, he has been regarded by many as in this tendency (see above) and that is the 
assumption of this thesis. He can be regarded as changing position over time. See Appendix A. 
- 18- 
His analysis was complemented with strategies which are directly related to the 
strategies the left is currently engaged in debating (e. g. European v national 
strategies, see: Strange and Worth 2007). Holland, therefore, is a thinker worth 
study when embarking on a Marxist critique of contemporary left social- 
democratic theories of political -economic change. 
Holland was an academic, politician, journalist and civil servant. Active in the 
Labour Party since his early 20s, he came to prominence as the theorist behind 
Labour's radical programme in 1973 (Wickham-Jones 1996, Chap. 3; Hatfield 
1978). His subsequent writings have been widely-read in the labour movement 
and he is well-known, in Britain and abroad, for his views (Wickham-Jones 1996; 
Hatfield 1978; Holland 1979d, 1983,1993a; Strange 2006). He was an adviser to 
Harold Wilson in the 1960s; was an architect of the Alternative Economic 
Strategy of the Labour Party in the 1970s, and was elected a member of 
parliament in 1979 and served there until 1989 when he was summoned by 
Jacques Delors, then EC President, to assist as an adviser on economic and social 
cohesion in the European Union. He wrote, or edited, at least ten major books 
which applied his theoretical ideas to problems at the national, regional 
(European) and global (development) levels. Alongside these there are numerous 
journal and newspaper articles which popularised and reiterated the material he 
wrote in his books. 7 Overall, these works set out Holland's interpretations of, and 
strategic responses to, the dramatic and rapid changes to capitalism in the last few 
decades of the twentieth century. The central focus of this thesis will be on the 
critique of central ideas in these works. 
For more details see Appendix A. 
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Holland developed over a thirty year period three left social -democratic strategies 
based on his theories of state capitalism relevant to the areas that I wish to 
address and which may be considered in some ways forerunners of social- 
democratic debates today on national policy and European policy in the context 
of global capitalism (e. g. Hirst 1999; Clift 2005; Baimbridge, Whyman and 
Burkitt 2007; Strange and Worth 2007). The three strategies were: 
(i) A national strategy to further economic and political reform in Britain; 
(ii) A European multilateral strategy to further economic and political reform in 
Europe; 
(iii) A European regional strategy to further economic and political reform in the 
Europe Union. 
His national and European strategies outlined his routes to 'socialism' and 
democracy in advanced capitalist countries. 
1.3 Literature Review 
Stuart Holland's work covered a vast range of topics and disciplines; as no one 
particular topic merits focus over others what is presented here is a short review 
of some relevant literatures. 
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1.3.1 Social Democracy 
The 'Golden Age of Social Democracy' (1945-1960S)8 was highlighted by the 
social -democratic belief that capitalism could be successfully managed. This 
perspective reached its apogee in the Bad Godesberg Programme of the West 
German Social Democratic Party in 1959. In the early 1960s growing difficulties 
within international capitalism and developments such as multinational 
companies NINCs) began to lead to questioning of this hubristic outlook 
(Callaghan 2000, pp. 16-20). 
The 1960s onwards marked an intensification of the questioning of mainstream 
social democratic tenets of Keynesianism by more radical elements in social- 
democratic parties. This was the beginning of the period of transition in 
ideological outlook within social democracy and the elaboration of a variety of 
radical social -democratic projects. Stuart Holland's writings manifest one 
trajectory in social democratic political thought and strategy which incorporated a 
number of different radical projects. This thesis outlines and critiques those 
projects from the standpoint of Marxism. 
Two aspects of social democracy are of particular concern to us in this thesis: the 
first is the social-democratic conception of the state and the second is the spatial 
dimension of the strategy in the changing global political economy. As will be 
discussed in later chapters these two aspects are related. 




By 'conceptions of the state' is meant assumptions regarding the political nature 
of the state and its relationship to, and potential to transform capitalism (Jessop 
1982; Barrow 1993; Camoy 1984; Burnham 2008; Wood 1983; Coates 1980; 
1981 and 1982; Thompson 2002). Secondly, 'the spatial dimension of strategy) 
refers to the assumption (and the questioning of it) that the spatial arena of 
strategy is the nation state. The type of question considered here is: is the nation- 
state an appropriate vehicle for progressive and socialist policies? (Radice 1984; 
Glotz 1985; Luard 1990; Garrett and Lange 1991; Geyer 1993; Shaw 2000; 
Martell et al 2001; Thompson 2002; Smith 2003; Strange 2006; Capital and Class 
2007). 
Historically, social democracy has developed within two trends: reformism and 
revisionism (Tsakalotos 1991; Coates 1983). 9 What has united the two trends has 
been a commitment to the central political strategical path of utilising capitalist 
parliamentary democracy to introduce change. Behind this commitment has been 
a common shared assumPtion about the neutrality or "autonomy" of the 
bourgeois state and its potential (seen as limitless) to introduce a socialist 
political and economic system (Coates 1975, pp. 141-147; Jones and Keating 
1985, p. 3; Pierson 1986, chap. 3; Tsakalotos 1991, chap. 1; Burnham 2008, pp. 
62-3). However beyond that there have been significant differences over political 
and economic strategy. 
9 The use of these terms is "highly ambiguous and deeply controversial" (Tsakalotos 1991, p. 6). 
An alternative terminology has been utilised by Martell (2001, p. 206) and McGowan (2001, p. 
92ff. ): they prefer the terms 'compensatory' (roughly the equivalent of revisionism) and 
4 countervailing' (roughly the equivalent of refon-nism). 
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In terms of political strategy, Revisionism, or right wing social democracy. 
accepted capitalism alongside parliamentary democracy and sought to extend 
social and economic reform parallel to democratic reform. Within its view,, 
ameliorating capitalism and its consequences for the working class became it 
foremost concern. Left social democracy, or reformism, held that fundamental 
reforms (sometimes known as 'revolutionary reforms' (Holland, 1976a, pp. 
154ff. ) of the political process were possible which could enhance the democratic 
nature of the capitalist state and eventually transform it into a socialist state. 
Primary, amongst it aims, was the increased power of parliaments or assemblies 
over the executive. Little attention was paid to other elements of the state such as 
the police, army and judiciary. 
In terms of economic strategy, revisionism has tended to operate within economic 
orthodoxies after World War II, either Keynesianism or monetarism (Tsakalotos 
199 1, p. 8ff.; Callaghan 1990, chap. 12 and 2000, chap. 1; Wickham Jones 1996, 
chap. 2). The strategy promoted is capitalist economic stability combined with 
elements of redistribution, welfare and social reforms and when possible full 
employment. It has not sought to change property relations to any great degree 
and has preferred indirect methods of guiding the economy. Reformism has 
preferred to stress the "structural properties" of the existing economic system 
which has informed its analysis of what changes need to be made to the economic 
system to enable the attainment of socialist goals (Tsakalotos 1991, p. 26). This 
has usually entailed attacks on the maldistribution of resources and power within 
capitalism which inhibit the operations of the market and inhibit policies of 
equity and redistribution. The state plays a critical role in reformist economic 
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strategies as it is considered to be the power which can counterbalance the 
awesome powers of private capital. 
1.3.2 International Political Economy 
The academic discipline within which we make our evaluation of Holland's ideas 
is International Political Economy (IPE), particularly Marxist and critical IPE 
which I term radical international political economy. ' 0 IPE was selected as the 
framework within which to evaluate Holland's ideas due to its focus on the world 
economy and the role of political and economic institutions. However, IPE is 
dependent on the cognate fields of International Relations, Comparative Political 
Economy, Economics and Sociology' I to supply relevant and associated material 
for its analysis; this thesis too will have to refer, at times, to material and research 
outside of the field of IPE. 
Thus IPE is not a unified discipline, and different approaches have different 
conceptions of, and the methods used to understand, what should be its subject 
matter (See Higgott 1994; Murphy and Tooze, 1991; Strange 1994; Hettne 1995). 
Some have held the basic unit of analysis to be the state; others have held the 
basic unit of analysis to be the individual in the market place; yet others have 
held it to be production and class (Gill and Law, 1988, p. 7). It is a field of study 
which has undergone a relatively recent revival (Cohen and Lipson, 1999, p. 1; 
Gill and Law 1988, p. HE). Mainstream IPE is a product of both international 
10 By 'critical IPE' I refer to those perspectives in the discipline which are linked with Gramsci 
and Marxism. See: below and Underhill (2000); Hettne (1995). 
" On this see Gilpin (1987); Underhill (2000). 
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relations and neoclassical international economics 12 and rests on "two 
foundational assumptions" as to the nature of its politics and economics: 
1. The world economy is witnessing the mutually beneficial integration of 
national markets; 
2. World politics is intrinsically state-centric and anarchical. 
There are, in other words, two contradictory processes at work: integration in 
economic terms and conflictual (or disintegrative) in political terms. This tension 
is expressed in the state versus market framework of mainstream IPE (Langley 
2000, p. 463; see also Underhill 2000, p. 818; Burnham 1995b). In this 
perspective the state and market each have their own separate rules and their own 
logics (Gilpin 1987, p. 26-27). This tension can lead states into two paths: either 
(a) economic and political competition and international conflict; or (b) attempts 
to manage the anarchy in the world of states through institutions, negotiation and 
bargaining. These two paths are captured in the two dominant approaches of 
mainstream IPE: realism and neoliberal institutionalism. 
Realism or neo-realism' 3, whilst recognizing actors apart from states (Hettne 
1995, p. 9), prioritises the political over the economic, it recognises "the central 
role of the state, security, and power in international affairs" (Gilpin 2001, p. 15). 
Realism is eclectic in the choice of subject matter upon which it can draw and in 
methods. In other words it will use a combination of rationalist individualist 
methodology in economic affairs alongside institutionalist explanations in 
12 IPE's origins are debated: see Underhill (2000). 
13 Gilpin (2001), p. 16: Gilpin makes the distinction between state-centric and system-centric 
realism. These differences are not material here. 
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political affairs (Gilpin 2001, p. 31 and p. 41ff. ). It has, therefore. no 
comprehensive theory through which to explain social phenomena. In its 
methodology, realism prioritises politics generally, and specifically the role of the 
state. 
Neoliberal institutionalism holds that market economies are best left to freely 
operate and that if they do welfare will be maximized and increasing economic 
exchange will result. However, just as domestic economies require basic rules 
and regulations to prevent market abuse so does the international economy. 
Governments can overcome the anarchy of international relations by establishing 
international rules and regulations, referred to in the literature as "international 
regimes" to enable the smooth operation of the global economy and to prevent 
undue harmful economic manipulation by any state participant (Frieden and 
Lake, 1995, p. 11). Management of the economy can enable the increasing 
peaceful economic cooperation of states. Thus states are just one actor in the 
international political economy: they act alongside intemational institutions, and 
transnational economic forces in furthering deepening economic exchange and 
interdependence (Keohane, 1989, pp. 7-9). 
A more recent strand of IPE has been that of constructivism. Tonstructivism' is 
a term used by mainstream exponents of IPE to cover a broad range of 
perspectives ranging from the neo-Weberian to the neo-Gramscian. It is under 
this rubric that critical IPE is frequently situated (Gilpin 2001, p. 19). This 
perspective, often reliant on sociological approaches, stresses the role of ideas, 
social structures and human agency in the ýsocial construction' of reality. The 
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role of ideas, social structures and human agency Is important in political affairs. 
Writers, such as Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie emphasise the importance 
of "intersubjective meanings" of international institutional activity. In their view. 
it as important to understand how "people think about institutional norms and 
rules, and the discourse they engage in evaluating the significance of norms as 
measuring the behaviour that changes in response to their invocation" (Keohane, 
1989, pp. 160-161). However, as is explained below, the question of the 
relationship of ideas to the material world must be asked and the answer depends 
on oneýs perspective. The position of this author is that if we are to hold 
consistent materialist beliefs on ideas then we must search for their origins in the 
material social/political context of their development. It is this context which 
ultimately governs their development. 14 
IPE, originally an American discipline, has had an odd relationship with 
Marxism. Murphy and Tooze have explained this relationship of 
'misunderstanding' as the result of the exclusive commitment to the 
methodological individualist outlook of much of mainstream or 'orthodox' IPE 
(as they term it) which denies the validity of heterodox 'contextually bound 
explanations as well as explanations in terms of concrete wholes' (Murphy and 
Tooze, 1991, p. 19). This commitment leads in turn to the inability to distinguish 
different positions among the many radical, nonorthodox positions. 
In the 1970s, in many IPE texts, Marxism was associated with world systems 
theory and used to highlight the relationship between the advanced capitalist 
" Marx and Engels develop this position in their key text 'The German Ideology' (1976) 
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countries and the 'Third World' rather than the relations between advanced 
capitalist states. In the 1980s it became associated with the 'new' historical 
materialism and the formation of transnational blocs around neoliberalism. In the 
1990s, for some, Marxism had disappeared altogether as a relevant perspective 
(Gilpin 2001); along with imperialism (Becker and Sklar 1987). In the first 
decade of this century it has regained some prominence with the discussion of the 
theory of imperialism. 15 It has never gained the recognition, from many 
exponents of the discipline, as a theory which can be applied to all elements and 
aspects of the global political economy. As Hazel Smith has pointed out, in her 
observation of Marxism within International Relations, it has been regarded as 'at 
the margins' (Smith 1994, p. 144). 
Over the past forty years, or so, these perspectives have tended to have as the 
centre of their attention the growing awareness of the interdependence and 
integration of the international economy (Underhill, 2000). This thesis, in some 
ways, challenges that focus, arguing that the world economy is not only made up 
of the forces of interdependence and integration but also of the tendency towards 
conflict and disintegration. Imperialism displays centripetal and centrifugal 
characteristics (Carchedi 2001; Cypher 1992; Nabudere 1977; Mandel 1985). 
Also, the state plays a more crucial role in my analysis of the world economy 
than it does it many of those conducted in IPE. 16 Very often, it is International 
15 In the 1990s the concept was maintained by a few e. g. Chilcote (2000), Callinicos et al (1994). 
For the revival in the new millennium see: Mark Rupert and Hazel Smith eds. (2002) and Albo 
(2004). Also articles in Historical Materialism (2006) and Review of Radical Political Economics 
3 8, p. 1, Winter, 2006; the article by Barrow (2005) and the book by Petras and Veltmeyer (200 1). 
16 From a brief discussion of the understanding of the state's role in IPE, see Underhill (2000, p. 
820-4). 
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Relations which can capture the political, conflictual role of capitalist state's 
rivalries more than IPE. 
17 
This thesis takes some of the enquiries and research studies made in IPE, along 
with their values, and reutilises them within a Marxist theoretical approach to aid 
in the analysis of Stuart Holland's theories. These studies have been made on the 
basis of various outlooks and no necessary preference will be given to Marxist 
approaches. This thesis has made no new empirical studies; it relies on theoretical 
and empirical studies already made within IPE, especially critical IPE, and other 
areas to comment upon Holland's arguments and assertions. 
Where IPE has no comment to make on Holland's ideas I have had to refer to 
studies in other fields. So. for instance, in examining Holland's ideas on Europe I 
have had to refer to European studies; to examine his ideas on the state I have had 
to resort to political theory and to examine his ideas on monopoly and monopoly 
capitalism I have had to refer to economics 
Marxism is the theoretical standpoint chosen from which to criticise and evaluate 
Holland's thinking on the strategies indicated above. 18 The reason for the 
adoption of this standpoint is: contrary to liberalism, realism, or constructivism 
within the discipline of international political economy Marxism offers an 
17 One view of the challenge to the state's role in IPE can be found in Susan Strange (1996). An 
example of the state and its conflictual role in Realism: see Gilpin (2001) and in International 
Relations can be found in John J. Mearsheimer (2002). 
18 For a discussion on the relevance of Marxism to contemporary international relations and 




historical materialist understanding of contemporary capitalism. 19 As Rupert and 
Smith point out Marxism is a 'rich, complex and contradictory' tradition and 
there are many understandings of Marxist theory. Therefore it is necessary that 
the approach to the theory taken in this thesis be explained to avoid confusion 
(Rupert and Smith 2002, p. 12). 
'Historical materialist' is taken to mean the understanding of the phenomena of 
our age within a framework of the development of production and its property 
relations within a global context (Burnham 1995). These property relations 
arising out of the production and reproduction of life form the bedrock of the 
class relations which underpin the emergence, development and dominance of 
institutions and ideas in society and the challenges to them. Thus the Marxist 
method for the understanding of the political and ideological struggles in the 
contemporary era seeks to understand those ideas within a historical, class 
context. 20 It makes no a priori assumptions about the actions, ideas, motivations 
or expectations that individuals or collectivities have or must acquire other than 
that they must produce and reproduce their social conditions of life first and 
foremost. It seeks to discover an understanding about the behaviour and ideas 
that individuals and collectivists hold through historical enquiry within a 
materialist framework and builds theories about economic processes, political 
systems, ideological outlooks and international relations based upon that enquiry 
(Rupert and Smith 2002, pp. 1- 13). 
19 There has been a recent revival of interest in historical materialism within IPE. See the 
collection of articles in Rupert and Smith (2002). 
20 This is the method adopted in this thesis. Class analysis is applied in an historical context. See 
methodology section. 
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Likewise Marxism seeks to understand the institutions that give structure to 
political and economic life within the context of class analysis. Contrary to much 
globalisation theory Marxism does not perceives capitalist structures as 
homogeneous and integrative. Capitalist political, economic and social structures 
are dynamic not static, fractured and not uniform, both integrative and 
disintegrative, and combine stability with conflict; this drives the dynamic for 
social, political, economic and ideological change. It is this material conflict 
which generates the battle of ideas. As structures are dynamically divided and 
conflict-ridden a result is that ideas give expression to the different interests of 
these social and economic divisions. The dynamic social structural process 
produces different agencies; and varied agencies are generated by social 
structural division. Of course, capitalist institutions and policies are fonned to try 
to give stability to the system and to seek to integrate them around various 
banners; foremost among these is the state. But all institutions arise, become 
dominant, change and decline over time. The problem is to explain this change. 
Marxism provides a materialist analysis for understanding this change. 21 Rather 
than limiting the analysis of change to the influence of ideas alone it seeks to 
explain the dynamic behind the change of ideas which influence institutions. To 
do this it must investigate the material, i. e. the social class context, in which those 
institutions and ideas arise. Historical materialism is the method used by Marxists 
to unveil that dynamic and consequently throw light on institutional change. To 
be clear here, I do not understand 'class' as only applying to economic relations. 
Social class is founded upon socio-econornic relations but it influences spheres of 
21 On this I disagree with P. G. Cerny's (1990) assertion that within Marxism there is a failure to 
explain conceptually how structures (specifically state structures) themselves 'originate, change, 
work, and reproduce themselves (p. 15). ' In contrast see Burnham (1995). 
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life beyond those relations. In other words, class affects approaches to politics. 
society and institutions. Class is based on structural social relations but each class 
forms its own culture and identity which is expressed in politics, parties, etc. It is 
the object of historical materialism to try to illuminate those relationships and to 
penetrate the curtain of ideas to reveal the social class influence at work behind 
the scenes. 
Thus Marxism provides a guide to a materialist (in the epistemological sense) 
understanding of the world in which we live. It can provide no substitute for the 
historical study for those relations as they develop. In turn those social relations 
which form the objects of Marxist study must be kept under constant scrutiny to 
avoid lapsing into dogmatic adherence to notions no longer sustainable by those 
relations. 
This outlook sets Marxism out from other perspectives within IPE. Whereas 
realism might start with the state as a first principle of understanding and then 
proceed with its analysis of the global political economy from that position 
Marxism would first seek to establish how that state arose and way it took the 
specific form it did in the context of social relations of production (Burnham 
1995; Clarke 1977; Holloway and Picciotto 1977). Likewise, liberalism might 
proceed from the position that the state obstructs, and the market frees, the 
economic potentialities of peoples and individuals and upon that premise analyse 
the workings of the global political economy as the conflict between state and 
markets whereas Marxism would seek to develop an historical materialist of the 
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relationship of the one to the other in the processes of economic and social 
reproduction. 
Lastly constructivism, which focuses on ideas as the centrepiece of its analysis 
would lapse into idealism (in the philosophical sense) from the Marxist point of 
view if it did not then go on to analyse the development of those ideas within the 
historical struggles which result from the conflict of classes in the reproduction of 
social relations. Thus Marxism has been chosen over other perspectives in IPE 
due to its historical materialist understanding which in turn makes it a reflexive 
philosophy. In other words, it can understand the origins of its own development 
and rejects the adoption of some abstract principle upon which to frame its 
analysis of the global political economy other than the fundamental premise that 
all human beings must enter into social relations to produce and reproduce their 
existence before they can do anything else and this in turn makes them subject, 
no matter what they think, to the necessity of this process. 
This perspective on historical materialism will be readily distinguished by some 
from that of the 'new' historical materialism presented by some writers. The new 
historical materialism associated with the neo-Gramscians has been considered 
by some as a close relative of constructivism. This is due to the fact that whilst it 
recognises class struggles as a motor of political developments it rejects both the 
laws of capitalist accumulation and the materialist conception of the origin of 
ideas (Bieler and Morton 2003). Ideational and institutional development is 
conceived as operating within their own dynamic and not subject to the material 
contexts to which they operate, thus ideas become the building frameworks for 
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social blocs and the inspirers of social movements (See Gill and Law 1988. p. 
64). Whilst recognising the importance of ideas in motivating humans in their 
social movements; the dominance of certain ideas over others, the selection of 
ideas from a range of ideas, and the origins of ideas need to be explained 
somehow. This is where both constructivism and neo-Gramscianism are weak; 
i. e. relating ideas to the social context in which they are generated, and which 
structures their development. 
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1.4 Research Aims 
The overarching research aim of this thesis is to submit Holland's theories of 
capitalism which were expressed in his political economies and strategies to a 
critique from a consistent Marxist analysis. Holland maintained in his earlier 
writings that he was arguing for socialism. He was a left social democrat. He was 
a member of the New Left (Wickham-Jones 2004). He used, occasionally, 
Marxist terminology and utilised concepts that had Marxist connotations. He, at 
times, held identical opinions and views with those who considered themselves 
Marxist (e. g. Barratt Brown). He has been considered as a Marxist interpreter of 
European integration both by Rosamond (2000) and Moschonas (1996). So an 
essential starting point of the thesis was to make some judgement as to what 
degree his understanding of global capitalism and his consequent strategies were 
consistent, or at odds, with Marxist principles of analysis, or more plainly, with 
22 Expanded treatment of there arguments can be found in Wood (1986). 
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the theories of historical materialism, as these were the basis of the critical 
standpoint. In particular, from the Marxist standpoint, two questions were asked: 
(a In w at ways did Holland's theories of the changes in the political economy 
of capitalism, specifically, in relation to the British political economy and the 
European political economy, differ from a Marxist analysis (Holland 1976a, 
1980,1983 and 1993a)? 
(b) Related to the above, to what degree are the various strategies he promotes a 
break with capitalism? 
This generated a large number of hypotheses regarding Holland's political 
economy. The principal hypotheses of the thesis are surnmarised below. The first 
and foremost task was to establish an understanding of the principles and the 
theoretical underpinnings of Holland's analyses, this led to: 
Hypothesis (i): that the central theoretical propositions and arguments of Holland 
on monopoly capitalism and the state originated in non-Marxist and non-class 
perspectives. 
This first hypothesis had subsequent effects on related hypotheses and 
corollaries. The four principal hypotheses and corollaries are presented below. 
23 
It is from these principal hypotheses that the subsequent divergent analyses 
between myself and Holland follow: 
23 It is necessary to provide both the author's hypotheses and Holland's in order to illustrate the 
critique. 
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In relation to monopoly capitalism: 
Holland's Hypothesis (ii): Holland maintains that the driving forces within the 
system derive from the maldistribution of resources based on institutional factors. 
Author's Hypothesis (ii): the primary driving force within capitalism and the 
central cause of its problems is the accumulation of capital through the 
exploitation of labour which is inherent to the system and structures its political 
and economic relations. 
In relation to the state: 
Holland's Hypothesis (iii): Holland's proposition is that the state is a neutral 
state. 
Author's Hypothesis (iii): that the state is an expression of class relations, the 
primary feature of which are imperialist class relations. 
In relation to reform of capitalism, the above proposition on the state entails: 
Holland's Corollary (i) of H (iii): there are no limits on the powers of the state in 
relation to monopoly capitalism. It is possible to manage the multinational system 
of capitalism and to curb the power of the multinationals and thus introduce 
political and economic reforms which will subordinate the capitalist system to 
social rather than profit criteria. 
Author's Corollary (i) of H (iii): that the state is limited in what it can achieve in 
relation to reforming monopoly capitalism. 
In relation to the character of global capitalism: 
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Holland's Hypothesis (iv): Capitalism has entered what he describes as a ýnexv 
mode of production' namely, the multinational stage of production. Capitalism's 
character is one of rivalries between either multinational monopolies or between 
mu tinat onal monopolies and nation states. 
Author's Hypothesis (iv). - Global capitalism's character is that of a system 
structured by inter-imperialist state rivalries. 
In relation to the relationship between states and NINCs: 
Holland's Corollary (i) of H(iv): The state and MNC are independent variables. 
The state is ambivalent on NINC interests. 
Author's Corollary (i) of H(iv): the relationship between states and NINCs is one 
of unity and contradiction. The MNC requires a state but also operates beyond it. 
The imperialist state expresses MNC class interests. 
These hypotheses set out the increasing divergent paths of analysis of both global 
capitalism and the suitable strategies for socialism. It is these divergent paths that 
form the content of this thesis and inform its conclusions. 
1.5 The Argument in Brief 
Holland, sometimes, utilised Marxist and socialist influences for both his theories 
of political economy and strategies. However, it is demonstrated that he did not 
apply classical Marxism propositions of economic and political analysis in his 
theories consistently (e. g. labour exploitation, surplus value, class struggle). The 
result is that Holland is eclectic or pluralist in his analytical theories, and 
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inconsistent in his analyses. Its repercussions are that he fails to engage with a 
consistent class approach to the state, to monopoly capitalism, to the British 
political economy or to the European political economy. One of the major flaws 
in his perspective is that capitalism has entered a 'new mode of production' in 
which the struggle of multinationals against states predominates. Instead of 
viewing them as an integrated whole, a contradictory unity, he perceives them as 
two independent forces. This position leads him to reject the alternative 
perspective of capitalism as a system of inter- imperial i st rivalries. His under- 
theorisation of the state within monopoly capitalism results in an over-estimation 
of its capacities in relation to the system. Out of the totality of the capitalist 
system, in his earlier theory he selectively identifies MNCs as the central obstacle 
in the way of states managing capitalism. This results in him advocating a 
strengthening of the capitalist state so that it can be used against MNCs. He 
visualises it too as an instrument in the 'transformation' of monopoly capitalism. 
Holland develops his political economies and strategies in three phases: which I 
term the national, the 'European multilateral or international' and the 'European 
regional'. Each of these is criticised in turn in the thesis. At first, Holland 
considers that national measures of state capitalism can manage the 
6multinational threat'. However, after reverses for such measures Holland seeks 
new political arenas for his policies. 24 This stance leads him to develop political 
economies and strategies that seek to establish the possibilities of a 
I supranational' strategy. Holland's final political destination is support for 
24 The failure of the Labour to be elected in 1979; the failure of the Mitterrand government in 
France to implement the 'Common Programme' in the early 1980s. 
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building the European Union as political conununity with the resources to 
manage capitalism. 
The central element of the critique is that Holland, as a thinker who declared his 
goal 'socialism', neglects a Marxist class analysis of monopoly capitalism and 
the state which has serious analytical and political consequences. Prime amongst 
these is the failure to recognise the capitalist system as imperialist. It is argued, 
contrary to Holland, that the capitalist state is locked into the social relations of 
imperialism through national and global production and market relations. This 
class basis of the state means that it is limited in relation to what it can do in 
reforming capitalism. It is argued that Holland's state capitalist policies far from 
being a means towards socialism are in fact, a means of supporting imperialism. 
Holland's analysis of the processes at work in the political economies of Britain 
and Europe is also flawed. Holland interprets the conflicts of the European 
integration process as emerging out of either multinational monopolies' conflict 
with states and their influence over the supranational authority (the European 
Commission) or the failings of institutional relations, rather then emerging out of 
the conflicts generated by the capitalist accumulation process and the capitalist 
rivalries it spawns. Lastly, in his analysis of the European Union Holland 
misconceives it as an instrument for progressive economic policies in place of the 
nation state and does not recognise the EU as a new form of imperialism, namely, 
bloc imperialism. In his final Political-economic analysis he dismisses the nation- 
state as an arena for the struggle for socialism. 
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1.6 The Analytical Framework 
Table I (below) presents the analytical framework of the thesis. The framework 
is divided into two main sections horizontally. Section A presents the analysis of 
Holland's strategy by dimension or variable. Section B represents the critique 
organised by dimension. It will be noted in Section B, that I use a separate 
dimension for imperialism: in order to criticise Holland I have to integrate 
various theories of imperialism (i. e. national imperialism, emergent bloc 
imperialism, bloc imperialism). This, as far as the author is aware, is an original 
aspect of this thesis. 
The framework is divided into three main columns; each column represents a 
separate phase in Holland's respective political economy and strategy. Column I 
represents Holland's political economy and national strategy of the mid-1970s. 
Column 2 represents the political economy and European multilateral strategy of 
the early 1980s. Column 3 represents the political economy and European 
regional strategy of the early 1990s. Section A of the framework is divided by 
row into eight dimensions. The first row outlines Holland's principal theoretical 
approaches. The second row is the main texts I use to summarise Holland's 
political economies and strategies. The third presents the principal context of 
Holland's writings. The fourth row represents the major obstacles to his policies 
identified by Holland. The fifth row represents the central focus of Holland's 
political-economic analysis at each stage in his theory. The sixth row is the 
strategy objectives. The seventh row represents the key economic policies of his 
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Table 1: Framework of Analysis of Holland's Political Economy ad Strategies 
Column I Column 2 Column 3 
Chap. 3: Political Economy i-nd-Z-hap. 4* Political Economy and Chap. 5: Political Economy and 
National strategy European Multilateral Strategy European Regional Strategy - Mid 1970s Early 1980s Early 1990s 
Key elements of Chap. 2: Elements of Marxism and Neo-institutionalism ; Pluralist methodologies and theories the Relationship 
Holland's theoretical between monopoly capitalism and the state 
framework 
Major texts 
Principal Context of 
Writings 
Principal Obstacles to 






Strategy (i): Key 
Policies: Economic 
Strategy (i i): Key 
Policies: Political 
Socialist Challenge 1975 
Crisis of Keynesian Social 
1. New mode of production: 
MNC threat to Macroeconomic 
Policies. 
2. Elements of the state 
(i) British monopoly capitalism 
(ii) Nature of British political 
institutions 
Progressive reform of nation- 
state or 'socialism' 
1. New Public Enterprises 
2. Planning Agreements. 
3. National progressive 
competitiveness 
4. Managing MNCs 
1. Reform of Parliament 
2. Role of Labour Party 
Uncommon Market 1980; Out of 
Crisis 1983 
EC Supranationalism & Crisis of 
national social dernocracv 
1. EC as a supranational institution 
2. N4NCs 
1. Nature of European integration 
process 
2. Supranational -National conflict 
3. EC neoliberal policies 
Progressive reform of EC and 
Multilateral Coordination for 
economic arowth 
1. Reflation, Restructuring, 
Redistribution Policies. 
2. Co-ordinated international 
progressive competitiveness 
3. Managing international capitalist 
European Imperative 
1993 
Crisis of Unilateral and 
Multilateral social dernocracv 
I- Global competition and global 
market forces 
2. Disunity of European Union 
1. Character of EU Political 
Economy 
2. EU institutions. 
3. EU and competition. 
4. Issue of best model for EU 
Progressive reform of EU; 
economic and social cohesion of 
EU 
1. Cohesion policies 
2. European progressive 
competitiveness; flexibility 
3. EMU 
4. Managing European capitalism 
Key elements of 
author's theoretical 
framework 
Key Issues identified 
by thesis author 
Central issue: state 
power and Socialist 
Strategy 
Imperialism: the 
framework used as 
basis of critique of 
Holland 
1. Reform of EC 
2. Coordinated nation state policies. 
1. National state has no power-EU 
does 
2. EU Assemblv: more powers 
Chap. 2: Theoretical premises: Historical materialism: Class analysis: Relationship between imperialism and the 
state 
1. Does State power reside in the 
nation state? 
2. Is a national strategy of managing 
N/fNCs viable and is it socialist? 
3. Problems of conflict between 
profit criteria and social criteria of 
Holland 's proposals 
4. Limits of State capitalism under 
capitalism 
5. N4NCs relation with the state 
1. State power based on nation state 
1. Holland does not acknowledge 
the nature of British imperialism. 
2. Fails to recognise imperialist 
nature of British State 
3. The State and MNCs in unity and 
contradiction 
1. Problems of State power in the 
process of European integration. 
2. Is co-ordinated international 
management of capitalism viable 
and is it socialist? 
3. Problems of co-ordination of 
imperialist powers behind social- 
democratic strategy; 
4. N/fNCs work at two levels: the 
national and the supranational. 
1. Nation state power has to be 
co-ordinated 
1. EC as an amalgam or bloc of 
national imperialist powers 
2. Trend towards both unity and 
rivalry between national 
imperialisms 
3. N/fNCs operate at two levels: 
national; regional. 
1. 'State' power in the EU; 
Holland dismisses nation state 
power. 
2. Management of European 
capitalism viable and is it 
socialist? 
3. Problems of political and social 
cohesion in the new European 
bloc. 
4. Consequences for national 
social democracy 
1. Problems of locus of state 
power. 
1. Bloc theory of imperialism. 
2. EU as a bloc of imperialist 
powers. Contradictions in unity of 
states 
3. Global struggle between blocs 
of imperialist powers. 
strategies. The eighth represents the key political policies Holland advocated in 
each strategy. 
-41 - 
Section B: represents the elements of the critique. This again is divided into three 
columns, each representing the criticisms corresponding to Holland's strategies. 
The section is divided into four rows. The first row represents my theoretical 
premises. The second row represents the key issues identified by myself The 
third row is devoted to the question of where state power is located in the 
respective strategies. The fourth row relates to the concept of imperialism used as 
the basis of the critique of Holland's strategies. So the concept of British 
imperialism informs the first column; the view of Europe as an "emergent bloc 
imperialism" the second column and the representation of the European Union 
(EU) as "bloc imperialism" the third column. 
To criticise Holland's political economy I have had to set out my own thoughts 
on the subject. The premises that I start from, as will become clear in thesis, are 
very different to Holland's. It has been necessary to develop a synthesis of 
current thinking on national, regional and global imperialism in the context of 
nation states, development of international or global organisations, regimes, 
multilateralism and multinational or transnational businesses. 25 The scope of 
such a task is enormous; this thesis is but a small contribution to developing that 
line of research. I criticise Holland from the standpoint that he fails to recognise 
imperialism in the national, regional and global political economies. This point of 
view makes it necessary for me to set out alternative political theories on 
monopoly capitalism and the state, on the imperialist nature of British capitalism, 
on the imperialist nature of the European integration process, and the formation 
25 In this thesis the term 'multinational monopolies' is used. Although imprecise, it is the term 
Holland used and so for the sake of convenience I have had to adopt the same terminology. 
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of a European bloc of imperialist states that has now become the EU. It may seem 
as if I am taking a detour from my subject at times but I am seeking to 
substantiate my critique of Holland based on fundamentally opposite principles. I 
believe this dual method of critique, of analysis and synthesis, of a social- 
democratic thinker, on the basis of emerging bloc imperialism, is unique. This 
method of critique is set out in my framework of analysis (Table 1). 
The table, therefore, summarises the debate between Stuart Holland and myself 
about both how to characterise changes in global capitalism and the strategies 
that derive from that analysis. Thus, for example, in column 1, section B, in the 
row: key issues identified by thesis author I summarise the main points of my 
criticism, these are: the question of whether state power resides in the nation 
state, whether a national strategy of managing MNCs is viable as a socialist 
strategy, the problems of the economic criteria of Holland's proposals and last 
the issue of the limits of state capitalism under capitalism. 
1.7 Evaluation, Methodology and Sources 
This is an evaluative thesis which abstracts Holland's core principles, analyses 
and prescriptions and subjects them to theoretical interrogation and evaluation 
from the standpoint of Marxist theory. The exegesis is essentially based on texts 
that are considered to be the most representative and the foremost expression of 
those ideas. The texts were chosen on the grounds of their comprehensiveness, 
their relevance, and their sustained argument. The exegesis relates the core 
-43- 
analyses and strategies to the historical and political context in which they were 
written and a commentary is made upon them with reference to other studies 
(particularly critical or Marxist where available), both contemporaneous and of a 
later date, which can illuminate and appraise Holland's ideas. This method 
provides both a critique of Holland's ideas and illustrates an alternative 
explanation of the phenomena he interpreted. It highlights the selection of 
premises made in Holland's arguments and their limitations and strengths in 
relation to Marxist theory. 26 
The selection of the material used in the evaluation and drawn primarily from 
IPE is taken from a wide variety of sources and political opinions. The criterion 
of selection has not been how Marxist the writers were or are. Rather they have 
been chosen to help open up questions about Holland's assumptions, propositions 
and theories and so highlight inadequacies and strengths in his analysis. 
The key criteria used to evaluate Holland's ideas will be those of 'understanding, 
explanatory power and intellectual coherence' from the standpoint of Marxism. 27 
These criteria are related to: (i) the understanding of contemporary capitalism and 
its trends and its modes of political interaction; and (2) the strategies of state 
capitalism that are formulated as a result of that analysis. By understanding and 
explanatory power I refer to how well the theories of Holland explain the object 
of their focus compared with those of Marxism. This in turn is related to 
intellectual coherence: to what degree do Holland's assumptions and arguments 
26 The problem of using texts as sources has been pointed out by Burnham et al (2004), Chap. 7. 
27 Gill and Law (1988, P. 19). 
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remain consistent not only within his own analysis but also how can they be 
improved upon from a Marxist point of view. 
I seek to illustrate through reference to books and articles that Holland's analyses 
were partial, inconsistent, and pluralist in theoretical perspectives from a Marxist 
point of view. Holland was both a pluralist and inconsistent in his use of theory 
(see Chapter Two). Generally he combined a distinctive Keynesian economic 
analysis (which recognised that demand management of the economy was not 
enough) with elements of Marxism (for instance, the use of concepts such as 
class and monopoly capitalism) and elements of critical Marxism, e. g. neo 
Gramscianism (which emphasised the independent role of ideas and ideology) 
and neo-institutionalism (promoting rearrangements to political and economic 
institutions as solutions). This melange of theory results in lacunae and 
inconsistencies in his analysis as he shifts from one theoretical framework to 
another e. g. he writes about capitalism in a Marxist way and then attributes 
economic slumps to Keynesian failure in demand; another example is how he 
highlights the 'predominant institutional form of monopoly capitalism' i. e. 
multinational monopolies rather than looking at the system as a whole (Coates 
1980, p. 249). It is these inconsistencies which will be highlighted and alternative 
Marxist analyses offered as more consistent and plausible explanations of the 
world capitalist political economy. I illustrate also gaps, or neglect of certain 
phenomena or one-sidedness in his analysis. Thus in examining his analysis of 
the British Political Economy in chapter three I indicate his neglect of British 
imperialism; in his analysis of the European Community in Chapter four I point 
out that he neglects the possibility that the European Community might use 
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measures of positive integration to win support among the populations of Europe. 
Thus the essence of my method is the flush out the flaws or partiality of 
Holland's analysis, to illustrate the scope and limits of the concepts he deploys. 
and to criticise them from the standpoint of the totality of economic, social and 
political relations which constitute global capitalism today - this is the essence of 
historical materialist method. 
As described earlier Holland's output was prolific. However much of this 
material was repetitive of arguments set out in key texts or minor adjustments of 
policy but which did not conflict in a fundamental way with the core ideas which 
we wish to focus on. Therefore I consider it justified to focus on those texts 
w ic g ve the most extensive and most comprehensive elaboration of his core 
ideas in relation to the underpinning of his various social -democratic projects. 
This criterion led to the selection of key texts, i. e. texts which marked a key 
turning point a his political thought and presented his arguments for such 'turns' 
in the most cogent, coherent and concise forms. In other words, they were 
considered the ma or works of his political theory. Reference will be made to i 
other, shorter articles but mostly this will be for illumination only or to add detail. 
Thus the primary sources are Holland's texts themselves which are subject to 
theoretical scrutiny. 
The problem with the method described is that it may give an appearance that 
Holland was more consistent and more straightforward in progressing from one 
idea to another than he was. But that is an appearance that is acceptable when the 
aim of the thesis is to examine and evaluate core propositions rather than to 
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highlight intellectual development. Nevertheless, it should be recognised that 
there is an 'internal logic' in the development of his ideas. 
The second problem is selection and relativism. My own values necessarily 
influence what I consider important and unimportant, and therefore what is 
selected for examination. In my own defence I argue that I have tried to be as 
4objective' as possible in the selection of core ideas and tried to present Holland's 
as forcibly, persuasively and as comprehensively as he would have himself. In 
fact, it is precisely on these most elaborated arguments that my attention and 
critique falls so that my questioning of his positions may be most clearly 
understood. It is another reason that I have concentrated my focus on his books 
rather than his journalistic articles so that the charge of misrepresentation of 
argument may be avoided. It is in his books that Holland sets out his core 
concepts most elaborately and comprehensively and one would hope most 
accurately and scholarly. I reiterate: what interests me in Holland's writings are 
his core concepts on political economy and strategy. 
The sources used can be divided into two: primary and secondary. The primary 
source materials are the writings of Stuart Holland himself. Holland published a 
number of major works on the topics which form the focus of this thesis. It is in 
these works that he deploys his core concepts of analysis and upon that argues for 
his strategic prescriptions. These works clearly state Holland's position and 
provide extensive material for the analysis and evaluation of his public 
arguments. There are a number of articles in various books which supplement 





these articles shed new light on an argument, especially his views on the state and 
his European strategy. There are also a number of position papers he wrote for 
various Labour Party committees. Additionally there are very brief articles 
Holland in various newspapers and political broadsheets. This material is often 
repetitive or popularising and rarely throws new light on the substantive 
propositions which form the core of Holland's arguments and the focus of this 
thesis. There are also verbatim reports of his speeches in the House of Commons 
in Hansard. Again these materials offer extensions of arguments made in his 
major works. Reference will be made, mainly, to Holland's major works which 
elucidate the implementation of his core concepts in the context of the strategies 
outlined above. 
No attempt has been made to interview the subject of this thesis or to research his 
personal files. It has been considered that there was already enough material in 
the public domain to enable a thorough analysis and evaluation of Holland's core 
concepts in the three strategies mentioned. Moreover, it was assumed that the 
work in the public domain was the most scholarly of his materials and provided 
the most coherent arguments for his political positions. Alongside this the 
assumption was made that his private documents and materials in his possession 
were the raw material of such finished works and would not add anything 
substantial to the political concepts and strategies that had to be analysed and 
criticised. It was the formulated ideas and arguments in the public domain, not 
his unfinished and private musings, that interested me; it is the finished article 
that is subject to scrutiny. 
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There are some weaknesses to these assumptions. There may be in Holland 
personal records different perspectives and strategies that may present yet other 
political positions to the ones I have selected. Yet, for me, they remain irrelevant 
as they were not published and did not try to influence social-democrats and the 
general public along certain paths. They, therefore, remain insignificant in terms 
of strategies asserted and fought for in the daily political struggle. 
This same argument underlies the reasoning as to why no interview was 
conducted with Stuart Holland. The texts that were in the public domain: the 
abundant books, journal and newspaper articles, and speeches illustrated quite 
amply Holland's major lines of reasoning and his arguments - and in 
considerable detail. There was hardly any need to supplement this through the 
formality of conducting an interview. Again, a nuance might have been gained 
from an interview but this in no way would have changed the major political 
concepts and beliefs that Holland had elaborated at various stages in his political 
thought. To stress again, it was these elaborated theories that were of interest to 
me and could provide a quite adequate base for my critique. 
The secondary sources are the commentaries made on Holland's works and the 
material selected from within IPE and elsewhere to provide criticism and 
alternative analysis. There has been no biographical work on Holland. There has 
been no previous work specifically focussed on Holland's strategy in the three 
areas named above but there has been some minor description and comment on 
aspects of his strategies especially his national strategy. The sources on 
capitalism, the state, imperialism, European integration, European Union, social 
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democracy and socialism, etc. are enon-nous and the selection has been made on 
the criteria of relevance. 
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Chapter Two: Monopoly Capitalism and the State 
This chapter will compare and contrast Holland's model of monopoly capitalism 
and the state against that of a Marxist model presented here. Holland had 
claimed, in part, a Marxian heritage however we will seek to show that his 
adherence to such a heritage was suPerficial and that he owed more to other 
strands of thought than he did to Marxism. 28 Another purpose of the chapter is to 
illustrate how Holland's conceptual schema was badly flawed due to its 
eclecticism, incoherence and inconsistency. Holland's 'socialist' strategies rest 
on two foundations: one is the argument that state capitalism is a step towards 
socialism (Holland 1976a); the second is that the state can be utilised against 
multinational monopolies to curb their influence over the economy and open up 
the prospect of a capitalism based on competition combined with progressive 
policies (Holland 1976a; 1980; Laux and Molot 1988, p. 17; Tsakalotos 1991, p. 
l9ff. ). I will discuss these claims, subject them to scrutiny and provide arguments 
from within Marxism to challenge them. 
To assist with my critique of Holland's model and to enable comparison I present 
table 2 below. The table has two columns representing the Marxist model of 
monopoly capitalism presented in this text against Holland's model based on his 
writings (primarily: 1976a, 1980,1987a and 1987b). 
28 This contrasts with Wickham-Jones' estimate which claimed that Holland's theories were more 
grounded in Marxism. See: (1996), pp. 58-59,80. 
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Table 2: Conceptions of Monopoly Capitalism and the State: Comparisons between a Marxist Model and Stuart Holland's Concepts 
Marxist Model Holland's model (see text for references) (based on Holland's texts; see text for references) 
Theoretical Marxism Eclectic: mixture of Keynes and Marx. 
Roots 
Overall Consistent historical materialism Theoretically pluralist or eclectic and empiricist framework of 
analysis 
Origins of Widespread development at a specific stage Primarily post WWII phenomenon 
Multinational within capitalism Institutional causes: imperfections in market; no concept Monopolies of development at a certain stage within capitalism 
Conception of Monopoly capitalism emerges out of Primarily a theory of industrial or market structure. Monopoly competitive capitalism; an inevitable tendency An institutional analysis. 
Capitalism- of capitalist accumulation. Monopoly capitalism described as an unjust spatial, 
economic Capitalism is a system of labour exploitation structural and social distribution of power and resources; 
based on private property with commodity an inequitable system. 
production for market. No clear concept of its role in the global division of 
" systemic analysis. labour 
" specific position in the global division of 
labour. 
Conception of There are specific social, political and No linkage made with imperialism. 
Monopoly ideological consequences of imperialism's role 
Capitalism- in the global division of labour. 
political 
Conception of Inherent in the nature of capitalist accumulation; Result of unjust distribution of goods, role of 
capitalist crisis cannot be averted by state action underconsumption; can be overcome through state action 
Conception of A specific stage in the development of A conjunctural event but not immanent within capitalism; 
imperialism capitalism; N4NCs are one element of imperialist MNCs are independent dominating forces 
relations; Competition between rival imperialisms replaced by 
States enforce private property rules globally, competition between rival monopolies 
the basis of global accumulation and circuits of 
capital. 
Competition between rival imperialisms 
Emergence of bloc imperialism 
Conception of State is an imperialist state; organised on 2 models: State is a neutral state, defined by "social 
State principle of private property. cohesion" tasks either: (early work 1976a, 
Looks at totality of global social and political p. 16): "spender, umpire, entrepreneur, planner"; 
relations of state or (later work 1980, p. 129): State power as means for 
mediating the problems posed by the unequal and uneven 
development of capitalism; role for social cohesion; State 
viewed from domestic social relations only. 
Conception of State sustains MNC interests; a contradictory MNCs operate above and beyond the nation-state; MNCs 
State-MNC unity in relationship and state operate in separate and opposed fields 
relations 
Conception of Revolutionary restructuring of the state; Revolutionary reforms; Parliamentary-based; Labour 
socialist revolutionary organisation and leadership Party to give leadership 
transformation 
Conception of Socialism is both economic and political: State capitalism alongside private capitalism; reformed 
Socialism predominance of state ownership within the relations between parliament and the executive. 
economy: new popular participatory state 
The rows or dimensions of analysis represent various aspects of monopoly 
capitalism including: the theoretical roots of the different models; the framework 
of analysis; the respective theories as to the origins of multinational monopolies; 
the essential differences in the conception of monopoly capitalism; the respective 
conceptions of the causes of cap'talist crisis; the concept of imperialism within 
the two models; the concept of the state, the concept of the state-N4NC 
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relationship; the respective notions of socialist transformation and lastly, the 
conceptions of socialism. The arguments that are highlighted are intended to 
summarise differences and not to be an exhaustive statement of difference. 
2.1 An Outline of Some Aspects of a Marxist Model ofMonopoly Capitalism 
The aim of this section is to present some aspects of a Marxist understanding of 
monopoly capitalism. Elements of an 'ideal type' or model are presented which is 
an abstract representation of what occurs in real life in specific, historically 
concrete societies. Variations of this model will occur (See Kemp 1967, p. 68). 
The variations will depend on the particular historical circumstances of each 
country. For instance, the capacity of the state to intervene in markets may 
depend on a variety of historical and institutional factors such as the 
'administrative structure of the state, industrial structure, and prevailing political 
coalitions' (Green 1987, p. 42). 
2.1.1 Theoretical Roots and Outlook 
The Marxist model presented here has its roots in the political and economic 
writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, i. e. that Marxism that is traditionally 
considered "classical". It does not consider their contribution to an understanding 
of our world today as exhausted or irrelevant. On the other hand, it does not 
uphold their ideas dogmatically but seeks to apply the guiding conception of the 
tradition namely, historical materialism, to contemporary international political 
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economy (Rupert and Smith 2002). 29 The new concepts that the following 
Marxist model emphasises that distinguish it from previous contributions are 
threefold: 
(a) Its emphasis on the contradictory relationship between the state and MNCs; 
that is the state is not fused with specific N4NCs nor are MNCs 'footloose' from 
the state in the sense of being above adherence to a state or a bloc of states. By 
'contradictory' is meant that MNCs operate across states and can operate against 
the interest of their home state, at times, but that all MNCs require a domicile 
state or bloc of stateS30 to provide the political 'muscle' to uphold their property 
relations. Thus MNCs work with and through states to gain political-economic 
objectives but may on occasion have need to advance their own particular 
interests and act against their domicile state (Gilpin 1975). MNCs are not 
'footloose' but neither are they fused with the nation-state; their relationships 
with the state are contradictory (Radice 1975a) .31 This contradictory relationship 
becomes the point of dispute within radical international political economy 
between those who, on the one hand, view the multinationals as an independent 
power within the global political economy (e. g. Stopford, Strange and Henley 
1991; Susan Strange 1996, Holland 1976a and 1980) and those who consider 
MNCs fused with the interests of the nation state (Bukharin 1975; Kirsanov 
1975; Moschonas 1996, p. 20; see McKinlay and Little 1986, p. 127). 
29 My conception of historical materialism has been discussed in Chapter One. 
30 Home state' is defined later on the chapter; MNCs may not adhere to a nation-state 
but to a 
bloc of states as in the case of the EC/ EU. 
31 This concept is developed in more detail in chapters three and four. 
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(b) It argues that the foundation of global capitalism, or imperialism, is the 
imposition of a private property regime globally (Lipson 1985). Circuits of 
capital, the accumulation of capital, the agglomeration of capital, the exchange of 
values, etc. all depend on this fundamental premise; all resources, all labour, all 
goods must be alienable and in the form of private, alienable property. This is a 
premise which is founded over a long period of time and with the use of force, 
i. e. the state. It is this foundation which becomes the basis of imperialism and 
structures the global struggle between classes and states which seek to uphold the 
prevalence of the private property relations and rules over other principles of the 
organisation and distribution of property and those classes and states which seek 
to subordinate private property to social or other forms of property (Lipson 
1985). 
(c) Its use of the theory of bloc imperialism to explain some of the prominent 
features of today's IPE, specifically, the tendency towards regionalism amongst 
advanced capitalist countries and the development of 'supranational' institutions 
above and beyond the nation-state. In other words, it does not hold to the thesis 
that imperialism is inevitably tied to the nation-state in a fusion between state and 
monopolies (Bukharin 1975; Kirsanov 1975; Moschonas 1996, P. 20; Callinicos 
et al 1994, p. 16). On the other hand, it rejects that a transnationalism or 
interpenetration of capitals has occurred to the degree that a national imperialism 
and its state is no longer of significance (Radice 1971 and 1984; Bieler and 
Morton 2001, Van Apeldoorn 2002). Its position is that in Europe, specifically, a 
'bloc' imperialism has formed which combines both aspects of national 
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imperialism and a new 'European imperialism' -a hybrid form (Holloway 1976; 
Cypher 1992; Moschonas 1996, p. 21; Carchedi 2001). 
2.1.2 Marxist Theory of Monopoly Capitalism 
Marxist political economy makes production, not exchange or the market, the 
central focus of its analysis of capitalism. Marx placed economic exploitation at 
the heart of his political economy. It was the social relationship between labour 
and capital that structured the rest of the system. Marx maintained that despite the 
formal equality of the wage contract between employer and employee the real 
relationship was one of exploitation. The economic exploitation arose out of the 
fact that the labour power of the labourers created more in value than they 
received in wages. This in turn resulted in a surplus value out of which payments 
in the form of rent, profits and interest were paid. In other words, the structure of 
advanced capitalist society and the distribution of revenues within it were 
dependent on the exploitation of the working class. This exploitation of the 
working class could never cease until the system of exploitation, dependent on 
the private ownership of the means of production and the expropriation of surplus 
labour was abolished (See: Marx 1996; Tom Burden and Mike Campbell 1985, 
pp. 3-8; Campbell 1981, pp. 32-49) 
The creation of ever new and enlarged amounts of surplus value is the aim of 
capitalist production. The spontaneous process of appropriation of surplus value 
by the capitalists cannot stand still. The capitalist, due to the growth in scale of 
the productive forces and competition of other capitalists, must accumulate 
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capital on a continuous and enlarged basis to avoid stagnation, loss of markets 
and loss of profit (Magdoff 1976, p. 222). 
As capitalism develops its expansive form so it extends its operations (in all 
forms abroad). Increasingly there is the transnational migration of capital of 
which multinational monopolies are but one form. The state's activities became 
increasingly implicated in this migration. All property globally, whether state, 
clan or familial has to be turned into private property; property that is alienable 
and which can be appropriated (Lipson 1985, p. 20). The global circuits of capital 
rest on this initial premise that all property be first made into private, alienable 
property. If there is resistance then force is used (Lipson 1985 passim). Once that 
is achieved, capital can accumulate in the hands of the propertied and wealthy 
through exchange. The capitalist state participates in enforcing a private property 
regime across the globe; in which wealth dominates; and public purposes of 
property are either made subordinated or denied (Lipson 1985, p. 20). The state 
stands guard over private property regimes domestically and globally (Lipson 
1985). 
Over time, on the basis of private property rules, a characteristic form of large- 
scale capitalist enterprise developed, 'the giant firm in the world market' whose 
aim was 'always toward the expansion of control over production and marketing 
on a global scale' (Magdoff 1976, pp. 201-203). These finns have a tendency 
towards domination of the market either individually or through cartels or 
alliances (Dunning 1992; Hardach, Karras, and Fine, 1978), hence the term 
4monopoly capitalism', despite the existence of what in conventional economics 
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are called oligopolies. Two tendencies coexist: the drive towards domination and 
the drive towards competition. 32 Alongside this developed 'the imperialism ý of 
states each guarding their respective capitals and their claims (Lipson 1985; 
Lenin 1964a). 
2.1.3 The Marxist Theory of the Multinational Monopoly Firm 
It is out of this accumulation process that monopoly (or oligopoly) capitalism 
arises (Magdoff 1976, pp. 222 ff. ). A process of concentration and centralisation 
of capital and production takes place. Concentration is the increased quantity of 
capital under the control of the capitalist, enabling expansion of production on an 
increased scale which enables the elimination of rivals. In the struggle between 
capitals, the larger capitals develop advantages, known in conventional 
economics as 'economies of scale' (Hymer 1975, pp. 43-47; Hardach et at 1978, 
p. 22). The larger accumulation of surplus by some allows increased application 
of scientific and technological improvements, access to greater finance, ability to 
lower costs and weather the problems of economic crisis. A few firms (oligopoly) 
or one large firm (monopoly) begin to dominate the key sectors in the spheres of 
production, finance, distribution and exchange. However, although competition 
between these monopolies is suppressed it is not overcome and new entrants can 
establish themselves (if they can agglomerate the financial resources to enable 
competition against existing firms in a sector) (Kemp 1967; Hardach et at 1978, 
pp. 22-24). It should be remembered here that my definition is an unconventional 
32 One of the features of the current capitalist state is that it has to guard against one section of 
capital becoming too powerful in the market. Cini and McGowan (1998, p. 3) have quoted Doern 
and Wilks as follows: 'Neither competition nor market is inevitable or natural. Markets have to be 
created through processes of social change and public regulation'. 
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one and that in my conception monopoly does not exclude competition. 
Monopoly and competition are not opposites within the frame of my definition 
(See: John Weeks 1981, Chap. 6; Bryan 1985). In conventional terms I am 
referring to oligopolies. 33 
Centralisation is the combination (takeover, merger) of capitals or in other words, 
a change of the distribution of capitals among capitalists. This combination is 
facilitated by the credit system i. e. the banks, investment houses, security, and the 
stock markets, etc. (Hardach et at 1978, p. 22; Nabudere 1979, p. 23; Kemp 1967, 
p. 70; Green 1987, pp. 31-32). As the scale of capital grows so the financial and 
monetary needs of it become greater. Increasingly the banks and the financial 
firms have to merge to provide the financial and monetary conditions capital 
requires for its expanded reproduction. This sector too becomes dominated by 
monopolies or oligopolies which increasingly becomes connected or integrated 
with the industrial fin-ns they fund and whose shares they purchase (Hilferding 
1981; Born 1983, Chap. 6). Industrial firms too take on financial aspects as they 
increasingly rely on financial reserves to fund their operations and to fight off or 
purchase their rivals (Green 1987, p. 29). Finance capital, under the control of a 
financial oligarchy, emerges, inevitably, as the dominant form of capital; the 
financial powers of different firms and sectors being in constant flux and leading 
to struggles to obtain political influence and assistance to beat off rivals 
33 From now on the term 'monopolies' is preferred. Monopoly is used in this text as a contrast to 
the 'free competition' characteristic of early nineteenth century capitalism. It is used in the sense 
that Lenin used it as 'a generic term which includes trusts, cartels, combines, syndicates and big 
business generally' and now includes MNCs. See: Kemp (1967), p. 68. 
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domestically and intemationally (Nabudere 1979, pp. 47ff.; Parboni 1981 9 
Preface, esp. pp. 19-23; Helleiner 1994, Chap. 7). 34 
The organisation of the monopolies changed under the influence of historical 
circumstances; in the 1930s they took the form of national and international 
cartels and trusts and since 1945 they have increasingly taken the form of 
international monopolies or what is called in popular texts multinational or 
transnational companies (Cassis 1997: Apter 1976; Magdoff 1976, p. 206-7). As 
Nabudere has written: 
In our view a proper understanding of the transnational corporation must start from the scientific 
proposition that this strategy (transnationalism) is a historical product of capitalist development. It 
must then proceed to show the historical epoch in which the phenomenon arises and its causes, 
and then concretely specify the forms monopoly has taken. Hence its real essence must be traced 
in the historical movement of capital as a product of society (Nabudere 1979, p. 45) 
Nabudere in another work in 1977 (pp. 186-7) emphasised multinationals are a 
product of the tendency within capitalism towards monopoly that develop at a 
specific stage; they are a continuation of the interwar movement that attempted to 
build cartels, trusts and syndicates; their development has been accelerated by the 
growth of economic blocs after World War 11 (See also: Magdoff 1976, p. 200). 
It was Lenin who identified the period of initial growth of monopoly within 
capitalism between 1870 and 1914. This was the period which he also established 
as the beginning of the modem era of imperialism. This linkage was no accident 
but the assertion of a necessary connection between the growth of monopoly and 
the stage of imperialism within capitalism. Lenin declared aphoristically: 'in its 
economic essence imperialism is monopoly capitalism' (Lenin 1964a, p. 298; see 
" On the power of the financial oligarchy in Britain see John Scott (1991), p. 151. Of course the 
concept of finance capital is subject to much debate, on this see Kemp (1967), p. 7 1. 
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Kemp 1967, p. 72 and p. 76 on the significance of this linkage; Magdoff 1976). 
This dimension of monopoly capitalism will be examined later but first the role 
of the state within monopoly capitalism requires examination. 
2.1.4 The State and Monopoly Capitalism 
Monopoly capitalism is not just an economic or an industrial phenomenon as 
some economists imply (e. g. Sawyer 1988). This accumulation process has 
enormous political preconditions and consequences (Magdoff 1976, p. 209). The 
central condition of the accumulation process is the generalisation of the 
commodity form, i. e. the transformation of goods, resources, and human labour 
power into private alienable property which can be bought and sold in the sphere 
of exchange. This transformation requires a power greater them individual 
capitals, and which has the capacity to enforce the private property regime, 
domestically and globally, that power is the capitalist state (Clarke 1988; Lipson 
1985; Barrow 1993, p. 78; Fine and Harris 1979, Chap. 6). 
Capitalism, although a spontaneous system, which is subject to the economic 
laws that are specific to it, has required the support of the state in establishing its 
sway domestically and intemationally (Clarke 1988; Holloway and Picciotto 
1977). The social and political tensions which are the result of economic cycles, 
economic crisis and a continuous struggle for the accumulation of capital require 
a state that can impose general social order based on the principles of private 
property (Clarke 1988). 
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Although the state was an important actor in capitalist expansion in the 
nineteenth century, it is in the twentieth century that the state has had to intervene 
more and more extensively in the economy to stabilise the system of private 
property relations (Fine and Harris 1979, Chap. 8). As monopoly capitalism has 
developed in the advanced capitalist countries so it has required the state to 
manage all aspects of the system from the maintenance of property relations 
intemally to promoting its interests abroad (Magdoff 1976, p. 209 ff.; Anderson, 
Gutmanis and Anderson 2000; Murray 1975; Warren 1975; Fine and Harris 1979, 
Chap. 8). This coalescence of the state's role and the economic system has led to 
some to characterise the complex relationship between the two as 'state 
monopoly capitalism' (Hardach et al 1978, passim; Jessop 1982, Chap. 2; Fine 
and Harris 1979, Chap. 8). The term has been disputed. 35 We consider that the 
term still has validity but only in a specific way: namely that the state is 
considered as politically and economically integral with monopoly capitalism but 
is in a contradictory relationship with it (Radice 1975, p. 13) rather than a direct 
fusion with certain national groups (Mandel 1978, p. 516; Bukharin 1975; 
Kirsanov 1975). 
State economic intervention or state management cannot do away with the 
fundamental laws of, and principles, of capitalism, although there are attempts to 
ameliorate the social, political and economic consequences of capitalism, the 
struggle for capital accumulation, founded on private property in the means of 
production, sets limits to the degree the state can manage or control the process 
(Burnham 2008; Campbell 1981, p. 179; Clarke 1988). Capital has been 
35 For summaries, see: See Mandel (1978) pp. 513-22 ; Jessop (1982), Chap. 2; Holland (1979c), 
passim ; Harclach et al (1978), pp. 63-68 
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ambivalent in its relationship with the state: on the one hand, sections of capital 
have welcomed state intervention; at other times capital in its urge to accumulate 
resists state intervention, to prevent as far as possible accumulation of capital 
being siphoned off into state coffers, or restraints being placed in the competitive 
struggle (Holland 1980, p. 59; Burden and Campbell 1985, p. 69). When 
intervention is accepted, it is accepted on condition of propping up the system 
and enabling the further accumulation of capital (Campbell 198 1, p. 179ff.; 
Burden and Campbell 1985 p. 48; Holland 1980, p. 59). Intervention on grounds, 
other than these, is seen as 'Political interference' and resisted (Lipson, 1985). 
Thus within twentieth century capitalism a political tension over state 
intervention and public ownership of resources and means of production has 
emerged: between the forces and groups which seek state intervention and 
common or public ownership and those that resist this tendency or want to 
channel it along minimal lines in support of capital. This struggle has massive 
implications for the state both domestically and in terms of foreign policy 
(Burden and Campbell 1985, pp. 18-19 and Chap. 3; Holland 1980, Chap. 4; 
Lipson 1985). 
Domestically, the state, through a political struggle of the capitalist class, is (a) 
transformed and subordinated to the capitalist accumulation process and (b) 
becomes dependent on it (Barrow 1993, pp. 58ff, Clarke 1988; Bridges 1974). Its 
transformation and subordination is achieved through: the reform of political 
institutions and the political process to make it both primarily representative in 
form and formally equal, whilst in reality it is dependent on access to wealth 
resources, thereby denying real mass democratic participation (Szymanski 1978, 
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p. 150; pp. 221-225); the establishment of the primacy of private property laws; 
and the political and economic commitment to maintain the dominance of private 
property relations (Engels 1968, p. 528; Szymanski 1978, pp. 156-7; Poggi 1978, 
p. 116 and pp. 129-132). Reforms open up the recruitment of the middle classes 
into the higher echelons of the army and civil service; security services are 
pledged to maintaining the current status quo against its enemies (on UK, see 
Dearlove and Saunders 1991 , Chap. 6); military power 
is increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of the State (Weber's 'monopoly of the legitimate use 
of means of violence', quoted in Crouch 1979, p. 39); changes in the institutional 
arrangements of government are made that increasingly gives power to the 
executive and weakens the representative institutions supervisory and 
accountability functions (Miliband 1969, p. 161; Barrow 1993, p. 27; Navari 
2000, pp. 130-1; Sweezy 1970, p. 319); and the power of the previous ruling 
class is undermined and the power of the capitalist class over the state is 
established. 
This is not an instrumentalist perspective (Hall 1985, p. 364), because the 
perspective here is that the state does not simply pass 'ready made' 
from one 
class to another to be wielded for their use but is, and has to be, continually 
transformed and moulded into a system for capitalist economic and political 
domination which enables the capitalist class to maintain its rule despite the 
distributional and other struggles that the system generates (Cox 1987; Burnham 
1992, p. 15 1; Sweezy 1970; Jessop 1977, p. 370). 
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Often, the most suitable form for that bourgeois state is the democratic republic 
as this gives the fractions of the capitalist class in struggle with one another, as 
well as the working class in struggle for social reform, the opportunity to express 
themselves and to win reform and freedom from arbitrariness (Alford and 
Friedland 1985, Chap. 15; Pierson 1986, chap. 2; Szymanski 1978, p. 147; Jessop 
1977). But the democratic republic, as we have seen, is bounded by constraints, 
restrictions and pro-capitalist rules (Clarke 1988; Burnham 2008; Sweezy 1970, 
250; Alford and Friedland 1985, Chap. 15). The boundaries of the democratic 
republic are set: the limits being those of capitalist accumulation (Clarke 1988). 
Likewise state intervention and social reforms are subordinated to the 
accumulation process; where state capitalism is developed within capitalism, it of 
necessity operates according to the laws of accumulation and the market. It, 
ultimately, is as much subject to the economic laws of capitalism and the 
economic powers of finance capital as any other enterprise (Williams 1982; 
Feigenbaum 1982; Burden and Campbell 1985, Chap. 3, esp. p. 69). 
Nationalisation may be won through popular struggle but the form and content 
given to nationalised industries or services mean that they have to operate within 
the capitalist framework, i. e. subordination to the capitalist accumulation process, 
participation in the capitalist market, financial constraints (i. e. debts, loans, etc. ), 
and hierarchical management with little or restricted worker participation 
(Mandel 1968, p. 498ff.; Holland 1976a). Worker participation, if it is accepted, 
frequently comes in the form of corporatism or tripartism which ultimately serves 
the capitalist class (Panitch 1986). The criteria for success is often set along 
efficiency lines which prioritises profits. cost-cutting, increased capital 
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investment, redundancies, competition, struggles against (often larger) private 
capital and being drawn into the logic of the capital accumulation process (Jones 
and Keating 1985, p. 97; Williams 1982; Feigenbaum 1982). 
The dependence of the state on the capitalist class comes about through the fiscal 
and financial requirements the state incurs as it seeks to prop up the capitalist 
system; the funding of the state comes to rely increasingly on the wealth and 
wealth-creation of capitalism (Bridges 1974; Barrow 1993, pp. 58-59). The 
legitimation of capitalism, as well as the accommodation of working class, 
requires this increasing expenditure. The state increasingly relies on taxes upon 
capitalists and workers (as well as other classes) for its maintenance and also 
relies on borrowing from the financial classes. These economic and financial 
dependencies place the state at the behest of the overall capitalist accumulation 
process (Barrow 1993, p. 59). It is in the interest of the state to avoid economic 
crisis and to spur capitalist economic growth which creates the parameters of 
state policy; the interests of the capitalist state is directly bound up with the 
broader interests of the system's drive to capital accumulation (Bridges 1974; 
Barrow 1993, pp. 58-59). Of course, there may be political disagreements over 
the strategy of capital accumulation whether it is through less state interventionist 
policies or through corporatism and tripartism but the goal of capitalist growth to 
provide for the reproduction of the system is shared. 
Critics of Marxism refute the Marxist view that the state is subordinated to 
monopoly capital by arguing: (a) that the state has to address the interests of other 
classes and not just monopoly capital (Jessop 1977, p. 370; Jessop 1985, p. 274 ); 
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(b) that the 'fusion' thesis of some state monopoly capitalists theorists is 
disproven by the fact that the state sometimes acts against segments of monopoly 
capital (Gilpin 1975, pp. 143-147; Holloway 1976) ; and (c) lastly, that the state 
and monopolies, especially multinationals have a conflict of interest (Strange 
1996, Vernon 1971, Chap. 7, Gilpin 1975, p. 146). In reply to (a): the interests of 
the other classes are addressed but always within the overall context of the 
maintenance of private property relations and therefore of the predominant form 
of those relations, monopoly capital. Capitalism today cannot exist without 
monopolies; and to sustain capitalism is to sustain the monopolies. In reply to (b): 
there have been some theorists of the state-monopoly capital relationship that 
have asserted the complete fusion between the nation-state and monopoly capital 
(for summary see: Mandel 1978, p. 516; Kirsanov 1975); however, what they 
have overlooked is that the relationship is one of contradiction (Holloway and 
Picciotto 1977, p. 97; Radice 1975, p. 13, Coleman 1986 pp. 247-25 1, Vernon 
36 1975, p. 146). This thesis stresses this perspective. By this is meant that 
although the nation-state acts in the interests of monopoly capital, i. e. capitalism, 
in general this does not mean that the state does not come into conflict with 
sections or fractions of capital. At times the state will have to act in the interests 
of capitalism, in toto, which will bring it into conflict with sections or fractions of 
monopoly capital. The term 'the interests of capital' should not be narrowly 
conceived. The 'interests of capital' in its broad meaning expresses the needs of 
capital for stability, legitimation and maintenance of the system which 
incorporates working class (and other classes) reforms. But as Holloway and 
36 Vernon (1975, p. 146) makes the point that although the tendency is for corporations to 
maximize freedom from governmental control and pit government against government 
nevertheless, the MNCs and the U. S. government act 'consistently' with one another in the area 
of foreign policy. 
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Picciotto (1977, p. 97) have argued, there are limits to the state's intervention in 
connection to the capital relation. 
How does the state know the general interests of capital? In the 'democratic 
republic' process it is discovered through the political process itself, as 
viewpoints are aired and decisions made, but always on the basis of the 
constitution of private property (Barrow 1993, p. 78). (Nationalisation, as will be 
discussed in chapter three, is made on the basis of the overall requirements of 
private property or capitalism. ) In reply to (c) which forms one of the central 
elements of this thesis so this will be brief. monopolies do sometimes undermine 
the power of nation-states in certain respects; they can act against or undermine 
policies of both advanced 37 and developing states yet the state must always 
further the interests of 'its' monopoly capital in general if it is to generate 
'national' growth and its tax base. Also monopolies in pursuit of their interests 
cannot dispense with a home state, whether it be a national-state or some other 
entity e. g. a 'regional' political structure for ultimately political and military 
power in the world is still within the dispensation of political 'states'. 
Furthermore the nation-state as a power may not be sufficiently strong to advance 
capital's interests (Rowthom 1971). This opens up prospects of how capital has 
its interests advanced beyond the nation-state through some new 'supranational' 
entity (Mandel 1970; Radice 1971; Holloway 1976; Nabudere 1977; Holloway 
and Picciotto 1980; Carchedi 2001). 
3' For an example of how US monopolies can act against the US state see: Gilpin (1975), pp. 144- 
146 
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2.1.5 Partial Economic Crisis (or Economic Cycles) and the Role of the State 38 
We have seen how the state plays a critical role in the development of capitalism 
and in the emergence of modem imperialism. There is one more dimension that 
requires examination, especially as it is one that is central to capitalism after the 
Second World War and also, to Stuart Holland's analyses and strategies. 
In his review of Marxist theories of partial economic crises Anwar Shaikh 
distinguishes between two groups of theories within Marxism based on different 
interpretations of the 'laws of motion' of capitalism. He calls these two groups of 
theories: (i) 'possibility theories' and (ii) 'necessity theories' (Shaikh 1983). 
Possibility theories can be divided into two groups again: (a) the 
underconsumptionist theorists and the stagnation theorists and (b) wage squeeze 
theories. These theories work within the general understanding of Marxism that 
interprets crisis as the result of a certain conjunction of historically determined 
factors. To condense the arguments of this group severely, but necessarily due to 
limitations of space, the policy outcome is that the inherent tendency towards 
crisis that Marx identified as an essential aspect of capitalism can be countered 
by state action in relation to group (a) theories and group (b) theories. In other 
words, the state can play a critical role in reducing or eliminating the crises of 
monopoly capitalism. Holland's analysis is positioned within the 'possibility' 
theories. However, there is the second position of the 'necessity' theories which 
the author of this thesis adheres to in his analysis. The rub of this analysis, based 
both on private property in the relations of production and the law of the 
38 A useful review of political dimensions of Marxist theories of economic crisis can 
be found in 
Val Burris (1984). 
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tendency of the falling rate of profit is that capitalism in its drive to accumulate 
surplus constantly comes into a self-contradiction: on the one hand it needs to 
increase the amount of fixed capital as a ratio to the capital it employs overall in 
the accumulation process, on the other hand, this leads to a falling rate of profit 
as a tendency, which can be meliorated, among other factors, but not overcome, 
by state action. In other words, economic crises are the inevitable outcome of 
capitalism's laws of operation and the disproportions it creates and are 
inescapable (Mandel 1968, p. 166; Burris 1984). 
2.1.6 Imperialism and the Global Division ofLabour 
The model of the national development of capital accumulation presented above 
can be visualised as a process taking place on a global scale. Where capital 
establishes itself and subordinates "its" state so then that capital and its state 
seeks to accumulate and appropriate as much of the global capital available as it 
can (Szymanski 1978, pp. 206-212; Burnham 1991, p. 83). A global struggle of 
capital sets in - giving new form and content to the old mercantile struggle for 
colonies or markets and raw materials. Nation-states embark on foreign economic 
and political policies that serve domestic capitalist interests within the context of 
the distribution of economic and political power which prevails at the time 
(Kemp 1967, pp. 73-75 and p. 78; Mandel 1985, pp. 526 ff. ). The actual specific 
content of those policies cannot be derived abstractly but have to be uncovered 
through historical investigation. But the general law which operates behind the 
separate national foreign economic and political policies are primarily the 
interests of the capitalist class in their drive to accumulate capital or to provide 
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the conditions which sustain it, i. e. the production and reproduction of private 
property relations (Kemp 1967, pp. 73-75). 
The requirement to turn from the domestic market to overseas markets is 
internally driven by the capital accumulation process. As rates of profit fall with 
the growth of competition, alongside the continued demands of capital expansion, 
so it becomes a necessary feature of capital accumulation to search out and 
secure or influence sources of capital accumulation abroad (Rowthorn 1971, p. 
69, n. 40). Monopolies or oligopolies seek to oust rivals from markets, establish 
chains of supply and secure control over those supplies on a global scale (Martel 
2000, pp 411-412; Mandel 1968, Chap. 13; Nabudere 1977 and 1979; Barone 
1985, Chap. 2; Polychroniou 1991, Chap. 2; Kemp 1967, Chap. 5). It is important 
to stress here, and it is a point commonly confused, that this does not require 
formal political control over a territory, nor is it aimed at solely "agrarian 
countriesii. 39 In the struggle of the monopolies to capture new markets they may 
seek to seize upon the capital of the local markets to increase the pool of capital 
resources they have at their command. This results in the further concentration of 
capital in their hands. Some have interpreted this aspect as undermining Lenin's 
thesis of imperialism (see Barratt Brown 1995, p. 111) rather it is increasing 
evidence of the economic power in the hands of the monopolies. 
39 Thus Barratt Brown defines imperialism thus: 'a complex of economic, political and military 
relations by which the less economically developed lands are subjected to the move economically 
developed... Imperialism remains the best word for the general system of unequal world 
economic relations' (Barratt Brown quoted in McKinlay and Little 1986, p. 125). At the same 
time Barratt Brown dates the era of imperialism as lasting from the 1870 into the 1930s (Barratt 
Brown 1995, p. 35). 
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The influence over other countries may be informal; through the invisible threads 
of finance or just the structural organisation of production, distribution and 
exchange in the global capitalist economy (Green 1987, p. 99ff.; Kemp 1967, p. 
168; Mandel 1968, p. 480ff.; Nabudere 1977 and 1979; Lipson 1985 passim). As 
Elson has emphasised: 'the power of the multinationals resides in their control of 
know-how' (Elson, 1984, p. 173). The struggle is global; in fact in the 1960s and 
1970s with more of the national liberation and 'Third World' countries ready to 
nationalise foreign companies or appearing as areas of political risk to 
investment, the struggle increasingly focussed on the economies of advanced 
capitalist countries (Lipson 1985 passim; Kemp 1967, p. 160). The growing 
capital export and foreign direct investment between these countries does not 
reflect so much the intensified intermeshing of economies, contrary to some 
globalisation theories, but rather the growing struggle between capitals to find 
places for capital accumulation on the planet (Kemp 1967). 
Thus the foreign economic and political policies of states derive not purely from 
policy choices of governments but are a stage of capitalism based on fundamental 
drives of the capitalist economic system and the global political-economic 
context of their operation (Kemp 1967, p. 76). 
The global capitalist system is structured within a 'hierarchy of states' (Lenin 
1964a, p. 300; Clark 1989). This hierarchy is founded upon an uneven 
distribution of economic and political power among nations. 40 This power is not 
just ýovert' and 'covert' forms of power but also structural power: that is 
40 For a discussion of the concept of power and its application to the international political 
economy, see Gill and Law (1988), pp. 71-80. 
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economic and social structures which suit the interests of the major powers in the 
global political economy (Gill and Law 1988, p. 75). Krasner and Gilpin have 
pointed to the construction of international regimes and organisations which 
'reflect the power and interests of the dominant power/s in the international 
system' e. g. the liberal trade and monetary regimes following World War II 
promoted the economic and security interests of the United States and 
strengthened the anti-Soviet political alliance (Gilpin 2001, p. 88; p. 92; p. 101; 
Krasner 1985). These regimes do not necessarily reflect the power of one 
dominant power but can express the common interests of several or more in the 
furtherance of general economic and security interests (Gilpin 2001, p. 88; Gill 
and Law 1988, pp. 36-39). 
This distribution of power is not permanent but shifting; it is upset as the 
conditions of accumulation for states change within the system. This means that 
no political-economic configuration of powers is permanent; as the struggle of 
capitals persists, so the political structures through which they operate and 
express themselves change and responds to the demands of capital in its struggles 
41 
against its rivals (Gilpin 2001, p. 92; Kemp 1967, p. 74 and p. 78) . 
Upon this premise of shifting relations between powers it is quite possible to note 
and foresee the decline of US hegemony compared to its position after World 
War 11 (contra Panitch and Gindin 2006), and the rise of a European or Asian 
power to hegemonic status in the future (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik, 1999). 
41 On the political struggle within regimes see: Gilpin (2001), p. 92. 
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Contrary to the thinking of many economists and international political 
economists the international division of labour, the global circulation of capital 
and commodities, is not simply the outcome of solely an economic division of 
labour. It is the result of a political-economic struggle that takes place globally 
between states, classes and developed and developing countries. In the process of 
capital export certain rules regarding private property are established and 
continually fought over, such as; the formation of alienable, private property and 
rights of appropriation, the rights and responsibilities of private property or 
capital, the legal jurisdictions to which it is subject, political attitudes towards its 
freedom of movement and issues of compensation in the case of expropriation. 
Thus an international private property regime has to be secured in which both 
states and private NlNCs participate. The terms of this regime has changed over 
time as the result of struggles that have taken place (Lipson 1985, passim, 
especially p. 258 ; Picciotto 1991). 
The significance of the origins of the international property regime is important. 
It suggests historical materialist reasons as to why neo-liberalism became such a 
dominant ideology in the 1970s (rather than as Holland (1980) views it as an 
outdated philosophy). In this perspective the foundation of this form of 
hegemonic ideology has been the result of a titanic struggle between states and 
classes in the twentieth century over property rules and how they are interpreted, 
rejected and implemented. This historical materialist approach offers to place the 
dominance of principles and concepts within an historical development of the 
struggle between states and classes upholding private property principles and 
-74- 
those states and classes working to oppose them (Lipson 1985; Cassese 1988; 
Bumham 1991). 
2.1.7 Conception of Imperialism 
In the discussion on imperialism in contemporary radical international political 
economy Lenin's theory on imperialism although acknowledged is rarely applied. 
This thesis argues that Lenin's theories do still have relevance but they need to be 
applied on the context of contemporary capitalism. This, of course, depends on 
how we interpret such theories. Ernest Mandel (1985) has divided the left 
theories of contemporary monopoly capitalism or imperialism into three broad 
groups: (a) the model of super- imperialism: where 'a single imperialist power 
possesses such hegemony that other important powers lose any real 
independence' (Mandel 1985, p. 532). Contemporary theorists of such a position 
are those like Panitch and Gindin whose concept of the 'unique American 
empire') or US super imperialism follows on from Poulantzas's arguments in the 
1970s (Panitch and Gindin 2006, p. 24; Panitch 1994,2000). This position 
argues that globalisation is nothing but absorption of the globe under the US 
economic framework and that all rival capitalisms have become subordinate to its 
economic, military and political power. (b) The model of ultra- imperialism: this 
is where 'the international fusion of capital has advanced so far that all critical 
differences of economic interest between the capital owners of the different 
nationalities disappear. All major capitalists have spread their capital ownership, 
production of surplus-value, realisation of surplus-value and capital accumulation 
(new investments) so evenly over different countries and parts of the world that 
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they have become completely indifferent to the particular conjuncture, the 
particular course of the class struggle and the 'national' peculiarities of political 
development in any particular country' (Mandel 1985, p. 533). This position is a 
close approximation of the contemporary view of Hardt and Negri with their 
conception of amorphous Empire which: 
Establishes no territorial centre of power and does not rely on fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a 
decentred and deterritorializing (authors' italics) apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates 
that entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers (Hardt and Negri 2001, xii). 
Within this framework empire becomes equivalent to globalisation. What each of 
these approaches to imperialism share is the belief that the institutions and 
networks of globalization or US super-imperialism have stifled and subordinated 
the economic rivalry of the major capitalist states. These of course are a 
replication of, or a variation of, the old Kautskyian argument that the tendencies 
towards rivalry and conflict between states or their political blocs in the 
contemporary age have been overcome (Hardach et al 1978, p. 46). This is not 
the perspective presented here and as will be argued, Lenin's theories have far 
more relevance to today than the authors mentioned above are willing to concede. 
Lastly, (c) the model of continuing inter- imperialism, taking new historical 
forms: "in this model although the international fusion of capital has proceeded 
far enough to replace a larger number of independent big imperialist powers with 
a smaller number of imperialist superpowers, the counteracting force of the 
uneven development of capital produces the formation of an actual global 
community of interest of capital. Capital fusion is achieved on a continental 
level, but thereby intercontinental imperialist competition is all the more 
intensified' (Mandel's italics: Mandel 1985, p. 533). This perspective is close to 
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the one taken in this thesis, however, I defer from a number of aspects of 
Mandel's understanding of the process in that the 'bloc' formation which he 
refers to between the 'smaller' imperialist powers is not as straightforward and as 
smooth as Mandel might propose nor is the number of blocs fixed or 
permanen . 
42 
Thus Lenin's theory of imperialism still has relevance today: it can explain 
imperialism and globalization but like any theory it requires to be applied in the 
circumstances of its day, with real understanding of historical context and not be 
applied dogmatically. 
Finally within Marxism, Nabudere has pointed out, it is important to demonstrate 
that imperialism manifests itself at various stages of development of societies. ... imperialism 
cannot therefore be comprehended as a general phenomenon, but has to be examined in relation to 
stages of development of the productive forces and their corresponding social relations and forms 
of organisation of production. But to do this scientifically it is necessary to establish the laws of 
motion specific to the various stages of development of the relevant imperialist and subordinated 
societies, hence the importance of historical materialism (Nabudere 1977, p. 268). 
This position is the context of our understanding of imperialism. 
2.1.8 Social and Political Aspects ofImperialism 
Some commentators on Lenin's theories have only focussed on the economic 
aspect of his understanding of imperialism. Yet Lenin's intentions in writing 
about imperialism were not primarily economic but political (Kemp 1967, p. 65). 
Its aim was 'an analysis and exposure of the theoretical errors of Kautskyism' 
(Lenin 1964a, p. 192). It sought to reveal the socio-economic premises upon 
42 We return to this subject in Chapter 4 when we examine Holland's European strategy. 
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which social democracy operated. In other words, his arguments were directed at 
exposing the roots of the political trend within the working class movement 
known as 'social democracy' of which Kautsky had become a major 
representative at that time. It was Lenin's aim to show: (a) the theoretical 
differences he had with Kautsky over modem capitalism and (b) to explain the 
economic and social roots of the political tendency of social democracy under 
conditions of monopoly capitalism. Some of the theoretical arguments of Lenin 
have already been scrutinized. In this section we will deal with Lenin's 
explanation of the economic and social roots of social democracy and its political 
outlook. 
Lenin argued that the role of the imperialist states in the global division of labour 
and the global distribution of Property enabled the ruling classes within those 
states to provide the basis for the "buying off' of sections of the working class 
and to accommodate certain working class demands within capitalism (Kemp 
1967, p. 79). In today's political economy this advantage is expressed in the 
position that states find themselves within the global division of labour (e. g. 
Dicken 1998). Lenin's theory enables an understanding that the capitalist classes 
of the imperialist states were able to utilise their dominant and privileged position 
in the world's markets to use tariff protection or free trade regimes (as the case 
may be) to secure jobs, cheaper food and raw material supplies, to maintain or 
establish social -democratic political and industrial structures at home, to provide 
consumer goods incorporating technological know-how, draw on larger tax bases 
for fiscal, military and welfare purposes, and improving standards of life for 
many metropole workers at the expense of workers and peoples elsewhere 
in the 
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world (see Jones 1986 on Neo-Mercantilism; Kemp 1967, pp. 79-80). 
43 These 
benefits of imperialism became the 'consumer society' of the late twentieth 
century, with economic power in the markets diverting commodities to the 
imperialist metropoles and providing an outlet for the export of commodities and 
capital (Kemp 1967, p. 83). However, as stated above, those benefits are not 
assured under the constant struggle of capitalist against capitalist and imperialism 
against imperialism. 
This economically favourable situation provided fertile ground, in Lenin's eyes, 
for the political movements of reformism and opportunism, which diverted the 
working class away from the struggle for socialist revolution and preferred 
accommodation with capital. Thus a split in the labour movement became 
established in imperialist era between those who sought reforms within 
capitalism and those who wanted to achieve its overthrow (Pierson 1986, Chaps 2 
and 3). 
Not surprisingly Lenin claimed that chauvinism, nationalism, jingoism and 
racism were the products of these alliances. 44 The imperialist states have 
developed various cultural constructs to express this identification of workers 
with their imperialisms (Magdoff 1976, p. 213; Mackenzie 1986,1987). 
43 This position differs from that of Szymanski (198 1, chap. 14) and the Monthly Review authors 
of the New Left of the 1960s that saw benefits to the metropole working class mainly at the 
expense of 'less developed countries' (LDCs) ; this repeats the mistake of Kautsky of seeing 
imperialism as benefiting from the 'less developed regions' only; imperialism operates globally 
not only in the LDCs and the benefits to sections of the working class of imperialist countries 
accrue from the privileged position it has in the global division of labour. See: Kemp (1967), p. 81 
4' For the attempts to whip up working class support for imperialism (defined as colonialism) see 
John Mackenzie (1986; 1987). Of course this was J. A. Hobson's (2005) point too. 
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Lenin's arguments have been subject to strong criticism, not surprisingly from 
social democrats, who have wanted to deny this analysis of reformism and 
opportunism in the working class movement and to reject the understanding of its 
social base. Some, such as Michael Barratt Brown, have argued that: 
The maintenance of imperialist political and economic relations ... did not benefit the working 
people of developed nations (Barratt Brown 1972b, p. 83) 
Barratt Brown argues this, however, from a false understanding of the concePt of 
imperialism as indicated above. He propounds a 'dual economy' concept in 
which the momentum of the global technological division of labour creates a 
global political economy where the developed world is technologically advanced 
and the under-developed part is not (Barratt Brown 1972b, p. 86). It is based on a 
technological determinist view and fails to highlight the role of the capitalist 
social and political relations that shape the international division of labour (see 
above). Barratt Brown totally fails to see also that imperialism is not about 
relations solely between advanced and 'developing' nations but about how 
monopoly capital acts in its relations to all countries, developed and 
underdeveloped, as a whole and how it imposes its rule through the institution of 
private property (Kemp 1967, p. 8 1). 
Imperialism, as Lenin emphasised, is monopoly capitalism. It includes the 
multinationals (served by the state), spreading their wings to all parts of the 
globe, imposing private property regimes, and the privileged and powerful 
economic positions they are able to exploit for themselves and the maintenance 
of the social system as a whole (Kemp 1967, p. 8 1). 
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2.1.9 The Bloc Theory of Imperialism 
Monopolies have a home base, which currently, exists in nation states (Brewer 
1990, p. 265; Magdoff 1976 p. 213; Mandel 1970, p. 55ff., Mandel 1978, Chap. 
10: Gill and Law 1988, p. 195). 45 However, in the struggle of capitals, especially 
of smaller against larger, there is no reason why smaller national capitals may not 
look to seek and build larger political units than their domestic nation state in 
their struggles against rivals (Engels 1990, pp. 457-458; Lenin 1964c; Rowthom 
1971; Mandel 1970 p. 55ff. and 1978 Chap. 10; Holloway and Picciotto 1980; 
Burnham 1995, p. I 10; Milward 2003, chap. 13). However, the concept of a 
worldwide state representing all capitals and managing their interests in common 
is but a mere illusion (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik, 1999, p. 59; Lenin 1964a; 
Beitel 2005; pp. 189-191; Nabudere 1977, p. 184; Mandel 1978, Chap. 10). It 
would be tantamount to asserting that the conflictual nature of the capital 
accumulation process could be overcome by the power of the state in some form 
of 'organized' capitalism (Hardach et al. 1978, pp. 54-56; Mandel 1978, Chap. 
10). However, supranational political entities are possible; the formation of 
economic blocs being a good example (Lenin 1964c; Mandel 1970 and 1978; 
Nabudere 1977 and 1979; Beitel 2005, pp. 172-178; Carchedi 2001, p. 129) but 
these blocs themselves are fragmented by the interests of conflicting capitals and 
are equally liable to reformation under changing circumstances as is the nation 
state (Lenin 1964c; Holloway and Picciotto 1980, p. 142; Chase-Dunn and 
41 of course this is a contested viewpoint. (See, for example, Reich (1993), Introduction and esp. 
p. 8) 
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Podobnik, 1999, pp. 56-58, Burnham 1991, pp 82-83; Burnham 1995, p. 109- 
110). " 
A feature of the post-WWII global political economy has been the emergence of 
political -economic 'blocs' or more commonly called 'regionalism' (Gamble and 
Payne 1996; Schultz, S6derbaum and 6jendal 2001 ). 
47 Of course there is nothing 
new about the formation of such blocs (Gamble and Payne 1996, p. 11). 
48 The 
outcome of the Second World War proved a turning point in the organisation of 
such blocs, whereas previously they, by and large, had been based on colonies 49 
they began to take on, in general, a regional dimension. 50 This was largely 
because colonialism had suffered at the time, and was in the process of, political 
and economic defeat (Dell 1963, pp 28-29; Nabudere 1977 and 1979). 
51 
The fact that the US could act as both a trade bloc and a nation-state on a huge 
scale increased the attraction of trade bloc formation amongst the West European 
states (Dell 1963, p. 37, Mandel 1970; George 1996, pp. 22-23). The irony is that 
46 The theory of bloc imperialism in relation to was first explored in depth by Ernst Mandel 
(1970; 1978) 
47 1 use the term political-economic, rather then economic, in order to emphasise the state's role in 
the formation of modem regional blocs. They are not the product of economic forces alone but 
the result of state action in pursuit of economic goals as well. In stating this I am not prioritising 
the role of the political over the economic as some realists do, but rather ensuring that the state 
role or politics in the process is not overlooked. See Gamble and Payne (1996) and Schultz, 
S6derbaum and Ojendal (200 1). 
" Their predecessors go back to the colonial empires of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
run through the formation of the United States and Germany in the nineteenth century, their 
significance was pronounced in the interwar years 1918-1939 especially the military 
expansionism of Germany and Japan, Britain and France tried to organise trade blocs and the 
United States reinforcement of protectionism (through the Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930) followed 
by its bilateral trade policy in the later 1930s (See also: Gamble and Payne (1996), p. 11). 
49The exceptions to this were the United States in Latin America and Japan in East Asia. 
'0 On the history of trade blocs and common markets see Sidney Dell (1963), Chap I and Lairson 
and Skidmore (19933). P. 59 and pp. 141-162). 
51 Of course, there was the attempt bý some countries such as Britain and France to hold onto 
their colonies as long as possible or to form new economic blocs e. g. with the Commonwealth. 
African countries, etc (Dell 1963, p. 30; Martel 2000, p. 417). 
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the United States assisted in this process, largely for economic reasons of its own 
and for po I itical -security reasons to ward of the Communist 'threaf and to build 
Western Europe as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (Gilpin 1971 p. 409 ff. 
Bonefeld 2002). 52 The European Economic Community (EEC) which was 
established in 1957 as a result incorporated neo-colonial relationships with its 
colonies through the Lome agreement (Mandel 1970, Nabudere 1979, Chap. 5 
and Carchedi and Carchedi 1999; Carchedi 2001, p. 117). The EEC became the 
model for later blocs in other regions of the world, e. g. ASEAN, NAFTA (Mattli 
1999). Thus the world has become increasingly divided into economic blocs with 
the character of the bloc determined by the political -economic nature of the states 
driving the process (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik, 1999, p. 57; Schultz, S6derbaurn 
and Ojendal 2001). However, the bloc theory of imperialism does not hold that 
imperialism is tied to nation-states irrevocably but that imperialism changes with 
historical context and that it produces new political formations in the process of 
struggle both against other imperialisms and against the working class (Mandel 
1970, p. 55ff. and Mandel 1978, Chap. 10). 
53 
2.2 Holland's Concept ofMonopoly Capitalism 
2.2.1 Holland's Theoretical Roots 
Holland's theoretical outlook was originally strongly influenced by 
Keynesianism. However his Keynesianism is what Schott has described as the 
"wider variant" which is "more socialist" and believes in greater state 
52 For the economic reasons see: Cox and Skidmore-Hess (1999), pp. 76-8 1; Gilpin (197 1), pp. 
409-414 for the po liti cal -security reasons Gilpin (197 1 ), pp. 409-414 
53 The subject of bloc imperialism is dealt with in Chap. 4. 
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involvement in the running of the economy than the more limited variant of 
Keynesianism known as the neoclassical synthesis (Schott 1985, pp. 340-342). 
Holland, in response to the right-wing social democratic focus on demand in the 
1960s, stresses the supply-side of economic policy (Tsakalotos 1991, p. 73). 
However the 'supply side' is focused on organisational power in the market or in 
exchange relations rather than the understanding of the processes of capital 
accumulation or in the laws governing developments in production relations. 
Holland's understanding of capitalism is not based, as in Marxism, on the laws of 
the dynamic relationship between the forces of production and production 
relations and the integral nature of economics and politics. Instead it is centred on 
the problems of the market. Primarily it is a political economy of how to improve 
capitalist market supply rather than a political economy of a social system 
(Tsakalotos 1991,12ff. ). As Holland wrote in 1977: 
The issues of the structure of supply rather them demand, of chronic disproportion and of direct 
rather than indirect Keynesian controls have been brought to the forefront of debate (on economic 
policy - DL) (p. 76) 
Holland's economic thought is dominated by the consequences of the distribution 
of power rather than in the Marxist model by the distribution of property (I 976a, 
p. 15). Hence his theory is of the "power theoretic" school (Wolff, 1999). His 
strategies concentrate more on the redistribution of power especially between the 
state and monopolies and within the industrial sphere rather than on the 
redistribution of property. This underscores his outlook that the fundamental 
problem of contemporary monopoly capitalism is not the concentration of 
property into the hands of a small minority and the consequences for society of 
that property distribution but rather about the power of multinational monopolies 
to frustrate goverment policies (Holland 1976a). 
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Much of Holland's early thinking on MNCs was influenced by the work of 
Raymond Vernon and the work of the American international business school. 
One of the outcomes of Vernon's study was that national economic sovereignty 
was held at "bay" by the rise of multinational companies (Vernon 1971). A 
second influence on Holland was that of the Marxist school known as the 
"Internationalisation of Capital" (IoC) School. There were various strands to this 
school represented by Palloix, Murray, Poulantzas, and Mandel and others. 54 A 
common strand in their thinking was that a process of the internationalisation of 
capital was occurring, and had been since WWII, and that this had implications 
for the nation-state . 
55 Briefly, it was viewed that the nation-state could no longer 
implement economic policy independently and therefore policy implementation 
was constrained by developments in the intemationalisation of capital (Palloix 
1975; Murray 1971; Poulantzas 1974; Mandel 1970). 
Although, at times, he uses categories of analysis, and terminology, from Marxist 
literature he never applies those categories in a consistent manner. In fact, the 
central core of Marxist theory, the labour theory of value and the related theory 
of surplus value, are hardly ever mentioned. It is mentioned once in an article 
outlining the differences between Keynes and the Socialists (Holland 1977, pp. 
71-72). It is intimated in his analysis (e. g. 1976a See Appendix) but is never 
expanded on or used again by Holland as the heart of his analysis of capitalism. 
Class is used by Holland in the Weberian manner, defined by relations to the 
market rather them by relations to production. 
54 Holland makes reference to and bases arguments on some or all of these authors in both 
Socialist Challenge and Uncommon Market. 
55 See John Holloway 1976. 
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The labour theory of value is central to an understanding of class relations in the 
capitalist system and the class struggle that results. Exploitation occurs through 
the institution of private property in the process of production and therefore that 
exploitation cannot be abolished without ending the institution of private property 
in the means of production (Resnick, Sinisi and Wolff 1985, p. 99 ff.; Howard 
and King 1975, p. 15ff. ). Given that this theory is central to a theory of labour 
exploitation, to an understanding of Marxist economics and sociology and is the 
lynchpin of Marx's critique of capitalism it is not surprising that Holland applies 
Marxism inconsistently. He is not able to broaden out his theory of monopoly 
capitalism to link it with the nature of capitalist accumulation and the class 
struggle which drives it forward. The preference for a pluralistic mixture of tools 
of analysis over Marxist approaches results in Holland neglecting important 
aspects of capitalism as an economic and social system. All in all, Holland fails 
to engage in any significant way with the fundamentals of Marxist economic or 
political theory. 
2.2.2. Holland's Theory ofMonopoly Capitalism 
Holland's theory of monopoly capitalism is primarily a theory of industrial or 
market structure. He has a very narrow conception of monopoly capitalism and 
its relation to the rest of the social and political system. His theory analyses one 
segment of the whole social system, rather than providing a theory of the social 
system as a whole (Holland 1976a, Chap 2; Holland 1976b, pp. 127-142). This 
approach is entirely consistent with mainstream academic economic analysis 
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(Sawyer 1988, pp. 48-51; Begg, Fischer, Dombusch 2000, chap. 9). Thus, unlike 
in Marxist accounts, there are no attempts to indicate the determining effects of 
such a system on the state and an explanation of the dynamics of the 
accompanying social structure. 
Monopoly capitalism is examined apart from political and social institutions and 
is viewed as just one specific factor in a social and political framework that is 
structured by this as well as several other factors e. g. culture, ideology, politics 
and social structure. From Holland's standpoint, these other institutions or 
spheres may or may not be influenced by monopoly capital. The main weakness 
of Holland's analysis is that it fails to provide a holistic and integral 
understanding of the capitalist system based on private property (as we have tried 
to show with the Marxist model outlined above), i. e. how private property shapes 
the relationships between economics, society and politics but rather maintains the 
separation of these spheres as occurs in mainstream academia. 
His work is influenced too by the writings of Baran and Sweezy on monopoly in 
the 1950s (Holland 1977, p. 75). But he does not share the neo-Marxist concept 
of monopoly capitalism as developed by Baran and Sweezy (1968). His works 
contain no reference to what they consider the 'central theme' of monopoly 
capitalism: 'the generation and absorption of the surplus' (Baran and Sweezy, 
1968, p. 2 1). Nor does Holland possess an integral analysis of the system as a 
whole as the neo-Marxists Baran and Sweezy have. Holland does use elements of 
their analysis e. g. the role of advertising in modem monopoly competit on. He 
superficially shares with them a theory of underconsumption and the importance 
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of the role of the state in providing consumption and therefore boosting 
production, growth and jobs (Holland 1976a, p. 389). However, by and large, 
Holland's theories of underconsumption and the role of the state largely stem 
from Keynes, partly from Marx, and partly intellectual sources within the social 
democratic tradition (Holland 1977, pp. 72-77). 
Holland in his writings emphasises the 'new mode of production, distribution and 
exchange' in both the British and European economics in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Holland 1976a pp. 51,154 and 1980, Chap. 4). The core of the concept is 
Holland's discovery of the power of monopolies and multinational monopolies in 
particular, at work in the global, European and national political economies. At 
no point does he try to linkup the development of these phenomena with 
developments in capitalism and private property regimes over the whole 
twentieth century. Thus he fails to connect the rise of these phenomena with the 
international power of cartels, trusts, syndicates and monopolies that existed in 
the period 1900-1945 (on this see, for example: Nabudere 1977,1979; Magdoff 
1976; Apter 1976; Cassis 1997; Hannah 1976; Jeremy 1998; Franko 1976; 
Hilferding 198 1; Held, McGrew et al 1999; Lenin 1964a). Multinationals had 
been present on the economic scene for a long time (Jeremy 1996; Held, McGrew 
et al. 1999); of course, what Holland emphasises is the spread of the 
multinational form of the monopoly which did increase rapidly after the war 
(Held, McGrew et al 1999), especially US and British post -1945 (Gilpin 1975; 
Gill and Law 1988) and the emergence of European MNCs after the war (Franko 
1971). Monopolies were powerful in the economies of European and the US 
before 1939 (Cassis 1997; Jeremy 1996; Du Boff 1989). The acceleration towards 
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multinationality after 1945 was, in part, a response the rise of trade and economic 
blocs. Holland's major failing when dealing with multinational monopolies is the 
failure to link this development with the various precedents in the global political 
economy pre- 1945. 
To sum up, Holland does not operate within the Marxist analytic framework of 
monopoly capitalism, i. e. a specific stage in the development of capitalism where 
monopolies, and specifically MNCs, become the predominant form of capitalist 
organisation and consequently shape the dynamics of the capitalist state (Kemp 
1967; Lenin 1964a; Nabudere 1977 and 1979; Milward 2003, Chap. 4). 
2.2.3 Holland's Analysis ofMonopoly or Oligopolistic firms 
His theory of the firm is rooted in, and is a radicalised version of, mainstream 
academic economics and is mainly grounded in the critiques of neoclassical 
economics made by various theorists (Holland 1976a, Chap. 2; 1987a, Chaps. 3 
and 4; Radice 1975a, p. 12) . 
56 There is no doubt, too, that Marx and latter-day 
Marxists (i. e. Lenin, Bukharin and Hilferding) also had some influence on 
Holland especially in their analysis of monopolies (Holland 1987b, pp. 181-187). 
But whenever Holland discusses monopoly the context he uses is that of 
distortion of market structure (See 1976a Chap 2; 1976b, Chap. 5; 1980, pp. 65- 
71; 1987a; 1993a, pp. 86-99) or unequal competition (1992b). Holland's ideas on 
multinational monopolies also reveal closer affinity to the American school of 
international business led by people such as Raymond Vernon (197 1) than it does 
56 Holland mentions among others: Sraffa (1926), Chamberlain (1933), Robinson (1933), Kalecki 
(1954), Penrose (1963), Downie (1958) and Galbraith (1967), Sylos-Labini (1962 and 1969), 
Perroux (1964), (see Holland 1976b, Chap. 5., and 1987a, xiv, pp. 12-13, Chap 4). 
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to Marxism (Radice 1975, p. 12). Holland participated with Vernon on various 
works on European public enterprise and in seminars on the same subject and it is 
clear that his ideas have a close proximity with Vernon's on the threat of 
multinationals to national sovereignty (Vernon 1971) rather than how they 
exploit the working class (Mandel 1968). 
His ideas regarding the impact of monopolies in politics can be discerned in the 
works of Barratt Brown (1968 and 1972a), the writing of Raymond Vernon 
(1971), the work of John Strachey (Holland 1977, p. 75), Robin Murray (1975) 
and Walter Goldstein (1974). 
His analysis is based on a response to the perfect market model of neoclassical 
economics rather than a break with its premises (Holland 1987a; Holland 1976a). 
Holland perceives the rise of multinational monopolies as a variety of market 
failure rather than a product of a specific stage in the development of capitalism 
(Tsakalotos 1991,12ff. ). He does not connect the rise of multinational 
monopolies with forms of business organisations that had prevailed in the 
interwar years such as cartels and trusts. 
A consequence of Holland's analysis is that he regards the solution as not the 
uprooting of the very sources of monopoly within capitalism but the introduction 
of some form of competitive market structure instead which for Holland had 
existed in the 1950s would enable the redeployment of Keynesian 
macroeconornics (Holland 1976a, p. 164ff. ; Laux and Molot 1988, p. 17 ). 
Holland also viewed the ýboorn years' of the 1950s and 1960s as a product of the 
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success of Keynesian state policies in a competitive economy rather than a 
temporary boom in capitalist accumulation as Marxists had argued (Holland 
1976a, chap. 2 and 1987b, p. 141; Armstrong, Glyn and Harrison 1984; Bienefeld 
1994, p. 125; Thomson 2000, p. 39). 
The problem with Holland's critique is that even though it questions some of the 
assumptions of conventional economics, namely free competition among firms in 
the market, it does not break with them completely. 
2.2.4 Holland's Theory of Economic Crisis 
In his major work on political economy (1987a and 1987b), Holland reduces 
Marxist theory of capitalist crisis to a problem of under-consumption and this 
enables Holland to utilise Keynesian prescriptions as the remedy to the problem 
of economic crisis (Holland 1987b, pp. 379-381). Holland's aim is to restore the 
workings of the capitalist market, but not to abolish its foundation - private 
property in the means of production. 
The market and its spontaneous operation of the law of value are still accepted as 
a goal within Holland's political economy. However, instead of Adam Smith's 
metaphysical 'invisible hand' guiding its operations, Holland maintains that the 
real hand of the state must correct its anomalies. More active state intervention is 
the solution to the economic crises of capitalism (Holland 1976a, 1980; 1987b p. 
141 and p. 38 1) and that intervention is aimed at enabling capitalist growth again 
so that its fruits can be distributed among the main classes of capitalist society. 
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Thus within Holland's analysis the central focus to the solution of economic 
crisis falls upon the relations between institutions that structure the market. The 
realignment of those institutions to ensure the proper functioning of the market is 
at the heart of Holland's political economy. Yet it is the operation of the system 
through the market, from the Marxist perspective presented above, that produces, 
inevitably, monopoly capital and the crises of monopoly capitalism (Fine and 
Harris 1979, p. 132; Mandel 1968, Chap. 11). 
The major economic problem of the 'real world' which Holland described was 
that the tendency to 'equilibrium' in the market which the neoclassicals 
propounded was in fact a mere fiction (Holland 1976b, p. 13 1; Holland 1987a, 
pp. 99-102). Thus, in Holland's opinion, the real tendency of capitalism's market 
was not towards balance, equilibrium and stability but rather to imbalance, 
disequilibrium and instability. This question of whether the 'free working of the 
market tends to equilibrium or disequilibrium', Holland argues, 'is crucial to 
public policy'. He continues: 
If the market... balances... [t]hen government intervention may be minimal or unnecessary. If by 
contrast ... the economy tends to 
depart from equilibrium, a whole range of public policies will 
be needed to offset such misbalance (Holland 1987a, pp. 8-9). 
This sums up Holland's political economy in a nutshell and can be situated 
within Shaikh's (1983) group of "possibility theories" of economic crisis. 
2.2.5 Holland's Theory of Socialist Transformation 
As Holland does not recognise the exploitation of labour in the Marxist sense, he 
cannot elaborate clearly the economic, social and political conditions for the 
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abolition of the exploitation of the working class i. e. the abolition of private 
property in the means of production and its replacement by common ownership. 
Holland looks to the state capitalist intervention to remedy problems facing the 
working class rather than advocating working class power. By the latter is meant 
that the working class has to develop new participative forms of power which 
enables it to become fully sovereign (Hoffman 1995; 1998), responsible, political 
actors rather than the recipients of decisions of representatives (Pierson 1986, 
chaps 2 and 3 ). 
57 
In Marx's social and political analysis the working class was the centre of the 
social system. The analysis acknowledged that the working class alone had the 
power to liberate itself if so organised and was the only class that had a direct 
interest in socialised relations of production (i. e. to free itself from exploitation 
by private property owners). This, for Marx, made it a revolutionary class and the 
focus of his call for its political organisation. Although Holland makes appeals to 
the working class and calls for radical reforms to the state he has no vision of the 
working class restructuring the capitalist state so as to allow mass democratic 
participation in political decision-making at all levels (Pierson 1986, Chaps. 1-3). 
The working class, in Holland's vision, have to act indirectly through the state 
and its representative institutions rather then taking direct action and forming 
their own new, participative institutions along the lines Marx, Lenin and 
Luxemburg advocated (Pierson 1986, p. 22, p. 54. p. 65; Weber, 1978, p. 8). 
Likewise, from the above Marxist standpoint, corporatism and triPartism, which 
57 This is discussed further in chapter three. 
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Holland promotes in his planning agreements, can be viewed as collaboration by 
the working class in their own exploitation (Panitch 1986, passim). 
Nevertheless Holland is aware of how changes in the institutions that structure 
production have an impact on other spheres of politics and society. For instance, 
he argues that multinational monopolies can frustrate the ability of governments 
to steer the economy. But he does not perceive these socio-political changes as 
the product of the struggles within monopoly capitalism. For Holland, the 
problems are not a result of the system of private property but of a 
maýfunctioning of the system, which if remedied, can make the system run more 
efficiently and thereby countervail the harmful effect of monopoly organisation 
in industry i. e. by the state facilitating competition. This differs sharply from the 
model presented above where the only way to eradicate the menace of the 
multinationals is to change the social system at the roots, both economically and 
politically. Ultimately, Holland's perspective is a rebalancing of relations 
between state and monopoly capital rather than the abolition of both the capitalist 
state and the acme of private property, monopoly capital. 
2.2.6 Holland's Characterisation of the Contemporary Age: Imperialist Rivalry 
v. the Competition of the Multinationals 
Radical international political economy is divided within itself as to how to 
portray contemporary capitalism today. Some believe it is best characterised by 
stressing the prominence of multinational capital which has become "footloose" 
in its relations with the state (R. Murray 1975, Goldstein 1974, Sutcliffe 2002, 
pp. 51-54; Barratt Brown 1995, Chap. 17); others consider imperialism as a more 
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accurate analytical understanding of capitalism (Freeman and Kagarlitsky 2004, 
Carchedi 2001 , Petras and Veltmeyer 200 1, Nabudere 1979, Halliday 2002). The 
difference between the two concepts is the role the state plays within them. 
Within the former model, multinational monopolies act outside and beyond the 
powers of the state; the state appears as a dependent variable on the independent 
power of big capital. In the latter model, the state and capital work together to 
impose global private property relations and to enable the global accumulation of 
capital. Holland leans towards the first tendency but is prepared to acknowledge a 
'conjunctural' understanding of imperialism in his writings (Holland 1980, p. 
152ff. ). 
Holland's notions of imperialism and the modern global economy are based on 
beliefs that Lenin's theories of imperialism are inapplicable and that imperialist 
policies are just that - policies of particular historical conjunctures of economics, 
personalities and institutions rather than the expression of a stage in the 
development of monopoly capitalism. Rather than viewing capitalist economics, 
politics and ideas as an expression of the whole system or mode of production; 
Holland is of the school that views the 'social fon-nation' as 'the structural 
separation between politics and economics, state and market' (Colas and Saull 
2006, p. 2). Holland's analysis bears similarity with those who consider 
'ideological frameworks, political contestation and historical contingency' (Colas 
and Saull 2006, p. 3) are important in the analysis of imperialism. The Marxist 
model presented above views imperialism as the outcome of a stage in the 
development of capitalism, a stage whereby private property relations which are 
imposed globally reach new heights under the rule of monopoly capital. 
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In a review of Eurocommunist parties' political economy which is relevant to our 
argument, Holland writes that their approach "shifted Lenin's emphasis from 
international struggle between imperialist states to competitive struggle between 
multinational companies" (Holland 1979c, p. 213). This comment could not 
better apply to Holland's own political economy. Holland too prefers the 
'competitive struggle between multinational companies over and above states and 
within which states intervene rather than adopting the imperialist model. The 
state is not recognised as a 'home' state of monopoly capital which promotes its 
interests; but rather as a 'host' state which must negotiate with it. 58 This position 
enables Holland to argue for state intervention against the monopolies. 
For he continues: 
They (the Eurocommunist parties -DL) stressed the changed scale and scope of state intervention 
in capitalism, with the implicit admission that state subsidy and public purchasing... could now 
achieve real gains both for capital and for the working class. Their differences were also crucially 
reflected in political strategy: while Lenin saw state intervention mainly as a futile attempt to 
offset the impending crisis of capitalism for a while, and state capitalism as the ante-chamber to a 
socialist transformation of a capitalist society, the state monopoly capitalism thesis, as endorsed 
by the main communist parties in the mid 1960s, admitted the adaptive capacity of the modem 
capitalist state, and its relative ability to postpone and frustrate the transformation of capitalism 
through placation of broad sections of the working class (Holland 1979c, p. 213). 
State monopoly capitalism, a term first used by Lenin (Lenin 1964b, p. 387 and 
p. 415), utilised the concept to stress tendencies within imperialism. These 
tendencies were the 'extraordinary strengthening of the "state machine" and an 
unprecedented growth in its bureaucratic and military apparatus" (Lenin 1964b, 
p. 415) and the merging of the state 'more and more' with the monopolies (Lenin 
1964b, p. 415). Subsequently the concept has been used by different thinkers in 
58 The terms 'home' and 'host' state are widely used within IPE : the former to denote the home 
base of monopolies ; the latter to denote a state which 'hosts' the investment of MNCs from 
another county. 'Home and 'host' states have different policy characteristics in their relationships 
with monopoly capital. 
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different contexts. 59 This is not the place to enter into the debate around the 
interpretations of the concept but one version of the concept became the basis of 
Eurocommunist political economy which held that the state control over 
monopoly capitalism had reached such a point that the democratisation of the 
state would and could allow socialist policies to be introduced (see Holland 
1979c). Holland's 'state capitalism' concept plays the same role. Holland's 
position on state capitalism changes over time in terms of its forms (i. e. its 
democratic content) but generally, the concept forms the core of his political 
economy. Holland defines 'state capitalism' as inter alia: 
Intervention by the State to attempt to alleviate or overcome the failures and contradictions in a 
private capitalist system... it represents intervention in which the state itself becomes a capitalist, 
owning and managing enterprise (Holland 1976a, pp. 144-145). 
The central role it plays within his political economy is shown by the following 
statement: 
Socialists should not stand idly by in the face of new techniques of state management or new 
dimensions to the public sector under a state capitalist mode of production. They should seize and 
use them as instruments for the wider socialist transformation of the system as a whole. (Holland 
1976a, p. 154) 
This role of state is recognised too by Holland in the changed attitude of certain 
West European communist parties to the role of the regional bloc, the EEC. Both 
the Italian and the Spanish Communist Parties viewed this international 
organisation as an 'effective countervailance. .. 
[to]. .. monopoly and 
multinational capital (Holland 1979c, p. 214). 
These statements on Eurocommunist political economy are almost perfect 
summaries of Holland's own position. For Holland the monopolies and 
'9 Useful, but not always accurate, reviews of the concept can be found in Hardach, Karras and 
Fine (1978), pp. 63-68; Jessop (1982), Chap. 2; Mandel (1978), pp. 513-522 and Laurence Harris 
(1983). 
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multinationals were the central obstacle in the strategy towards socialism and it is 
to the powers of the 'adaptive capacity of the modem capitalist stateý that he 
turns in order to countervail them both in Britain and Europe. Moreover, he 
regarded monopolies not as products of the capitalist system but as failures of the 
market. 
Thus these two very different conceptions enable the creation of two very 
different strategies to deal with them. The 'market failure' model requires the 
market to be restored, this is Holland's fundamental strategy; the 'monopolies-as- 
capital i st- system-product' model requires a change of system, this is the crux of 
my critique. The monopolies and multinationals had replaced imperialism as the 
main enemy of the left and this conveniently freed up the state from its political 
and class role as an expression of monopoly capitalism and provided the theory 
for it to become the 'neutral' countervailing force against monopolies, to become 
the guardian of the market against monopolies; thus the left social-democratic 
emphasis on the role of the state against N4NCs. 
In the theory of imperialism (as we have shown above) the state was inextricably 
bound up with the maintenance and expansion of the system. Separating 
monopolies and multinationals from the state, as Holland has done in his 
analysis, allowed him, like the Eurocommunists, to take a different approach to 
the 'modern capitalist state' and to visualise it as a means of countervailing the 
monopolies and multinationals in his strategy. This brings us to Holland's 
concept of the state. 
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2.2.7 Holland's Concept of the State 
Holland perceives the capitalist state as separable from private property relations. 
He considers the state to have no limits; that it can act against monopoly capital 
and manage its consequences. In this conception Holland is within the social- 
democratic tradition which tends to emphasize the independent power of the state 
and its ability to impose policy priorities over society (Jones and Keating 1985 p. 
3; see section 2.2.6). Control of the state is, therefore, the most important task of 
progressives (Jones and Keating 1985, p. 3). 
The notion of the state (whatever form it takes national or supranational) as a 
4 countervai lance' to the multinationals is a common concept amongst radical IPE 
theorists (Payne 2005, pp. 32-35; Radice 2007; G. Strange 2006). Thus Cox 
considers an alternative to the hegemonic neoliberal bloc may be possible. He 
writes of 'the alternative of state capitalism, that is, a new corporatism with an 
industrial policy geared to competitiveness in world markets... presupposes the 
reconstruction of a historic bloc capable of creating a reasonably broad social 
base to sustain its policies' (Robert W. Cox 1989, p. 48). Holland shares with 
radical IPE theorists a similar concept of the autonomous state in relation to 
multinational monopolies and capitalist society (Burnharn 1991, p. 90). It 
is a 
concept of an autonomous state that can be changed by democratic reform so that 
the power of the monopolies can be curtailed; 'it is a programme for building 
socialism through the extension of bourgeois democratic forms' 
(Wood 1983, p. 
269). Not all interpretations of the state are the same, there are nuances of 
understanding, but many boil down to this position. 
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However, as I have shown above, the capitalist state is inextrIcably linked with 
private property, both domestically and globally. It is the institution which 
maintains and regulates the relations of private property (Clarke 1988; Holloway 
and Picciotto 1977; Burnham 2002; Lipson 1985). This means it maintains the 
dominant form of private property, the relations of multinational monopoly 
capital. In today's world, where capitalism (where it is dominant) exists in the 
form of nation-states then capital has to take a multinational form if it is to take 
advantage of those nation-state markets otherwise it must succumb to the 
methods of the early twentieth century to gain access: which is war or other 
fon-ns of violence (Cassese 1988, Chap 9; Lipson 1985, pp. 119,134,145, and 
147-153). States in such circumstances seek to ensure private property rules by 
other means (when it can) i. e. international organisations (e. g. WTO, EU), 
regimes, bilateral and multilateral treaties and rules relating to property, 
diplomacy, influence and economic sanctions. Also it is within the multilateral 
form that the various national and social class conflicts over private property are 
attemPted to be managed. (Picciotto 1991,1988; Cassese 1988, p. 317 ff.; 
Krasner 1985; Luard 1984, pp. 48-60; Lipson 1985, p. 137ff.; Ruggie 1993, pp. 
3-47; Burley 1993, pp. 130-139; Garrett 1993, pp, 376-379; Panitch 1994, p. 
63ff. ). 
It is clear therefore that if the base of both capitalism and the capitalist state are to 
be removed, i. e. private property in the means of production, this cannot be 
performed by a state that has been erected upon those principles and is organised 
so as to enhance the rule of private property globally and 
domestically; the 
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property relationship is 'inherent in the very form of capitalist state power' 
(Clarke 1988, p. 130; Burnham 2008, pp 62-63). 60 
For Holland, the stability of capitalist society and the political base of social and 
economic redistribution policies hang upon the role of the capitalist state 
(Holland 1976a; 1980; 1993). It is not surprising that generally he does not 
question its role in his theory, and that it remains under-theorized within his 
works, because for him, historically, it is the instrument that has conducted the 
type of intervention he supports. This view is the product of his studies in state 
capitalism, European public enterprise (Holland 1972a and 1974) and his 
Keynesianism. 
It is notable that when he does subject the state to any deeper 'class' analysis it is 
because he considers the state to have fallen prey to the grip of the multinational 
monopolies and that what is required is to develop strategies to win the state back 
to its previous role in the economy. In a sense, Holland strategies look back to the 
'golden age' of social democracy (Thomson 2000, p. 39). Holland's politics add 
up simply to the outlook of reformism. It is the power of MNCS to apparently act 
independently of the state and to frustrate its policies and undennine the social- 
democratic 'project' that sets Holland off on his political path to try to devise the 
means under which they can be "managed". His political economy exhibits one 
long struggle of seeking to manage the problem of monopoly capitalism which, 
for him, fetishises itself in the increasing power of one particular capitalist 
60 An example of how the state is shaped both by domestic and global social and economic forces 




institution - the MNC - over society (Holland 1976a and 1980; Alford and 
Friedland 1985, part II; Burnham 1999). 
But in a sense Holland is chasing a chimera; for what he considers the problem, 
the power of MNCs, is not the real problem itself but the product of a much 
deeper structural development within capitalism. It is a problem for which 
Holland will find no solution within capitalism because the multinational 
monopoly is capitalism itself and today capitalism can only exist in and through c;, -- 
its dominant form: the MNC. There can be no capitalism without multinational 
monopolies. Capitalism with multinational monopolies cannot exist without an 
anarchic form despite attempts to manage it (see sections 1.2 and 1.3 above). 
State intervention may manage it here or there but it can never subordinate it, as 
the state itself is integral in sustaining capitalism and that means sustaining 
multinational monopolies. There are limits, in other words, to how far the state 
can act against capital under capitalism (Clarke 1988; Holloway and Picciotto 
1977). 
Holland utilises two models of the state both in his analysis of Britain (Holland 
1976a; 1979a) and of the European Community (Holland 1980, Chap. 7). In the 
former he describes the state in Milibandian terms as an instrumental form, as a 
'spender, umpire, entrepreneur and planner' (I 976a, p. 16) and in the latter he has 
a somewhat more sophisticated concept of the state, in a Poulantzian structural 
functionalist form (Burnham 1995b), as a 'means for mediating the problems 
posed for different sections of capital and labour by the unequal and uneven 
development of capitalism' and supplemental to this its 'role for social cohesion 
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and maintenance of a particular form or mode of society' (Holland 1980, p. 129). 
It should be noted that in both concepts the state can be utilized for either 
capitalist or socialist purposes, it retains its basis for reformism, it is an 'empty 
vessel', depending on the balance of class or social forces (Holland 1979a, 1980; 
Wood 1983; Bumham 2008, pp. 61-2). 
For Holland the state is defined through its social functions internally within the 
capitalist system by referring to either its mediating role or its cohesion function. 
He does not define the state in relation to its private property basis, i. e. that the 
state performs the role of facilitating imperialism in the global political economy. 
This latter definition immediately highlights the capitalist class aspect of the state 
in its domestic and global relations and in its power-form rather then in its 
facil itating- form in the circuits of capital (Burnham 2002). In contrast to the 
welfare-creating "social cohesive or social mediating" (or state interventionist) 
form (Holland 1976a, 1980); the main role of the imperialist state is to reproduce 
capital in the global economy not purely to sustain capitalist production within a 
national economy. The state function of "social cohesion" is but one aspect of the 
task of the state to carry out the functions of imperialism. Therefore the state of 
an advanced capitalist country has not just a "mediating" form in the global 
political economy (Radice 2000a, p. 12) but rather an "imperialist" form. It 
actively pursues the interests of monopoly capitalism or private property rather 
than passively mediating either the conflicting interests of capital or labour or 
facilitating the circuits of capital. 
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By defining the state by its "social cohesive or social mediating" role alone 
means that an important aspect of the state is omitted or overlooked, this is the 
role of the state in carrying out monopoly capitalism's drive towards imperialism. 
The consequences of this omission are important for strategy; as Holland argues, 
if the primary role of the state is considered to be to produce social cohesion the 
possibility opens up of a strategy of redirecting that purpose towards socialist 
ends through "socialist policies" which can be utilised against, or for that matter 
with, monopoly capital. For it could be argued, as Holland does and globalisation 
theorists do, that social cohesion cannot be served by the simple dominance of 
monopolies over the state, it is necessary for power to be shared (See Cox 
quotation above). Implicit, too, is a concept of the state that is concerned for the 
welfare of its citizens above and beyond that of the capital relation. The state is 
defined not by class but by "above class" social objectives. It is but a different 
form of the 'welfare state'. The class essence of the state remains hidden. 
Such a definition is partial and conveniently neglects the internal and external 
political relations of the state: the state as the political expression of monopoly 
capitalist relations domestically and externally, i. e. imperialism. However if the 
primary role of the advanced capitalist state is considered to be an imperialist 
one, and cannot but be so due to its role in global capital accumulation, i. e. the 
reproduction of an imperialist state in the global political economy is imperative; 
then that state cannot be utilised fundamentally against monopoly capitalism, as it 
is an expression of it, both politically and socially (Mandel 1978; Carchedi and 
Carchedi 1999; Carchedi 2001). Social reforms serve the purposes of the 
imperialist state. The imperialist state cannot be used to abolish imperialism or its 
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foundation, private property in the means of production: it becomes a logical 
contradiction. Or to put it another way around: the monopoly capitalist state 
cannot abolish multinational monopoly capital. The state has been structured to 
serve monopoly capital in the parliamentary democratic era. The conclusion to be 
drawn is that the state has to be rebuilt from the foundations up. The concept has 
the implicit recognition that the social cohesion role is to serve for imperialist 
purposes only. The monopoly capitalist nature of the state is emphasised. . 
2.3. Conclusion: An Evaluation of Holland views ofMonopoly Capitalism and 
the State 
In this chapter we have outlined two concepts of contemporary monopoly 
capitalism and the state. The first concept, a Marxist one, presented the view that 
monopoly capitalism or 'imperialism' was a stage of capitalist development. This 
concept of an imperialist state was close to what might be called a 'classical' 
perspective. Monopoly capitalism was seen to derive from the competitive nature 
of capitalism itself. The struggle for capitalist accumulation worldwide had 
economic, social, political and cultural effects. It argued that monopoly 
capitalism had to be viewed as a whole in all its aspects but special attention was 
paid to its economic, political and social outcomes. Economically, capitalism, it 
was argued, had become an economic system dominated by monopolies. Those 
monopolies were the natural result of the enlarged scope of the productive forces 
of our age and the continued pressure towards the concentration and 
centralisation of production. Capital, in other words, could not but take the form 
of large-scale enterprises in the modem age. Capitalism could not exist, today, 
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without large-scale firms or in other words monoPolies. There can be no return to 
capitalism without monopolies without the destruction of all the productive 
advances that have been made so far by humankind. Therefore, to support 
capitalism today is to support the monopoly capitalist system in all its 
dimensions. Likewise, due to the advance of the social processes of production 
the state has had to enter more and more into the economic life of capitalist 
states. However this involvement flows and ebbs with the strength of private 
capital and is never in a harmonious relationship with it but rather, through its 
role in legitimating the system must appear to be above class. But the capitalist 
state is as much a product of monopoly capitalism as imperialism. 
An integral dimension is imperialism. By imperialism, it was argued, is not 
meant just colonies or the export of capital but rather the whole drive of 
monopoly capitalism to dominate through finance capital, exports, control of 
markets and resources, and political structures etc. as much of the global political 
and economic system, both in advanced and "less developed" countries as it 
could. In the contemporary world this has not been through formal empire as 
such but through the structural power of markets and regimes and through the 
invisible threads of finance and conditionality. A private property regime, or a 
regime favourable to monopoly capitalism, has been imposed (through force 
where necessary) on the globe which has underpinned the global hierarchy of 
states and the global division of labour. 
Within that global division of labour the advanced capital countries have been in 
a privileged position. Through their ability to configure global political and 
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economic structures in line with their preferences they have been able to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the rest. This situation has been the material 
underpinning of the amazing advances in the economic resources which has 
funded the scientific and technological changes, the welfare states and the rising 
consumerism of many which has led to such 'affluence' and 'contentment'. In 
turn this has created the context of the politics of advanced capitalist countries, 
the ability to fund generous welfare systems and to draw in sections of the 
working class into corporatist systems where they support 'their' capitalism in 
competition or better, struggle, against the rest. 
Nevertheless, that struggle for capital accumulation is restless. Capital and its 
state can never be satisfied. In the process, as we have described, capital has 
sought new forms of political organisation to advance its interests. This has taken 
the form of regional trade blocs in the contemporary era which have taken on 
more sophisticated and complex forms in certain regions where historical 
circumstances favour such formations e. g. the European Union. This regionalism 
has been a counter-tendency to enmeshing of capitalisms through globalisation. 
The path of regionalism does not run smoothly as it too is contradictory: interests 
overlap but also diverge. 
61 
Against this picture of an integral monopoly capitalism and imperialism we have 
contrasted that of Stuart Holland. Holland's premises are eclectic and 
consequently lead to eclectic conclusions. His understanding of monopoly 
capitalism is restricted: he narrows it down to an understanding of industrial 
61 We shall return to this theme when we examine Holland's European strategy. 
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structure. Monopoly, for him, is not a necessary stage in the development of 
capitalism but a malfunctioning of capitalism which can be rectified by state 
action. This concept enables him to detach the economic developments from the 
sociological and political. The state rather than being an integral institution to the 
maintenance of monopoly capitalism becomes an autonomous institution which 
can be used to make monopoly capitalism competitive again, or to function 
(properly'. He defines the state primarily by its 'social cohesive" function which 
conveniently evades the contemporary advanced capitalist State's imperialist 
"essence". He is never clear over the state's relationship with monopoly 
capitalism and the capital accumulation process and therefore cannot recognise 
the limits of its actions against monopoly capitalism. Thus he perceives the 
failure of state action against monopoly capital in the 1970s not as the outcome of 
the systemic constraints which have to be addressed but the result of a failure of 
managers of the state. This leads to his emphasis on tepid reforms of the 
institutions of government rather than the necessary fundamental restructuring of 
the social and political system. This becomes his remedy for all things politically 
problematic: reform the institutions of government to a degree and install 
sympathetic managers and the result will be the capitalism's management. An 
example of this outlook is clearly expressed when he gives support to the 
European Union (chapter 5). 
Lastly, it has been argued in the Marxist model of capitalism that regional blocs 
based on capitalism are the outcome of monopoly capitalism's development in 
the modem world. They are the imperialist replies to the intense struggle taking 
place in the struggle for capital accumulation. Holland's position is that regions 
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are the new means for the countervailance of monopoly capital and its mobile 
finance capital (see Chapter 5). These diagonally opposite political positions are 
yet one more fundamental difference in the understanding of contemporary 
monopoly capitalism. 
To surnmarise: Holland's conceptual schema was badly flawed due to its 
eclecticism, incoherence and inconsistency. His economics was a mix of Keynes 
and Marxism; it relied on a 'power-theoretic' rather than a 'property-theoretic' 
analysis of capitalism. He failed to apply historical materialism and instead 
applied pluralist frameworks to his analysis. Multinationals were understood in 
the context of a framework of 'market failure' rather than that of a stage of 
monopoly capitalism. He did not ground his conception of monopoly capitalism 
within a theory of surplus value and capital accumulation but instead substituted 
a concept of unjust distribution of resources and an inequitable, capitalist society. 
His concept of imperialism was conjunctural rather than derivative of a specific 
stage of capitalism. His notion of the state was seriously under-theorised and a 
glaring weakness of his political thought. His concept of multinationals bore the 
imprint of American business school thought dominated by Raymond Vernon 
(197 1) rather than viewing them within a Marxist framework of monopoly 
capitalism. His conception of socialist transformation was based on parliamentary 
strategies and neglected issues of working-class political power. Overall 
Holland's thinking on monopoly capitalism and the state bears more the marks of 
Labourism, Fabianism and reformism then it does the theories of Marx and 
socialist revolution. 
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Chqpter Three: Holland's National Political Economy and Strategy 
We described in Chapter 2, section 2.2.6, how radical international political 
economy was divided within itself as to how to characterise the current global 
order. In that section two alternatives were considered: a global order conceived 
either as a struggle between monopolies and states or as a struggle between 
imperialisms. In this chapter we will utilise the debate between these two 
perspectives to illustrate how Holland's po I itical -economic analysis and 
consequent strategy can be understood to serve very different purposes depending 
on which one of the above the analytical frameworks is adopted. 
This chapter will discuss Holland's conception of the relationship between the 
British nation-state and the 'multinational threat' and his subsequent 
characterisation of the British nation-state as 'weak' in relation to MNCs. This 
position is characteristic of the states v. market arguments of globalisation 
theorists which treat both as independent variables (Burnham 2002, p. 122). 
Contrary to Holland's characterisation I portray the British nation-state as an 
imperial state but at the same time a 'dual' economy, i. e. an economy which is 
both a home to monopoly capital and a host to mobile international or global 
capital. 62 In fact, I argue, Britain was a strong imperialist nation but entangled at 
the same time in a web of imperialist interaction and conflict which gave Britain 
a specific strategic position in the 1970s. Britain's imperialist position, it will be 
argued, also had repercussions for its traditional domestic industrial base which 
was undergoing a period of transition, which came to be known as 'Britain's 




manufacturing crisis. ' (Coates 1981, p. 12; Coates 1983, pp. 32-63; Coates 2002, 
p. 168ff.; Blank 1977) It is suggested, therefore, that Holland in arguing from 
nation-state v. MNC premises regarding the British nation-state in the 1970s 
neglected the imperialist character of British monopoly capitalism. The 
consequences of such an omission of analysis are discussed. In particular, I draw 
out an overlooked dimension of analysis in the relation between state and 
monopoly capital, namely private property relations, this enables me to 
distinguish between the circuit, and the property relations, of capital and their 
impact on the analysis of the state. A further discussion is also made in light of 
the analytical frameworks mentioned above whether Holland's national strategy 
was a socialist strategy or not and whether in fact a socialist strategy in the 
national context is a viable option in the contemporary era. 
The chapter is divided five sections: the first section (3.1) outlines Holland's 
perspectives in the early 1970s and the context of his writing. The second section 
(3.2) summarises the model of British capitalism he adumbrated and the political- 
economic strategy he based upon that model. The third section (3.3) is the 
critique of Holland which: (i) argues that Holland's model of British political 
economy does not accurately reflect Britain's position in the global political 
economy. This leads to major flaws in his characterisation of the relationship of 
the state to monopoly capital. I juxtapose a model of imperialism to offer a 
Marxist view on that relationship (sections 3.3.1-3.3.1.3); (ii) asserts his theory of 
state capitalism fails to conceptualise the limits of state action under capitalism 
(3.3.2.1); (iii) questions whether a strategy for competition for markets within 
global capitalism under a capitalist state can be a strategy for socialism 
(3.3.2.2.1-2). Lastly sections 3.3.3.1-2 question the effectiveness of Holland's 
political strategy. Section 3.4 discusses the issue of whether there can be a 
national strategy for socialism in the contemporary political economy. The last 
section (3.5) presents my conclusions. 
No extensive attempt is made to examine the empirical arguments that Holland 
makes and the grounds of criticism are established mainly on a theoretical basis. 
The major text of Holland's used for the basis of our discussion is The Socialist 
Challenge (I 976a). 
3.1. The Early Perspectives ofHolland and the Context o the Writing of the 
Socialist Challenge. 
The background to Holland's national strategy (NS) consists of five elements: 
(i) Holland's commitment to Europe; (ii) the economic crisis of the early 1970s 
as the result of the 'intensification of international competition' (Coates 1980, p. 
247; (for an alternative view see: Blank 1977); (iii) the influence of European 
models of state capitalism; (iv) the struggle within the Labour Party over 
planning and state intervention; (v) developments in theories about the global 
political economy and its structure in the 1960s. 63 
1.1 Holland's commitment to Europe. 
Contrary to the opinion of some authors (Sassoon 1997, p. 703) Holland's 
commitment to Europe was present throughout his political career, although he 
63 Compare Wickham-Jones (1996), p. 82. 
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wavered on the issue on occasion (Wickham-Jones 1996, p. 76). In 1971, before 
the publication of Holland's key work on national strategy, the Socialist 
Challenge, Wayland Kennet in an introduction to a Fabian pamphlet entitled 
Sovereignty and Multinational Companies wrote a declaration of his and 
Holland's views: 
Stuart Holland and I are agreed that the best grouping to which Britain might look, as a means of 
restoring democratic control over production, distribution and exchange in the age of international 
capital, would be the enlarged European Economic Community. (Kennet, Whitty and Holland, 
July 197 1, p. 4) 
Later, in the same text, Holland outlined his credo further, it can be surnmarised 
as follows (Holland in Kennet, Whitty and Holland 1971): Holland saw the major 
obstacle to national and European economic progress being [US] multinationals; 
the response to such a 'threat' was to develop national and international 
strategies; he considered the central issue to be 'the development of European 
firms' that can compete with the [US] multinationals; the British Labour Party 
should consider being a member of the EEC as a means to combat [US] 
multinationals; economic union was a means by which EEC countries could 
retain some form of economic autonomy against the economic might of US 
business and lastly, Holland was committed to the European project as a means to 
counter US economic power. Membership of the EEC was a means to the goal of 
economic sovereignty and "control over Britain's destiny" (Kennet, Whitty and 
Holland 1971, p. 28). 
Thus in his earliest political writings Holland had the concept of competition 
against U. S. multinationals as being the key pol iti cal -economic issue for Britain 
and he considered participation in a capitalist, European regional project as the 
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means to build up both British and European capital in the challenge against the 
U. S. adversary. 
His national strategy was in fact part of a European strategy. The subsequent 
failure of his national strategy in Britain made his arguments for a European 
strategy more opportune. 
3.1.2 The Economic Crisis of the early 1970s. 
Oddly enough, Holland makes little reference to the economic crisis of the early 
1970s as the main reason for his strategy. Rather than see the crisis as the product 
of capitalism and its class struggles, he attributes its origins to the workings of 
much longer term structural causes, namely the development of monopoly 
multinationals (see 1975, chaps. 3 and 4). 
At the time there were a number of alternative analyses of the economic crisis. 
Val Burris (1984, p. 239) has identified four left theories: the left Keynesian 
underconsumption theories; the neo-Ricardian profit squeeze theories; the 
orthodox Marxist falling rate of profit theories and the neo-Marxist political crisis 
theories. Holland belongs to the first category: theories which "view the cause of 
economic crisis as a deficiency of consumer demand, aggravated by monopoly 
control over the market" (Burris 1984, p. 238) i. e. to structural changes to the 
mode of production. Burris associates underconsumption theories with populism 
and describes this as follows: 
By "populism" we mean a political ideology which views excessive concentrations of wealth as 
the chief evil of modern society. Grounded in the class position of the petty bourgeoisie, populism 
attributes the economic ills of capitalism not to the system of private property per se, but to the 
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concentration and centralization of property, and especially the rise of monopoly. Populism calls 
upon the state to redress this economic imbalance by regulating or dismantling large 
combinations of capital and by redistributing income from the rich to the poor (Burris 1984, p. 240) 
Holland espoused a classical populist analysis of the economic crisis of the 1970s 
and his strategy reflects both its strengths and weaknesses. 
3.1.3 The influence of European models of state capitalism. 
Holland was profoundly influenced by both French and Belgian state planning 
models and the Italian State Holding Company, IRI 64 (Holland 1971, pp 24-26; 
Holland 1972a; Holland 1974; Holland 1976a, p. 179ff.; Holland 1980, p. 66; 
Tsakalotos 1991, p. 73; Wickham-Jones 2004, p. 34). The policies he advocated 
within the Labour Party in the early 1970s took inspiration from these models 
(Wickham-Jones 1996, p. 59). Holland sought to transfer elements of both these 
models to Britain and to strengthen their efficacy through greater use of the 
public enterprise model (Holland 1976a). Holland was influenced by the existing 
state capitalist promotion of 'national champions' or national large-scale state 
monopolies. It was continental social-democratic Practice (one could even say in 
Italian terms, Chri stian- Democratic practice) that he was seeking to introduce 
into Britain, although on more extensive terms, rather than any Marxist-inspired, 
socialist programme (Wickham-Jones 1996, p. 80). 
64 Industrial Reconstruction Institute 
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3.1.4 The Struggle within the Labour Party over Planning and State Intervention. 
The economic crisis of the early 1970s is recognised by Holland as providing a 
political and social challenge to traditional capitalist planning or the 'combination 
of indicative targets and aids and incentives' and resulting in two developments: 
firstly, the growth of monetarist ideas on the right as well as in the Labour Party 
under Jim Callaghan; and secondly, 'democratic planning' conceptions on the 
Left (Holland 1979d, pp. 1-2). His strategy falls within those 'democratic 
planning' strategy conceptions. 
The national strategy devised by Holland can be considered an early version of 
concepts of the 'democratic economy' (See for example: Hodgson 1984, Bowles, 
Gordon, and Weisskopf 1983, Glynn, 1998, Tsakalotos 1998). The common 
theme of this concept is the control of the monopolies and the strengthening of 
the power of the state over the market economy, with some form of worker 
participatory measures in management combined with planning agreements 
which have the intention of enabling the national democratic control of industry. 
Making the national economy accountable to the national public rather than the 
multinational private companies was the principal objective of these strategies. 
Holland wrote of his own strategy in 1975: 
Essentially, a strategy for revolutionary reforms means transforming the basis on which 
economic, social and political power is organized within society. It also means an irreversible 
reversal of this power. It would extend and reinforce democratic processes both at the national 
and regional level, and in the enterprise itself. In other words, it would be a revolution within a 
democratic framework and not an undermining or overthrow of democratic processes (Holland 
1976a, P. 158). 
Holland, therefore, considered that monopoly capitalism could be managed 
within a capitalist state framework. 
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3.2. Holland's Political Economy of the British Economy in the 1970s and His 
Rationale for a National Strategy 
This section is divided into three sub-sections: the first outlines Holland's model 
of British capitalism and his analysis of its problems. The second outlines his 
economic strategy and the third his political strategy. 
3.2.1 Holland's Model of British Capitalism and his Analysis of its Problems 
Holland (I 976a) highlighted the increasing intensification of monopolisation in 
British manufacturing from the mid-1950s onwards and emphasised the growing 
multinational character of firms active in the British economy. This combination 
frustrated the ability of the British national government to implement traditional 
Keynesian policies (Holland 1976a, pp. 74ff. ). The efficacy of Keynesian 
macroeconomic instruments, such as exchange rate changes (Holland 1976a, 
87ff. ), exchange controls (Holland 1976a, pp. 86-87) monetary policy (Holland 
1976a, p. 79ff. ), fiscal policy (Holland 1976a, p. 83ff. ) and regional policy 
(Holland 1976a, chap. 4) either had been undermined or qualified. The national 
social -democratic strategy of Labour, expressed through Keynesian social 
democracy, was threatened by these new developments (Thompson 1996a, p. 
199; Thompson 2002, p. 30). 
Thus Holland had a particular understanding of changes being wrought at that 
time in the national and global political economy. These were the premises of his 
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national strategy. Table 3 presents Holland's model of capitalism which 
underpins his national strategy. 
Table 3: Holland's Model of British Capitalism 
Holland's Characterisation Character of firms Character of Government 
of the Economy State 
'National competitive Mode of Manufacturing firms national Government in control of 
Production' (1945 to mid- in size and scope; competitive economy and dominant; 
1950s) national markets successful use of Keynesian 
economic levers 
'Multinational Mode of Dominant manufacturing Government not dominant and 
Production' (post mid- I 950s) firms multinational in scope; not in control of economy; 
and monopolies in markets unsuccessful use of Keynesian 
economic levers; new 
economic levers required 
(state capitalism) 
Table 3 illustrates how Holland's model of capitalism rests on the assumption 
that there had been a dramatic change in the structure of British capitalism with 
the decline of 'relatively' competitive, national firms (Row 1) and their 
displacement by monopolistic, multinational companies (Row 2). As he states: 
The leading firms in the private sector are now so big that they constitute monopolistic power 
which, twenty-five years ago, were relatively competitive' (Holland 1976a, p. 30). 
This 'new structure of supply' (Holland 1979d, p. 139) meant that the power and 
interests of the multinational monopolies could and did come into conflict with 
governments seeking to improve Britain's economic position through monetary, 
fiscal and trade-promoting measures. Thus, in his economic arguments, 
multinationals are viewed by Holland as working against the British nation-state. 
The multinationals 
4challenged British economic sovereignty through their ability to undermine fiscal and monetary 
policy; partially eclipse exchange rate changes as an 
instrument of trade policy; exchequer loss, 
balance of payments cost and inflationary pressure of transfer pricing; and the blackmail of 
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multinational location if they are not allowed the regional location in Britain of their choices' 
(Holland 1976a, pp. 198-9). 
Further, Holland argues that the economy had lost its "competitive" structure: 
It was appreciated by those who supported the new planning strategies that the trend to monopoly 
and multinational capital had undermined the assumption of competitive national firms in the 
conventional Keynesian policy framework (Holland 1979d, p. 139). 
What was necessary therefore, in Holland's view, to restore the command of 
government was the securing 'control over leading enterprise... [to make 
Government]. 
.. 'master of the strategic sectors in the economy' (Holland 1976a, 
26). 
It should be noted that Holland focuses his attention on manufacturing as the 
6value-creating sectors' in the economy as opposed to the 'wealth transferring' 
sectors of finance (Holland 1976a, p. 212ff. ). At first, he viewed financial 
institutions as largely 'negative and passive' and subordinate in importance to 
manufacturing (Holland 1976a, p. 212 and pp. 214ff. ). Thus in his original 
writings on strategy, measures in relation to the financial sector are hardly 
mentioned. Later, he adjusts this view and outlines some measures to tackle the 
role of finance in a short section of his essay 'New Public Enterprise and 
Economic Planning' (19 81 b). 
Thus Holland, in common with many thinkers in radical IPE, made his starting 
point that there was developing in the national and global political economy a 
fundamental 'non-co incidence' of relationships 65 between multinational 
monopolies and the advanced capitalist state. Furthermore, the economic power 
of multinational monopolies (or N4NCs) had increased to the degree that they 
65 The term 'non-coincidence' is Robin Murray's (1975), p. 58. 
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could undermine the policies of Keynesian social -democratic or socialist 
governments seeking to establish what he perceived as socialism. MNCs could 
utilise the global division of labour to frustrate attempts by nation-state social- 
democratic or socialist governments to rein them in and make them subservient to 
the ends of democratically elected governments (Holland 1976a, chaps. 1 and 2). 
3.2.2. Holland's National Strategy 
Policies 
its Elements - Economic and Political 
Holland argued that his national strategy illustrated how a socialist government 
could deal with the transition which was taking place in the global political 
economy from a system of manufacturing production based within a nation-state 
to production being based in multinational locations (Murray 1975, p. 13 1). This 
strategy had two elements: the economic and the political. They will be reviewed 
in turn. 
3.2.2.1 Holland's National Strategy: The Economic Strategy 
Holland's national strategy, it should be apparent, was that the nation-state could 
be the arena of a socialist strategy. This perspective was informed by a number of 
assumptions: 
(i) the power of the multinational monopolies and the influence of international 
capitalist institutions could be countervailed by action at nation-state level; 
(ii) the nation-state had the resources and capacity, which could be mobilised, to 
enable fundamental economic, social and political reform; 
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the labour movement, with other social classes, could alter the institutional 
arrangements of capitalism within the parameters of the nation-state given the 
correct strategy; it was not bound by structural constraints (Wickham-Jones 
1996). 
The central aim of Holland's national strategy was: 
The re-establishment of government capacity to manage the British economy... (Holland 1976a, 
p. 177) ... to promote the sustained growth which has eluded governments relying on Keynesian demand management (Holland 1976a, p. 185) ... so long as government relies on macroeconomic management alone. .. to influence the mesoeconomic leaders, it will fail to 
promote a higher rate of investment (Holland 1976a, p. 186). 
Holland considered higher investment in manufacturing as crucial to a number of 
problems not least among others: (a) making industry more competitive; (b) 
increase in the number of jobs; (c) increase in exports; (d) overcoming Britain's 
chronic balance of payments problems; (e) improve the regional distribution of 
industry. 
His strategy built on, and extended, previous Labour industrial policy measures. 
Thus Holland was extending and elaborating in his writings a trend in British 
social-democratic thought that considered the usefulness for policy development 
of state- sponsored, competitive, industrial monopolies (Hodges 1974, p. 68; 
Thompson 1996a, p. 201). 
The problems posed by the opening of the EEC and the intensification of "the 
multinational challenge in the 1960s" (mainly US firms-DL) had given new 
emphasis to public enterprise. This form of "second-generation" state 
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intervention 66 (i. e the management and financing of industry as had been shown 
in Europe) could offset the liberalization of trade; provide counter-recessionary 
stimuli; ensure a more regionally balanced economy; facilitate high-risk projects; 
maintain effective competition in the economy, promote exports and improve the 
balance of payments, and deal with the MNC threat (Holland 1974, p. 3 1). 
Holland was struck by their versatility. They could make the economy more 
competitive. Through them the state could play a "directive rather than a 
responsive" role (Laux and Molot 1988, p. 21). 
What was specifically original in Holland's proposals were: the development of 
new public ownership of a range of British companies (Wickham-Jones 1996, p. 
82: Holland 1976a, pp. 204-205) in manufacturing and finance (Holland 1981b, 
p. 134) - in profitable sectors which had previously been more or less untouched 
(Tsakalotos 1991, p. 75 ; Laux and Molot 1988, p. l7ff. ). He envisaged a plural 
public sector (public enterprises and large-scale shareholding in other companies 
combined with regional and local enterprise boards, etc. ) (Holland 1981b, p. 
126); at the centre of which lay measures of large-scale public ownership largely 
through a number of new state holding companies (Holland 1976a, p. 214 and p. 
216): 
Essentially, no transformation will be possible unless a critical minimum of leading firms in the 
meso-sector is brought into public ownership and social control. On average, four to five firms 
control the upper half of the twenty-two main industrial and service sectors of the economy. One 
in four to one in five of these firms must be socialized through new public ownership and control 
if we are to begin the critical transformation of private microeconomics power (Holland 1976 a, 
p. 160; see also pp. 206 ff ). 
66 Holland made the distinction between first-generation type state nationalization of the 1950s (in 
failing industries) and second-generation public enterprise in competitive, profitable sectors. A 
'third generation' has been identified by Laux and Molot (1988, p. 24) where state ownership was 
used be ensure national participation in internationally competitive industries. 
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He also advocated the implementation of planning agreements with the 
multinational monopolies (which had been used in Western Europe) in an attempt 
to harness them to 'serve social and economic objectives' (Holland 1976a, 
178; Tsakalotos 1991, p. 82). He urged new planning perspectives which would 
incorporate new planning methods, instruments and institutions (Holland 198 1 b, 
pp. 134ff, Tsakalotos 1991, p. 73ff. ). 
Notably, Holland, in passing, did accept that the shrinking manufacturing base 
was related to 'excessive capital outflow abroad' (Holland 1976a, p. 77 and 
1979d, p. 149). However he did not develop this important argument which 
reveals his unwillingness to follow this line of thinking. Holland views the reason 
for the weakness of Britain's manufacturing base lay in development of 
multinational monopolies which led to a 'new concentration of economic power 
in the hands of a few dozen companies' (Holland 1979d, p. 140) which 
'commanded half or more of the key macro-economic aggregates of the 
economy-output, industrial employment and assets, prices, and direct or visible 
export trade' (Holland 1979d, p. 140) and had the power to transfer facilities 
abroad rather than base them in Britain. 
Holland asserted that the 'rise of mesoeconornic power has divorced the big finn 
from the marriage with state power' which underlay the Keynesian blueprint 
(Holland 1976a, p. 187). Keynesian policies had been effective through the 
ability of the state to influence firms. Now that influence was broken. The 
resultant pattern of growth was politically unacceptable (Laux and Molot 1988, p. 
21). Keynesianism, for him, was the state working with competitive firms and 
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labour to deliver policies which led to economic growth and providing benefits to 
the major classes of capitalist system. This allowed the state to appear 'neutral' in 
Holland's eyes. However, that appearance was threatened, much to his concern, 
by the state's inability to countervail the multinational monopolies and therefore 
having to submit to their diktat which, he believed, now undermined the state's 
neutrality, its ability to deliver economic benefits and therefore its legitimacy. 
For that legitimacy and neutrality to be restored, it was necessary from Holland's 
perspective, to provide yet more powers to the capitalist state to enable it to 
challenge the strength of the multinational monopolies and thereby restore the 
power of national government, to enhance its power to act 'neutrally' in 
command of the economy and so ensure national economic sovereignty and 
enable 'socialist' government. Macroeconomic "tinkering" was no longer enough 
(Laux and Molot 1988, p. 21). 
Lastly, the most radical measure, certainly in Britain, to overcome the problems 
of industrial conflict or what he termed the 'relations of production problem' 
which had manifested themselves in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there should 
be worker participation in the management and control of companies and in the 
national planning process (Holland 1972d, p. 6). Thus worker participation was 
incorporated into the process to lay the basis of social consensus around 
Holland's proposed measures. 
The objective of the strategy was to guide state investment into British 
multinationals or 'national champions' in manufacturing so that it built 
companies large and strong enough to compete against rivals and serve the needs 
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of the British (capitalist) political economy rather than fulfil the profit priorities 
of overseas (at this stage, U. S. ) multinational monopolies (Laux and Molot 1988, 
pp. 17-23; Holland 1981b, pp. 133,136 and 140; Holland 1979d, pp. 148-149). 
Overall, the conception of Holland's project was not to passively concede to 
global constraints, and submit to US multinational competition but to mobilise 
the resources of the capitalist state to invigorate the domestic economy "to 
participate in production, exchange and accumulation on a world scale" (Laux 
and Molot 1988, p. 24). 
3.2.2.2 Holland's National Strategy: Holland's Political strategy and Analysis of 
the British State 
Holland recognised that this economic strategy had associated political and 
ideological elements. 
He expected opposition domestically from the leadership of the Labour Party, the 
leadership of the trade unions, the civil service, big capital, and overseas from 
international institutions e. g. IMF, EEC and foreign powers (Holland 1976a p. 
204, p. 342; and 1979d, pp. 146-148,151,155). He hoped, however, to minimise 
foreign opposition by initially bringing under state control British companies 
only (Holland 1976a, p. 204). 
Holland's concept of the British state was of a set of institutions that was top 
heavy towards government and bureaucracy and that serviced big capital and 
marginalised the political process (i. e. parliament, political parties, and pressure 
groups) and labour. This "superstructure" was underpinned by a dominant 
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ideology of laissez-faire which hid the real power of big capital (Holland 1979a, 
pp. 212-219). Holland's state concept was heavily influenced by the base- 
superstructure models prevalent at the time. 
Holland accepted that the British state would offer resistance. Holland was 
unclear how to characterise the state-capital relationship. On the one hand, in his 
economic analysis, he argued there was a rupture between the state and 
multinational monopolies, on the other, in his political analysis, he recognised a 
state connected with big business. He offered an instrumental view of the state 
(Wetherly 2008, pp. 109-110): 
The central relationship in the modem capitalist economy is between capital and the state, and 
especially between big business and the Civil Service. Capital largely imposes its terms of 
operation on both government and labour, while the government in turn imposes its own demands 
- almost exclusively - on Parliament. (Holland 1979d, p. 156) 
As a consequence he pressed for radical democratic reform of the parliamentary 
system which had the overall intention of decreasing the power of the executive, 
increasing the authority of the elected parliament and developing tripartite forms 
of democracy and government in relation to industry (Holland 1976a, p. 256 and 
Holland 1979a, p. 235ff. ). He promoted the concept of an anti-monopoly 
programme to break the grip of big business and the hold of liberal capitalist 
ideology on the state (Holland 1979a, p. 256); power relationships could be 
reversed so that labour could dominate over capital (Holland 1979a, p. 232). His 
strategy would seek to: 
Transform a capitalist mode of production and to introduce mechanisms for democratic planning, 
it would seek to reverse the central domination of resource allocation by capital and the state and 
to establish the dominance of parliamentary sovereignty and the institutions of the 
labour 
movement at the heart of the system of power (Holland 1979d, p. 156). 
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The ideological element Holland recognised was the requirement to shift from 
the dominant framework of laissez-faire values to values based on planning for 
social requirements. However he recognised that the arguments and campaigns 
for his alternative strategy would begin to open up this process of change in 
ideology and open up a new understanding of what was politically legitimate 
(Holland 1979d, pp. 159-161). 
Holland's national strategy had an internationalist aspect. He believed it was 
necessary to build up international political organisation among left political 
parties and trade unions to provide solidarity actions to movements taking 
national action (for more on this see next chapter). He wrote: 
One of the main strengths of the international trade union movement lies not only in its power to 
contest the action of an individual multinational company, but also in its collective strength to 
pressure the foreign subsidiaries of a group of multinationals if they should directly challenge the 
economic sovereignty of a democratically elected socialist government in another country 
(Holland 1976a, p. 204) 
He dismissed Europe Community as an obstacle to his strategy, it was a 'paper 
tiger', which a national government could ignore if it so wished (Holland, 1976a, 
pp. 317-319). 
3.3. Critique 
This critique is divided into three sections. The first examines Holland's 
characterisation of the British political economy. The second evaluates 
Holland's 
unilateral national strategy. The third discusses the 
issue of the validity of a 
national strategy in the contemporary global political economy. 
The evaluation of 
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each is made from the standpoint of a Marxist theory of imperialism (outlined in 
Chapter Two). 
3.3.1. Considerations on Holland's Political Economy ofBritish Capitalism 
The section is divided into three sub-sections. The first deals with the influence 
of monopolies in the British economy throughout the twentieth century. The 
second examines with the relationship between multinational monopolies and 
imperialism. The third examines the British state's relationship with MNCs. 
3.3.1.1 British Financial Capital and Monopolies in the British Economy in the 
Twentieth Century. 
Holland in Table 3 presents two images of the British political economy: one, for 
the 1950s, where the government (or the state) is allegedly in command of the 
economy and a second, in the 1970s where it has lost control. However both 
these images of the relation of the government (or state) to the economy are 
questionable (Tomlinson 1982; Callaghan 2002, p. 438). 
What these images conveniently provide are ideas of a sharp turn or break in the 
political economy of Britain which justifies Holland's position, from his 
67 
perspective, of demanding new government action in a new context . The 
method that Holland uses to do this is to focus on the growth of MNCs in 
production alone and ignoring other forms of multinational capital. Thus he is 
6' Tomlinson (1982, chap. 6) has criticised Holland on this score. Much of the debate between 
himself and Holland turns on Holland's definition of monopoly which is a conventional one that 
defines monopoly by power over the market. See Chap 2, § 1.3. See also Callaghan (2002): who 
comments that 'new phase of capitalism' idea may have been overblown (p. 447) 
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able to portray the British political economy as at the mercy of mainly [US] 
multinationals. However, this partial presentation omits the other forms of capital 
such as merchant capital and financial capital that helped shape the nation's 
political economy. Thus Lipson (1985, p. 39ff. ) points out the British had been 
world leaders in trade and overseas capital in the I gth and early 20th centuries (see 
also: Gilpin 1975, p. 75ff. ). Britain rebuilt its overseas investments post World 
War 11 and retained considerable political and diplomatic influence (Murray 
1975, pp. 13-17; Burnham 1992, p. 259; Blank 1977; Sanders 1990 Chap. 7; 
Porter 1987, p. 112). Holland neglects to mention this aspect of Britain's political 
economy. 
A second element of weakness in Holland's portrayal of the British political 
economy is the fact that monopolies had played a considerable role in the 
economy before World War II and many of these, especially merchant banks, 
overseas banks and financial houses had overseas interests (Feis 1965, Chap. 1: 
Cliffe 1983, p. 24; Cain and Hopkins 1993, Chaps. 2 and 3; Born 1983, p. 116). 
These financial monopolies were one of the foundations of British imperialism in 
the twentieth century (Cain and Hopkins 1993; Magdoff 1969, pp. 80-81; Born 
1983, p. 116). Cassis (1997, pp. 35-46) points out how British banks were larger 
than their French and German rivals in the 1920s (Cassis 1997, p. 35; Born 1983, 
pp. 70-71); Britain held world financial leadership, although challenged by the 
US (Cassis 1997, p. 35; also Magdoff 1969, pp. 80ff. ); merchant banks were 
influential in big business and had a "close relationship" with the state (Cassis 
1997, p. 36). British big business dominated in certain sectors and immediately 
after the Second World War these overtook their German counterparts. Thus 
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British big business was already strong before the 1950s, it was active overseas, 
and was influential over government. Cassis (1997) concludes: 
British big business had reached a full-blown, mature stage a generation or two before Gennany 
or France. (Cassis 1997, p. 46) 
Moreover, big business had gained from the help of state intervention and 
protection (Cassis, 1997; Tomlinson 1994, Chaps. 5-8) 
Whilst there may have been an intensified development of monopolies and 
multinationals in the British economy in the 1950s and '60s their existence in the 
British economy was not new (Jeremy 1998, p. 256; Hannah 1976; Cassis 1997; 
Corley 1994; Bostock and Jones 1994). As Jeremy points out they both had been 
in existence before the 1950s and their impact on the economy was influential 
(Jeremy 1998, pp. 200ff. and 235ff.; Cassis 1997, pp. 35-46). 
More data on NINC activity in Britain over the twentieth century has recently 
come to light (Jeremy 1998, p. 235) which of course Holland would have been 
unaware thus perhaps leading him to an understanding of discontinuity rather 
than continuity. However other thinkers and politicians of left political parties 
had long been critical of the influence of monopolies in Britain despite the 
paucity of official statistics (e. g. Thompson 1996a, Chaps. 9 and 10). 
Nevertheless the highlighting of the prolonged trend within British capitalism of 
both the influence of British monopolies, British multinationals operating 
overseas and the presence in Britain of overseas multinationals, especially US 
MNCs, throws a different light on British monopoly capitalism in 1970s. 
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Thus Holland's concept of a Keynesian government working with small, 
nationally competitive firms is a myth: the economy of Britain had been for some 
time populated with big and small businesses, some operating solely in Britain 
whilst others operated worldwide. Far from the situation being one of novelty 
what in fact was occurring was an intensification of a trend within capitalism that 
we have already indicated: that British capitalism was embedded within 
economic re at ons which were imperialist in nature (i. e. financial, trading and 
manufacturing monopolies with overseas interests) and which government or 
state policies had actively cultivated and promoted over the whole twentieth 
century (Cain and Hopkins 1993; Lipson 1985, p. 39 ff.; Nabudere 1977, p. 192; 
Magdoff 1969, p. 80). In other words, the British state had acted as a home state 
68 to further the interests of British multinational monopoly capital. Britain was an 
imperialist nation and this undeniable reality shaped its political economy. The 
British imperialist state was not being weakened by MNCs as Holland claims but 
had in fact, through various governments, including the era of Keynesianism, 
fostered their growth (Blank 1977; Sanders 1990, Chap. 7). The state, therefore, 
was an architect of the British po I itical -economic dilemma of the 1970s and not a 
victim of it as Holland suggests (Panitch 200 1, p. 3 74; Barrow 2005, p. 123). 
3.3.1.2 Multinational Monopolies and Imperialism 
Whilst Holland recognises that multinational monopolies played a crucial role in 
the economy, especially in the manufacturing sector, and makes them the focus 
of his strategy he fails to draw out the full significance of their role in the British 
68 For a definition of 'home' and 'host' states see Chap. Two. 
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and global political economy. He perceives Britain as a host to multinational 
capital (specifically an increased US presence; Holland 1971) rather than a home. 
He overlooks this dual nature of the British political economy (Murray 1975, pp. 
13-17). This point is close to Poulantzas (1974) but not quite the same (see also: 
Panitch 1994, pp. 66-67). Whereas Poulantzas argues for a dual nature of the 
political economies in relation to the US he does not recognise sufficiently 
enough the fact that Europeans national imperialisms, particularly British 
imperialism, sought to act independently of the US. The position taken here is 
that British imperialism although weak (compared to the US) was seeking to 
challenge US power and finding its niche in the global capital accumulation 
(Blank 1977, p. 680; Burnham 1992; Martel 2000; Murray 1997, p. 74 ff.; Curtis 
1998 and 2003, P. 5; Foster 2004, p. 175-177; Gifford 2007, p. 465ff. ). 
The significance of Britain as a home to multinational capital is the role of the 
British state in reproducing British imperialism in the global political economy 
(Warren 1975, p. 135; Murray 1975, p. 70; Curtis 1998). Martin Spence (1985) 
has brought this feature out clearly: 
There is a danger of forgetting something which is central to any understanding of British history 
... a home-truth which may 
be painful but must be faced. Britain is an imperialist power. The 
very structure of British capital is founded upon its imperialist status. Britain is, in fact, the 
second most important imperialist power in the world, after the USA. Any analysis of this 
country's economic crisis, and the options facing the working-class movement, must start from 
this obvious, but apparently easily-forgotten, fact (Spence 1985, p. 117). 
Within the complex of global economic relations Britain held a critical role 
which resulted in a distinctive economic structure. Due to this specific 
development of British imperialism the financial sector gained a special influence 
over the political system: more so than in other countries (Magdoff 1969, p. 8 1; 
Hirst and Thompson 2000b; Blank 1977; Gilpin 1975, pp. 85-97; Coates 1983, p. 
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40ff. ). Likewise the British economy become bound up with the fate of US 
imperialism, the mainstay of the global capitalist economy, and the hegemon 
which ensured its open nature and the wheels of trade, and hence finance, turning 
(Spence 1985; Curtis 1998). A British-US economic alliance, although 
incorporating tensions (not least the power of U. S. MNCs), became the 
foundation of the political 'special relationship' (Blank 1977, p. 680; Martel 
2000; Curtis 1998). The 'City' was important to global finance, as Spence (1985) 
states: 
The City's role in the 1980s is not so much about servicing British capital in particular, but rather 
about servicing the imperialist world system in general. But at the same time, the City's earnings 
are crucial to the viability of the UK national economy. 
Further, he adds: 
The role of the City should not be allowed to obscure the continuing importance of foreign direct 
investment by British-based industrial NINCs (Spence 1985, pp. 122-123). 
In Holland's major work on national strategy, the Socialist Challenge, there is 
only a briefest mention of British capital export and significantly, without deeper 
analysis, this is restricted to its deleterious effects on manufacturing industry. It 
gets a one line mention, too, in 1979, when Holland comments: 
there was a shrinking manufacturing base related to excessive capital outflow abroad (Holland 
1979d, p. 149) 
However, there is no expansion on its significance and relevance to Britain's 
imperialist role in the global political economy. 
The first real occasion Holland attempts to tackle the issue of the power of 
financial capital is a chapter written as an afterthought to his main strategy 
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written some six years later in 1981. He notes in the chapter that more than 
ýeighty-five per cent of the finance' the stock market raises is invested abroad 
(Holland 1981b, p. 129); also private finance in the form of pensions and 
insurance funds seek 'foreign investment' (Holland 1981b, p. 130). He called for 
the 'extension of public ownership into the finance sector' (Holland 1981b, p. 
132) which is to his merit. However, he fails to emphasise the role that financial 
capital plays in the structure of contemporary British imperialism. 
Thus Spence's analysis throws a different light on Britain's manufacturing crisis 
in the 1970s. The causes of such a crisis, in this analysis, was the outflow of 
British capital, under the control of British multinational companies, to further 
British imperialism rather than being the result of the nebulous MNCs acting 
against British capitalism which informs the approach of Holland. It challenges 
the 'competitive weakness of British capitalism' thesis that was so prevalent in 
the labour movement in the 1970s and '80s (Coates 198 1, p. 3). British 
imperialism's competitiveness, especially manufacturing, had declined due to 
capital export, relative to other imperialist states, but British imperialism (both 
finance and manufacturing) was still powerful and dynamic and sought to 
reinvigorate itself (especially in the field of manufacturing exports) at the 
expense of the labour movement at home and abroad and its capitalist rivals 
(Coakley and Harris 1992, p. 39; Albo 1994 p. 168). Thus Holland's call for 
increased manufacturing exports highlighted a problem created by British 
imperialism. 69 A problem it could resolve in the late 1970s or early 1980s either 
by further state- capital i st intervention and politicised management a la Holland 
69Holland was aware of the impact of British capital export on manufacturing (1973). 
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(but which raised the spectre of an increasingly politicised working class) or 
through an assault on working class conditions and living standards through Cý-- 
'depoliticised' management a la Thatcherism and monetarism (Burnharn 1999, 
pp. 42ff.; Albo 1997, pp. 19-20). 
Significantly, too, Holland fails to highlight the impact of imperialism on the 
structure of the domestic political economy. Its orientation towards militarism 
and the sponsoring of military and 'defence' industries; the rise of the service 
economy rather then a manufacturing economy: an economy dependent on the 
financial sector; and the influence and role of the City of London within the 
economy and on the state as a whole . 
70 All in all this structure of the British 
economy is neglected or barely mentioned. A brief mention of the military- 
industrial complex is made in his article 'Militarism, monetarism and 
multinationals' (1981a) but he does not follow his logic through and link that 
complex with the political economy of British imperialism. The need to break 
with the political-economic edifice of imperialism domestically and overseas is 
not stressed enough. The object of socialist strategy, surely, is to end imperialism 
rather than restore further a 'weak' British manufacturing sector (which is one 
element of imperialism) against its rivals 
'0 For details on such relationships see John Scott (1991) p. 151, who gives an instrumental 
analysis of the British state: "As the dominant segment of the capitalist class (i. e. finance 
capitalists -D-L. ) in Britain, the inner circle plays a 
key role in articulating capitalist interests 
within the power elite. They are the planners and co-ordinators of the economy. Through their 
political participation, their informal contacts with the state, and their role in lobbying and party 
finance, they translate the City point of view into a dominant influence over state policies. .. 
(their) members are disproportionately represented in the power elite which rules the state 
apparatus. " 
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Although Holland is aware of how British MNCs and British 'aid' exploits Third 
World countries (Holland 1976a, Chap. 14) he does not address at any point in 
his works Britain's overall position in the imperialist system. The absence of a 
structural analysis of imperialism and its impact, both domestically and overseas, 
in Holland's national strategy, combined with policies to boost Britain's domestic 
economy - the base of British imperialism - can only make Holland an unwitting 
and rather naYve advocate of the continuation of British imperialism globally. 
In contrast to Holland's model of British capitalism we have characterised Britain 
in the 1970s as a strong imperialist state (although weakening in relation to 
others) acting on behalf of the monopolies extending their reach the world over, 
accelerating the export of capital, in competition against other imperialist states. 
3.3.1.3 The British State's Relationship with MNCs 
Holland portrays the British's state's relationship with MNCs as a host state and 
gives the impression that the British state's position is one of weakness in terms 
of policy implementation and economic sovereignty. The central issue for him is 
not labour exploitation but power and sovereignty. This has a resonance with 
state debates in international political economy where a similar characterisation 
of the state is made (Held 1988; S. Strange 1996: Burnham 1999, p. 38; Berger 
2000; Payne 2005, p. 32; Stubbs and Eaton 2006, pp. 371-375). Holland's 
methodology here is to view the relationship between 'states and markets as 
external and contingent' rather than working 
from a Marxist position of regar ing 
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them as 'internal and necessary' (Burnham 1999, p. 41). Holland's portrayal of 
the relationship is limited on a number of counts. 
The first, as discussed above, is that Britain remained an imperialist power in the 
1970s and relied on its global financial operations for its wealth and power. This 
position in the global political economy required the British state's support 
(Gifford 2007 pp. 465-467; Ingham 1984; Overbeek 1990; Curtis 1998, pp. 17- 
24). The state and the monopolies (banking, financial and industrial) acted 
together to promote British financial and industrial interests i. e. imperialism 
(Cain and Hopkins 1993, pp. 267-268; Scott 1991; Curtis 1998, Chap. 1). 
The second is more complicated. In the 1950s and 1960s Britain could no longer 
hang on to its formal empire and decolonisation was in process (Cain and 
Hopkins 1993, Chap. 11; Martel 2000; Curtis 1998). Moreover, the power of the 
US, especially its multinationals was clear (as is evidenced by Holland's credo in 
1971 above; Holland 1980; Poulantzas 1974; Goldstein 1976). This created a 
dilemma for the British ruling class as to how should 'Britain's interest' best be 
served? Compared to the US and its multinationals and Britain's former position 
in global capital accumulation, Britain was weaker. This situation thrust Europe 
to the centre stage of British politics as a strategy to improve Britain's position 
(Gifford 2007, p. 465ff., Martel 2000; Porter 1987, p. 124ff. ). This situation was 
discussed on the left (Barratt Brown 1972a; Kennet, Whitty and Holland 1971; 
Mandel 1970; Rowthom 1971; Radice 1971; Murray 1975; Warren 1975; 
Holloway 1976). A centrepiece of the debate was an assessment of the 
comparative strength or weakness of the British state in relation to NINCs. 
- 137- 
Holland's position, which was similar to Rowthorn, argued that for certain 
sections of the British bourgeoisie the British state's power was too weak as a 
home base and that Europe offered an alternative (Rowthorn 197 1, p. 49). 71 
Warren argued the opposite: the power of the nation state in relation to large 
firms was greater then ever before (Warren 1975, p. 138). The state played a 
powerful role in support of industry (Warren 1975, p. 138). He challenged the 
notion that interdependence weakened the national capitalist state; a thesis, which 
he stressed, could not explain the increasing rivalry between the USA, Japan and 
Europe, as well as lesser conflicts between Europe and Britain. These rivalries 
reflected struggles of strength over capital accumulation rather than meek 
passivity in the face of economic interconnectedness. Warren perceptively 
pointed out that 
The danger of the thesis that 'the national state is weakening vis-d-vis international firms' is that 
it may lend credence to the reformist belief that the capitalist State could have interests different 
from the national capitalist economy and society as a whole and may thus have to be defended 
against the cosmopolitan monopolies (Warren 1975, p. 140). 
This point applies precisely to Holland. By drawing a picture of a 'weak state', a 
state separated from the monopolies and threatened by them, Holland creates the 
political space for his strategy of state capitalism and his European strategies. 
Holland seeks to 'restore' the powers of the state to counter NINCs. This concept 
is the fundamental underpinning of all his strategies. 
This is connected to a third point. Underlying Holland's argument is a model of a 
self-contained economy which could be managed to sustain the goals of social 
democracy. However this model was fanciful. The British imperialist state was 
71 This perspective of Holland's became more developed after 1979 and the failure of Labour's 
AES. See next chapter. 
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never self-contained, perhaps more than any other advanced capitalist country it 
had relied for its quality of life on its role in the global accumulation of capital 
(Magdoff 1969, p. 8 1; Cain and Hopkins 1993; Curtis 1998). Thus Britain's 
fortunes were tied to the world economy (Gifford 2007, p. 465; Hirst and 
Thompson 2000b, p. 337ff.; Cain and Hopkins 1993; Porter 1987; Curtis 1998). 
MNCs were but one aspect of that involvement in global capitalism. The 
Keynesian macroeconomic policies could never completely regulate Britain's 
role within global capitalism. They were sooner or later to be found short just as 
state intervention was in Europe in the 1970s (Holland 1980, Chap. 4; Foreman- 
Peck and Frederico, 1999. ). Capitalist governments are permanently in weakness 
in relation to the capitalism they seek to manage, they are confined by the limits 
of the state within the contradictions of monopoly capitalism (Clarke 1988). Thus 
the problems of MNCs were not a cause of sovereignty loss but merely another 
manifestation of the problems for the capitalist state residing in the operations of 
capitalism (Coates 1980, p. 146 ff. and p. 161; Magdoff 1976, p. 216). 
3.3.2 Considerations on Holland's Economic Strategy 
The argument of this section is that Holland's strategy was not socialism but a 
more radical continuation of a Labour tradition of capitalist state intervention in 
industry and the acceleration of 'national' state monopolies in the economy. 
Desai quotes Holland on his strategy: 
"The arguments did not come from a left perspective, it had nothing to do with... Clause Four... 
rather they came out of the actual experience of government at a fairly senior level, a critical 
evaluation of that in relation to European experience ... we could 
have regenerated the National 
Plan. (Desai 1994, p. 159) 
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As Wickham-Jones remarked the objectives of the strategy were 'ill-defined and 
open to interpretation', contemporaries could not be sure whether it was about 
'socialist transformation or a renovation of capitalism' (Wickham-Jones 2004, P. 
42). This very ambiguity raises doubts about the socialist nature of Holland's 
proj ect. 
This section is divided into two sub-sections: the first deals with the scope and 
limits of state capitalism; the second deals with the problems of his economic 
strategy. This is further dividend into two parts: one deals with the implications 
of competition in the global market; and the second deals with the problems of 
the adherence of public enterprises to social criteria in the operations in the 
global market. 
3.3.2.1 The Scope and Limits of State Capitalism (SC) 
Holland was unclear in his definitions of state capitalism. Holland, sometimes, 
did try to distinguish his strategic conceptions from state capitalism in his early 
popular works (I 976a; 1975). He termed his policies "socialist" rather then "state 
capitalist" (I 976a). He did this by narrowly defining state capitalism which 
enabled Holland to claim that state activity which went beyond those limits was 
'socialist'. Thus in his work 'Strategy for Socialism' (1975) which popularized 
his ideas among the labour movement he narrowly defines state capitalism as the 
'State intervening to do those jobs which private capitalism will not do' which 
opens wide the areas where the state can intervene in profitable industries and 
which he can label 'socialism' thus making it more appealing to labour 
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movement activists. However in the Socialist Challenge he defines it inter alia 
as: 
Intervention by the State to attempt to alleviate or overcome the failures and contradictions in a 
private capitalist system. (Holland 1976a, p. 144) 
A definition so broad it encompassed more than just state intervention with 
limited scope. However what is clear is that in his national strategy he did 
envisage a state-based challenge to what he saw as 'monopoly' capitalism. 
Holland wrote of SC in terms of "command", "control" and "mastery" over the 
economy (see section 2.1 in this chapter). He regarded SC as an instrument to 
undermine the autonomous power of multinational monopolies within capitalism 
and to overcome capitalism's contradictions. Therefore, Holland does not 
consider the state constrained by external forces. He would distinguish himself 
from the 'hyperglobalists' (Held, McGrew et al, 1999, p. 3ff. ) who argue that the 
nation state's day is just about over. Holland, in this phase of his political 
thought, would be held to be more in the 'sceptic' camp (Held, McGrew et al, 
1999, p. 5ff. ) in that he holds that the nation state still has power to command 
economic affairs. The power of the NINCs are not such that the nation-state is 
powerless to address them (Wade 1990; Weiss 1998) It is this outlook which 
embodies the attractiveness of such a strategy to the left, as it appears to offer the 
means to both manage capitalism and provide for the reform of capitalism into 
socialism (Coates 1981, p. 5). The central assumption of both strategies is the 
belief that the state can be won to manage or control the workings of monopoly 
capitalism in some fundamental way. I have already commented on this 
assumption in Chapter Two (section 2.2.7). 
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Socialist and social democratic parties in Europe and Canada have regarded state 
enterprises in key industrial sectors "as decreasing the social power of private 
capital" and that such enterprises will 
"ease the transition to a socialist mode of production by lessening areas of direct confrontation 
with the bourgeoisie and by enlarging the scope of resources immediately available to a 
governing socialist party attempting to launch a planned economy" (Laux and Molot 1988, p. 17). 
SC is expected to fulfil other management functions too: to moderate the capital- 
labour relationship through industrial democracy; to redirect the profits of state 
enterprises to non-capitalist purposes; and most importantly, they project the 
possibility of an alternative to capitalist methods of production (Laux and Molot 
1988, p. 17). This perspective envisages state enterprises competing with private 
producers and pursuing profits over time. Laux and Molot's (1988, p. 24) view is 
that they offered governments the means to develop national industries in the 
circumstances of competitive international capitalism under conditions of 
developing integration and interdependence. In other words, state enterprises 
participate in the functioning of the capitalist economy and either can be used to 
restore its competitiveness and enable economic growth upon which social 
policies can be provisioned (Albo 1997, p. 16; Radice 2000a; De Martino 2000, 
pp. 160-161) in addition they can be considered a step in the transition to 
socialism (Coates 198 1, P. 5). Holland's position, at times, seems to be close to 
both these perspectives. 
However, there are more critical approaches from within Marxism to SC. These 
perceive SC as a means of state support for private capitalist accumulation and 
therefore sustenance for the capitalist system. There are a number of different 
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Marxist theories to explain this. Some Marxists regard SC as a switch from one 
mode of state intervention, "allocation", to "production" in the context of the 
state's role in sustaining the conditions of accumulation (Laux and Molot 1988, 
p. 16). New forms of intervention, as Holland advocated, are seen by some, as 
one expression of a new stage of capitalist development as in SMC72 theory (Fine 
and Harris 1979, Chap. 8; Mandel 1978, p. 513 ff. ). Warren views capitalism's 
survival as dependent on such intervention (Warren 1975). Others have seen in 
SC an attempt to ensure capitalist superprofits (Mandel 1968, pp. 501-2). The 
Marxist position on SC, therefore, has perceived it as another instrument to 
maintain the capitalist system. Marxists have argued that SC theory fails to 
recognise the integral relationship of the capitalist state with the capitalist system 
and in particular the limits on state action (Mandel 1968, p. 498ff.; Holloway and 
Picciotto 1977, p. 76, p. 83, pp. 94-95). The social democratic under-theorisation 
of both the state and capitalism results in an over-estimation of the capacity of the 
state to manage capitalism. This is the viewpoint that is adopted here in relation 
to Holland. 
There is much in Holland's writings that justly can be incorporated into a 
socialist strategy. A state holding company, nationalisation in the form of public 
enterprises, planning agreements, industrial democracy, etc. can all, under very 
specific circumstances, be considered as weapons in the armoury of a socialist 
government in developing a flexible approach, as there must be, to building a 
socialist political economy in Britain (Breitenbach, Burden and Coates 1991, p. 
51). 
72 State Monopoly Capitalism 
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It is the contention of this thesis, however, that there is a fine, but important, line 
between using those measures for the ends of restoring state-managed, 
ýcompetitive' monopoly capitalism or for the ends of embarking upon the 
building of a socialist economy and society. The fine line ultimately is the 
political context in which those measures are used. Some of the measures 
proposed by Holland, without a participatory socialist state, could just as well be 
used by an existing capitalist state for the ends of aiding capitalism as he in fact 
proposes (as the European examples of state capitalism illustrate). If the attempt 
is made to use them for socialist ends within an existing capitalist state in a 
globally competitive market the result would sooner or later lead to debacle and 
disaster as international experience (France in the early 1980s) has shown and as 
Holland recognised in later strategies (Holland 1983,1984,1986; Ross and Daley 
1991, pp. 129 -136). 
Holland recognised that there were limits to state capitalist industrial policies 
within an open, capitalist economy. Those limits were both economic and 
political. One economic limit was the possible economic reaction abroad to such 
a policy (D. Coates 198 1, p. 10; 1980). Hence, the radical international dimension 
to his national strategy where he sought support from like-minded labour 
movements and governments to counter the threats of the withdrawal of capital. 
In his later works (Holland 1986,1983) he came to renounce unilateral state 
capitalist measures on the grounds that, given the mobile nature of capital and the 
interdependence of capitalist economies, a unilateral strategy of industrial 
intervention would have to overcome (a) the limited nature of a state's resources 
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in struggling against international markets and (b) the international repercussions 
of such a policy. The primary economic limit to state capitalism was, therefore, 
the willingness of capital to cooperate with his plans and if he sought to compel 
compliance, the problem could be further capital flight from Britain, a situation 
which his strategy sought to prevent (D. Coates 198 1, p. 11; Albo 1997, p. 24). 
The political limits we have discussed in Chapter Two, section 7 and we will 
return to this point below. 
Furthermore, the limits to state capitalist strategies of industrial intervention and 
planning were revealed in the 1980s when industrial policies and planning 
measures were abandoned by social -democratic governments, particularly in 
Europe. The reasons as to why they were abandoned have been debated: some 
have attributed the reason to the rise of the idea of neoliberalism (De Martino 
2000, p. 161), some to the role played by the global market (Hayward 1995, p. 6; 
Panitch 1994), others to the role of a realisation on the part of state officials and 
big business of the need for a European strategy rather than a national one (van 
Apeldoorn 2002, p. 70) and some to the growing power of multinational capital 
(Holland 1980, Chap. 4. ). The common theme among the arguments is the power 
of monopoly capitalism to frustrate the state when it so wills. As Holland 
commented state capitalism worked when the big bourgeoisie in Europe were 
weak after the war but once they became strong again they resisted certain forms 
of intervention by the state (Holland 1980, Chap. 3, p. 61). 
73 
73 Monopoly capital, it should be stressed, relies heavily on the state, despite the ideology of 
neoliberalism. See, e. g.: Anderson, Gutmanis and 
Anderson (2000); Gilpin (2001), Chaps. 5-13; 
Jones (2000); Pierson (1996), Chap. 4. 
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3.3.2.2. Problems of Economic Strategy 
This is divided into two sections: the first deals with general issues of a market- 
creating strategy; the second deals with the problems of the institutions that 
Holland proposed in his strategy. 
3.3.2.2.1 Competition in the Global Market 
Holland accepts the open global market and the operation of N1NCs. He 
recognises too the role of the EC in maintaining markets in capital, goods, labour 
and services. Holland was mainly concerned with developing companies in 
Europe strong enough to compete with US multinationals. His supply-side 
strategy emulates European strategies whereby the state attempts to both regulate 
and reinvigorate capitalism through new public enterprises and other institutions. 
Thus his strategy is to make the state more competitive, to adopt strategies of the 
competition state. The impetus for this, in our analysis, comes from the driving 
forces of monopoly capitalism and imperialism, not from the product of 
4multilevel games' within the globalization process according to globalization 
theorists (Cerny 2006, p. 377). Holland's state restructuring policies in my model 
are driven by the imperatives of capital accumulation which acts as both a 
constraint and as agency (Burnham 1999). The logic of Holland's strategy is to 
follow the competitive logic of the global capitalist market. 
Thus his strategy is a model for social democracy in an open economy; an 
economy, however, which was not similar to the European economies after the 
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war where constraints on the mobility of capital prevailed (Albo 1997, p. 25 ). 
74 In 
this model the role for new public enterprise is to curb the negative effects of 
multinational monopolies on, and to strengthen the competitive power of, the 
British national economy (as opposed to British firms overseas) within the inter- 
imperialist competition of the global political economy. The result of Holland's 
policies would be a more dynamic manufacturing base, economic growth and an 
improved position in world markets (thus in the process ousting rivals from those 
markets). Albo termed these policies as social democratic strategies of 'shaped 
advantage' (1997, p. 15). Holland appears to be a social-democratic Precursor of 
such a strategy. What made his model of 'progressive competitiveness 75 (Albo 
1994, p. 149; Panitch 1994, p. 8 1) in his national strategy different from later 
models was that it was still associated with 'social transformation' and changing 
the balance between 'public and private enterprise' (Thompson 1996b, p. 42). 
Whether such a competitive model could be the basis for socialism is open to 
debate. There are a number of criticisms that can be made of Holland's project. 
Firstly, Holland seeks to stimulate Britain's manufacturing base through 
competition as a means to reduce unemployment however there is no guarantee 
that increased competition will reduce unemployment. Competition could 
increase the technological input into productivity increases and not therefore lead 
to employment increase at all. Planning Agreements could be used to remedy the 
74 Albo (1997) mentions other possible models: the 'shared austerity' model (p. 17) and 
International Keynesianism (p. 17) which we examine in Chapter 4. 
75 De Martino (2000, p. 162) has defined 'progressive competitiveness' as: 'the promoting the 
prosperity of workers... as a central goal of a nation's economic policy and the achievement of 
this goal... requires the enhancement of national competitiveness. Panitch (1994, p. 82) defines it 
as "labour and state ... take the 
initiative and seize the hand of business in making the running 
towards competitive success. Usually the term is used in the more restrictive sense of state 
support given towards high-tech, high-value added/ high wage production'. 
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problem but it would require increasing interference in the business decisions of 
the private sector and result in the unwillingness on their part to remain in Britain 
(as long as capital mobility is unconstrained). Also it assumes the capacity for an 
increase in trade which in turns relies on overseas markets, but in the conditions 
of anarchic capitalism this cannot the guaranteed (Albo 1997, P. 18). 
Secondly, Holland's policy requires a radical reconstruction of the relationship 
between the state and private businesses. This, as he recognises, will run up 
against opposition from a variety of sources, he does not make clear how that 
opposition is going to be overcome other then by institutional reform of 
parliament, which in turn raises the problem of political mobilisation. There is no 
mention in his works of how to go about generating mass struggle; he appears to 
rely on influence and parliamentary pressure. The Labour Party was not a party 
geared for such struggles (Albo 1997, p. 20; Miliband 1961; D. Coates 1981; 
1982). This element of his strategy is particularly flawed. 
Thirdly, Holland takes no account of how the competition he wishes to generate 
in the economy will impact on the working class and its own internal relations. 
The assumption is that workers will benefit from increased prosperity and jobs. 
However, the competition between the state-backed public sector and the 
private ly-resourced NINCs could well lead to conflicts over wages and 
conditions. His attempts to integrate the labour movement in tripartite institutions 
would provide no remedy for labour discontent that could result from domestic 
competitive pressures on wages and conditions. This would be especially the case 
if those pressures were reinforced by participation in the global division of labour 
- 148- 
as he envisages (Albo 1997, p. 20). Also workers involved in "politicised" 
institutions of management could create in turn a politicised working class; 
regarding the state rather than the market as a cause of their problems (Burnham 
1999). 
3.3.2.2.2. Criticisms of Holland's Strategic Instruments: Public Enterprises, 
Planning Agreements 
Holland does not specify clearly enough how the new institutions within his 
national strategy i. e. new public enterprises, the holding company, the planning 
mechanism and institutions could be effectively controlled within a remit of 
social criteria rather then maximization of profit. They might well become the 
site of new class struggles over public interest versus profitability (as he was 
aware, Holland 1983, p. 121; Williams 1982). These are not insuperable 
obstacles but consideration needs to be given to their resolution. The dilemma is 
doubly so if the determination of such priorities is made within the overall 
parameters of capitalism. Through participation in the global market these new 
enterprises would become subject to the pressures of capitalist accumulation and 
these pressures would have to be counterbalanced by some form of institutional 
embedding within mechanisms of popular accountability (Williams 1982; 
Breitenbach, Burden and Coates 1991, p. 51; Holland 1983, p. 121). Moreover 
the public firms' impact on the private sector does not appear to have been 
thought through. Important here is to what degree would public enterprises 
increase rather them decrease the tendency towards oligopoly or cartels? 
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There is also the relationship of the enterprise's relationship with the state. As 
these public enterprises entered the framework of the global market they would 
require the capital resources of their rivals, they would need to enter global 
markets (to justify their scale of production), they would borrow on capital 
markets, make joint deals with other finns over markets, become obliged to other 
states; what principles would guide them in these issues. It has been noted by 
Feigenbaum (1982), Jones and Keating (1985, p. 97); Holland (1983, p. 12 1) and 
Foreman-Peck and Frederico (1999, p. 445) that such state enterprises might act 
according to the same principles as private firms in their operations in the market 
rather than by state or social criteria. 
Overall, one cannot but conclude with Coates (D. Coates, 1981, p. 10) that they 
mark a halfway house project. On the one hand, they are an attempt to overcome 
the problems of capitalism through state intervention, they are a 'statist' answer 
to global capital accumulation struggles; on the other hand, they are not 
sufficiently embedded within new political forms of state and democratic 
accountability that would be strong enough to counterbalance the pressures 
towards capitalist criteria the management of such companies would encounter 
(D. Coates 198 1, p. 11). 
3.3.3 Criticism of Holland's Political StrateSDý 
Holland's left-leaning labourism 76 , leads to a weakness 
in the sphere of politics, 
where he still works within the premises of the liberal capitalist 
form of state and 
76 For definition, see Burnham (2008), p. 52. 
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with no acknowledgement of the imperialist nature of the British state. Buoyed 
by the conviction that Keynesian social democracy was the assertion of working 
class power within the state it was but a small step to consider the ending of 
Keynesian policies as a loss of power for the working class within the state. The 
state was viewed in an instrumental rather than a structural relationship with 
capital (Burnham 2008, pp. 52-53). This premise allowed Holland the belief that 
the capitalist state could be recaptured for 'socialist' ends. His political analysis 
and strategy which is full of inconsistencies requires examination. 
We will criticise two elements of his political strategy: first, his understanding of 
the relationship between monopoly capitalism and the state; and second, his 
understanding of the role of the Labour Party. 
3.3.3.1 Holland on the Relationship Between Monopoly Capitalism and the State 
One of the central problems of Holland's political analysis is the nature of the 
relationship between monopoly capitalism and the state. This has been discussed 
in Chapter Two, section 2.2.7. There is one element, however, which does need 
some further discussion and bring us to one of the distinguishing points of this 
thesis. On the one hand, Holland argues that MNCs are separate from the state 
and opposed to its interests. On the other hand he argues that the central 
relationship in the modem capitalist economy is between capital and the state 
(Holland 1979a, p. 256) . Why 
does he argue these apparently contradictory 
positions which he never satisfactorily resolves? Holland is here tussling with 
one of the central problems of contemporary 
international political economy. Big 
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business appears in two guises: dominant over the state, yet not of the state. This 
contradiction has to be explained dialectically. The state expresses the monopoly 
capital relation in society, to sustain capital is to sustain monopoly capital. Yet 
monopoly capital is now multinational, in its circuits of production and 
realisation, territorially it has moved beyond the state's national form (Murray 
1975). Thus it appears to be beyond the nation-state. It appears to act, and does 
act on occasion, against the territorially-bound nation-states' interests (Strange 
1996). However, there is another aspect of capital which is its property relation. 
Ownership of MNCS, despite the increased tendency to interpenetration of 
capitals especially in Europe, still remains largely territorially bound (Wade 
1996, pp. 73 and 79ff.; Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995, Brewer 1990, p. 264, 
Magdoff 1976; Warren 1975). The property relation, as we explained in the 
previous chapter looks to a state to sustain it (Murray 1975, p. 64). Therefore the 
nation-state expresses the interests of N/fNCs overall. 77 Thus NINCs are both of 
the state (the property relation) and beyond the state (the circuit of capital 
relation), thus the contradiction which Holland identifies but is not able to 
explain. Obviously that property relation does not have to be fixed on a nation- 
state; it is quite possible for it to be sustained by another state (e. g. Europe) if 
such a supranational state existed. But all private property relations require a state 
in some form to sustain them (Engels 1968). 
Furthermore, this contradiction also explains the difference between my 
interpretation of the national political economy and Holland's. Holland focuses 
on the circuit relation and emphasises the beyond nation-state character of 
77 of course, other classes' interests have to be taken 
into account but within the overall context 
of the maintenance of capitalism. 
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MNCs; I focus on the property relation of MNCS and stress the imperialist nature 
of both MNCs and the nation-state. 
3.3.3.2 Holland, Parliament and the Labour Party 
It is clear that at the centre of Holland's political strategy is the restoration of the 
power of an elected parliament over the executive. Yet no analysis is given as to 
why the executive has become so powerful in liberal democracies. Is it because 
monopoly capital finds it easier to bring pressure to bear here than on any other 
part of the system, and that the executive's power is so critical to policy 
formation and implementation? (Holloway and Picciotto 1980, p. 144) The 
restoration of parliamentary dominance alone will not provide the means 
whereby participative working class power or socialism can be established. It will 
provide only the means for a renewed development towards party and executive 
power - as it has done so over the last century. Institutions of popular power 
which involve participation (except industrial democracy) and not just election 
are not promoted in Holland's strategy (for debates see, Pierson 1986, Chaps. 2 
and 3; Townshend 1996, Chap. 7). This in turn would lead to the problems I 
pointed out above about the struggles concerning the political-economic priorities 
of state industries in a market. Those institutions would require embedding 
in a 
framework of working class power to help enable a proper accountability and 
scrutiny of their activities and responsibility in their service to ordinary working 
men and women. 
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This, in turn is related to the fact that Holland does not value the need for 
extraparliamentary political organisation within his analysis. It is precisely 
because he envisages political change in parliamentary terms that he can pin his 
hopes of political agency on the Labour Party. 78 For him, it is the inner-party 
struggle within that organisation which is so crucial (Coates 1975, chap. 7). Yet, 
if socialism is about working class power (in a participative sense) and not just 
satisfying economic wants as it appears to be with Holland, then new political 
means have to be found in order for that power to be expressed. This new means 
(i. e. institutions) will not be parliament but will be outside of it. Although 
parliament may be a part of a new system of political power it is not the crucial 
component of it, the establishment of extraparliamentary institutions of working 
class participation are the crucial arena and mark the critical restructuring of 
power towards socialism. 79 Therefore the agency of political change must be a 
party that whilst recognising the need to work within existing political 
institutions must also be prepared to work outside of the them not just as a means 
of bringing countervailing pressure on big business but as the priority in 
developing the new political structures of socialism (Burnham 2008, p. 52; 
Coates 1975 Preface, 1981,1982; Miliband 1961). 
3.4 Problems of a Socialist Strategy in a National Arena 
Holland's national political strategy was premised on the nation-state as the arena 
of the struggle for national social -demo crati c strategies. The issue of the political 
focus of strategy has come to the fore with theories in radical international 
78 This shortcoming has been termed Labourism and has been well noted by Miliband 
(1961), 
Coates (1981, p. 10), Burnham (2008, p. 52ff. ) and others. 
79For debates around this see: Pierson (1986) and Townshend (1996). 
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political economy that argue the nation-state no longer wields power or has 
severely curtailed power in the world and is thus unable to be an arena for social 
democracy or for socialism of any stripe; it is argued that the locus of power has 
moved downwards to social actors such as corporations or upwards to 
supranational entities such as the EU, the state has become a 'space of flows' 
(Held 1988; Held and McGrew 1993; McGrew 2000, p. 148; Strange 1996; 
Cemy 1996,1999 p. 91 ff. ). Very broadly there are two schools of thought on the 
subject. One school, encompassing various left political positions, originating in 
theories such as the internationalisation of production, or the global or circuit of 
capital or the internationalisation of the state has urged a 'new internationalism' 
(Murray 1975; Picciotto 1991) or a 'transnational labour response' (Radice 
2000a, p. 15) to changes that have occurred and has argued that national 
strategies for socialism are no longer viable or are limited in what they can 
achieve (Barratt Brown 1972a; Murray 1975; Radice 1984,2000a, p. 15; Sol 
Picciotto 1991, p. 58). 
Another school, again similarly broad-ranged, has considered that either the 
nation-state can be utilised to moderate or manage capital in the interests of the 
working class or that socialism must deal with the national base of monopoly 
capital and a national strategy is possible (Warren 1975; Holland 1976a; Pooley 
1991, p. 78; Panitch 2001, p. 388; Weiss 1998; Wade 1996; Hirst 1999, Hirst and 
Thompson 2000a and 2000b; Baimbridge, Whyman and Burkitt 2007). 
This section structures a debate on this issue utilising Hugo Radice's arguments 
(1984) against those of Stuart Holland (I 976a). 
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Radice (1984, p. 113) asks the question "is the national economy a proper object 
for socialist strategy? " His reply is 'no' and he reasons as follows: (i) the 
capitalist world economy is now so thoroughly integrated across national 
boundaries that an autonomous national capitalist strategy is no longer possible; 
(ii) that neither in the capitalist class, nor in the national state, can the left find 
partners for an alliance powerful enough to mount a reformist economic 
programme on a national basis. Thus Radice questions whether a revolutionary or 
reformist socialist strategy is viable in the nation state. 
Radice's arguments can be divided into two: firstly, on the political-economic 
impact of the integration of the world economy and its significance for socialist 
strategy; secondly, on the issue of whether there are still forces for social reform 
within advanced capitalist states. We will examine each argument in turn using 
Holland's ideas as a focus of discussion. 
3.4.1 On the Integration of the World Economy and its Political-economic Impact 
Holland's writings in the 1970s make observations which provide a reply to 
Radice's points about world economic integration. Although capitalism was 
tending towards international integration Holland argued that 'socialist 
transformation' (Holland 1976a) was possible in one country. Capitalism 
develops, economically and politically, unevenly and it has unequal strength in 
different countries; it can be breached in one or more countries depending on the 
circumstances (Holland 1976a, p. 342). Nation states had carried out socialist 
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change singly before and their experience had to be taken into account (Holland 
1976a, p. 342). It was possible for a 'socialist' government in Britain to exploit 
the contradictions between capitalisms as a means of preventing the overthrow of 
socialist transformation in Britain (Holland 1976a, p. 342). An international 
dimension was important to the national strategy: it was a means of 
countervailing the threat of exit by mobile capital. Holland was prepared to call 
for radical action and solidarity in other countries where that mobile capital was 
based. 
In response to those critics, like Radice, who believed that a developed state's 
national government could not effectively bring part of a multinational company 
into public ownership and utilise it, or in other words, could not overcome the 
problems set by economic integration into the world economy, Holland countered 
that the state had powers if it so willed. He noted how the Italian state was able to 
undermine the deterrent effect of the multinational threat to withdraw its 
operations from a country (Holland 1976a, p. 205). Ultimately, according to 
Holland, the capacity of the nation-state to react to the impact of multinational 
monopolies was dependent on the rapidity, forethought and extent of its 
intervention (Holland 1976a, p. 206). 
Despite the changes that were taking place economically and globally, Holland, 
at this time in his strategic thinking, considered the world remained dominated by 
nation-states and the state had the powers to change, fundamentally, the political- 
economic direction of a country (Holland 1976 a, Chap. 13). This 
for Holland 
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was the lodestar of political strategy: where was power of the state located in the 
contemporary world? 80 At this time, he answered: in the nation-state. 
Holland's strategy was reformist, yet he touched on a crucial point for 
revolutionary strategists too. Strategies have to be directed towards power, i. e. 
states. The location, characterisation and definition of the state within a Marxist 
political-economic analysis are crucial to strategy (for debate see: Pierson 1986). 
This is the point of our analysis of Holland in this chapter. It has been argued that 
the nation-state is still the power-base of monopoly capital. It is an imperialist 
state. The state sustains monopoly capital's property rights. It seems logical, 
therefore, for a socialist strategy to be directed at the state power of monopoly 
capital i. e. the nation-state. This view is not directed by 'nationalism' as Radice 
(2000a) has maintained. The problem is not one of territory but one of power. If 
monopoly capitalism was maintained by a European state or a global state then a 
socialist strategy would have to be focused on it. However, that point has not 
arrived yet (see Chapters Four and Five). Rather it is guided by political analysis 
of state power and its locus. Socialism or working class power requires its own 
form of state, to call for internationalism in strategy but not to focus on states as 
well seems to this author to be misguided. The weakness of thinkers like Radice, 
Picciotto, Holloway and Murray and others is their political strategies fire at thin 
air, there is no concrete political specification of action against a state other than 
vague calls for internationalism or dependent on global action (Radice 2000a; 
Picciotto 1991; Holloway 1994). The strength of Holland's strategy is, despite its 
flawed refonnism, is that he has a clear concept of power which he addresses. 
80 This applies even if we accept Poulantzas' argument that the state has no power other than the 
social classes it represents for, nevertheless, the power of the monopoly capitalist class rests 
in the 
nation-state according to the argument above. 
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3.4.2 On the Sources of Social and Economic Reform Within the Advanced 
Capitalist Nation-state 
Holland unlike Radice, did believe that the nation state could be strong enough as 
an ally of the working class in the struggle for a reformist programme in the 
1970s. Holland believed that the nation-state, being a neutral instrument of 
power, could be wielded by the national working class and national bourgeoisie 
in the struggle against the global operations of 'stateless' [or US] multinational 
monopolies. This social democratic conception of the state, that it can be utilised 
for class conciliation and tripartism and has to be restored to that role (which has 
been undermined by 1\4NCs) is the foundation of Holland's 1970s national 
industrial strategy (Jones and Keating 1995). 
The argument of this chapter has been that there is a monopoly capitalist base in 
Britain that would provide the alliance Holland seeks (Wade 1996: Hirst 1999). 
The fact that British monopoly capitalism is anchored within the British state 
means that it has to be concerned both about its property rights being maintained 
and social stability ensured. This latter process still requires 'national bargains' 
with the working class and its reformist representatives, social democracy (Hirst 
1999 p. 87; Albo 1997, p. 16; Wickham Jones 2000). It requires strategies of 
progressive competitiveness to both ensure economic growth and to provide 
sections of the working class with the economic benefits that arise out of the 
privileged position in the global division of labour (Hirst 1999, p. 93). These 
reformist strategies both comply with monopoly capital's 
interests and ensure, to 
a degree, the stability required for the continued possession of private property 
in 
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the form of monopoly capital. Thus, contrary to Radice, the position taken in this 
chapter is that national social -democracy's day is not over yet (Bienefeld 1994: 
Hirst 1999; Clift 2005). It can take a variety of forms from the 'modernising 
social democracy' to the French PS model (Martell 2001 pp. 205ff.; Bastow and 
Martin 2003, Chap. 2.; Cowell and Larkin 2001, pp. 107ff.; Clift 2005, p. 500). 
Holland's new public enterprise policies might well consider itself an antecedent 
of such modernisation in the common endeavour to find paths to assist Britain 
compete within global capitalism 81 . 
However, Holland shares with Radice the inability to recognise that British 
multinational monopolies have their property rights/interests upheld by the 
British capitalist state domestically and globally. The monopolies and state are 
bound together, politically and economically, yet have contradictions in that 
relationship (Wade 1996, p. 79; Stopford 1985, pp. 199-200). Holland's position, 
conveniently, gives his social democracy the political space to argue to support 
nation-state policies 'against NINCs' as Warren (1975) pointed out above. 
There is no doubt that the MNC relationship with the nation-state is more 
complex and contradictory than if they were national firms (Stopford and Turner 
1985; Strange 1996; Stopford, Strange, Henley 1991). Multinationals find at 
times that their interests with specific home states collide, and this impels them to 
use either other nation-states for their own interests or to seek the aid of 
multinational fora to restrict the encroachments of their home nation-state, and 
other states as well, on their economic and political interests (Stopford and 
" Preceding the US; see Hay, Watson and Wincott (1999), p. 8 
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Turner 1985, p. 200; Strange 1996; Vernon 1971; Cowles 2003; Grant 1997). 
This latter activity is one of the sources of what some have called the 
intemationalisation of the state (Cox 1981, p. 139; Cox 1997, pp. 60-61; 
Hoogvelt 1997, p. 134, Picciotto 1991 and 1991a , Murray 1975). The advocates 
of this viewpoint have stressed the aspects of economic and political 
internationalisation at the expense of the continued national relationship of big 
capital and political power. 82 The nation-state is seen in conflict with 
multinational firms (as Holland does in his national strategy) or subordinated to 
some form of intemationalised state (Cox 1997, p. 61). They regard the 
internationalisation of the state and nation-states as direct opposites rather than 
see them as complementary sides of the complex relationships that multinationals 
have with states (Cowles 2003; Stopford and Tumer 1985; Stopford et al 1991; 
Strange 1996). 
The economic multinationalisation of firms does not mean that they end their 
political relationship with a specific nation-state (Stopford and Turner 1985, 
chap. 8; Kobrin 1997; Nigh 1997). On the contrary multinationals need a specific 
state, which at the moment remains the nation state, to protect and further their 
interests in the global arena through the various national, regional and global 
political -economic institutions, hence we get 
British, American, German, 
Japanese firms. The MNC still requires a home state i. e. a state machine, in a 
world made up of states and associated political apparatuses controlling access to 
military machines, markets, resources, etc., (Magdoff 1976; Ruigrok and Tulder 
1995, Brewer 1990). 
82 We return to this in our next chapter where we explore the imperialist origins of the European 
Community. 
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Contrary to Radice and Holland, I argue that MNCs are still interested in the 
state's social and economic role in nation-states and their interests will vary over 
time, sometimes requiring more, sometimes less, state economic intervention and 
that this lays the basis of a continuing political struggle between laissez-faire 
policies and state intervention (Jones 2000, esp. Chap. 11; Holland 1980). N4NCs 
still require some minimum of state intervention (a minimum which the parties of 
the working class seek to raise) to sustain their home state's economies, societies 
and political-military machines which sustain their enterprise domestically and 
overseas (Coates 1980, pp. 182-3; Anderson et al, 2000; Hirst and Thompson 
2000a; Gilpin 2001, esp. Chap. 14; Lipsey 1997; Murray 1975, p. 64). However 
that state intervention is under pressure due to the duality of role of the advanced 
capitalist state in very global economy the capitalist state has helped to build 
(Panitch 1994; Albo 1997; Gilpin 200 1, esp. Chap. 14). Advanced capitalist 
states have to act as both home and host states to multinational capital; they have 
to promote, and compete for, capital (Stopford and Turner 1985; Strange 2006; 
Stopford et al 1991; Dent 1997, p. 256ff, Dunning 1992, part 4). So the 
development of multinational capitalism acts in a contradictory way on the 
political economy of nation states (through tendencies and counter-tendencies, 
see, for instance, Hay and Marsh 2000; Hay, Watson and Wincott 1999, p. 10). 
Furthermore, the commitment of multinationals to a particular nation-state will 
vary or change, dependent on the specific historical and geopolitical context that 
the state is in. 83 Social democrats like Holland who seek 'bargains' with capital 
83 We return to this in our next chapter. 
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without advocating a new form of socialist state only assist monopoly capital in 
its global competition projects. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Holland grasped one aspect of the dual nature of the advanced capitalist state: the 
fact that it had to host increasingly mobile large-scale capital. This made the state 
appear weak and at odds with multinational, monopoly capital. However, he 
failed to stress the significance of the other aspect of that state which is its 
structural relationship with multinational, monopoly capital through which it 
sustains, maintains and extends its property or, in other words, the imperialist 
projection of state power; a state which is specifically constructed and organised, 
under conditions of liberal democracy, to fulfil the requirements of private 
property. 
Holland seeks to co-ordinate state and capitalist enterprise using the existing state 
apparatus (reformed) to bring about capitalist expansion without its negative side- 
effects i. e. disproportions and consequent economic and social problems and 
international competitive consequences. The labour movement thus gets drawn 
into a strategy which attempts to stabilize and restore 'competitive' market 
monopoly capitalism and enable economic growth within an imperialist global 
framework. Holland, seeks to return to a competitive market capitalism out of 
which monopoly capitalism and imperialism grew in the first place. It provides a 
scenario of state-sponsored market capitalism in a political-economic context 
where the existing state operates, monopolies still exist, where the flow of 
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international capital still exists, where the stock market remains and where the 
struggle for resources and markets and financial advantage is intense. 
Holland's concepts add up to this: a state reputedly losing its powers due to 
MNCs requires yet more powers to strengthen the capitalist state so that it can 
implement extensive state capitalist measures to manage and control private 
monopolies. The aim of building state monopolies is to make, in Holland's terms, 
national capitalism stronger and more competitive and moreover, incorporate 
labour into this project thereby reducing the constraints on economic growth. No 
matter what the socialist gloss Holland places upon his ideas, ultimately, his 
strategy reinforces Britain's position in the global accumulation of capital. 
Further, it has been argued that at the heart of this erroneous conception of 
British capitalism is a one-sided understanding of the relationship of the nation- 
state with multinational monopoly capitalism. Holland grasps the circuit of 
capital relation of the state but fails to grasp the property relationship of the state. 
Holland's mistaken understanding leads to an underestimation of the political 
tasks required if a socialist Britain is in fact the major political goal. Holland's 
national strategy highlights a fundamental weakness at the heart of all Holland's 
analyses: that is the theory of the state. Against his point of view, it is the 
argument of this thesis, that if the aim of his programme was to go beyond state 
capitalism and introduce a socialist political and economic system he was wrong 
in the opinion that the existing capitalist state could be utilised for socialist ends. 
All in all, Holland's proposals amount to a radical state capitalism dressed up as 
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socialism. The British state is not neutral; it is tied up with the fortunes of British 
monopoly capital and to sever the link between the two will require a 
fundamental reconstruction of the political foundation of British imperialism, 
namely, the British state. 
To extricate Britain from this situation will require not a state capitalist industrial 
policy combined with some parliamentary reforms which Holland proposes, 
which would only strengthen British imperialism, but rather, we argue, a strategy 
incorporating the fundamental reconstruction of the state i. e. primarily the 
creation of institutions of state that are thoroughly accountable to working people 
combined with measures of public ownership and new democratic forms of 
supervision and regulation in the industrial and financial sectors and a revamp of 
our international economic and political relations with developed and developing 
countries. New dispensations and controls on the power of private property have 
to be implemented both domestically and internationally. Moreover property in 
the public domain will also have to be clearly democratically regulated and 
supervised. Thus implementing radical political measures for socialism are just as 
vital as economic ones. They are the first steps to truly enabling political and 
economic sovereignty of the people. 
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Chapter Four: Political Economy of the European Integration Process and 
European Intemational Strategy 
The subject of the character of European integration and the potential and limits 
of a European strategy for the British labour movement and other European 
labour movements have been much discussed over the last 50 years (Mandel 
1970 and 1978, Chap. 10; Radice 1971; Poulantzas 1974; Holloway 1976; Naim 
1976; Holloway and Picciotto 1980; Holland 1980; Cocks 1980; Featherstone 
1988; Sassoon 1997; Bailey 2005; Capital and Class, 93, Autumn, 2007). Within 
the field of international political economy there has also been keen debate on the 
role of regionalism 84 : some scholars have seen it as a stepping-stone to an 
economy more interdependent with the global economy; others have seen it as an 
attempt to manage the problems that emerge with 'globalization' (Fry 2000 pp. 
127ff.; Palan and Abbot 1996, p. 57; Gamble and Payne 1996; Hirst and 
Thompson 1999; Tussie and Woods 2000, p. 55; Drache 2000). 
Holland's views on the EC changed rapidly. In 1975 he represented the EC 
Commission as the "biggest paper tiger outside China" (1976a, p. 317). Five 
years later he was representing it as a formidable obstacle to progressive politics 
(1980). By the late 1980s he was ready to assist Jacque Delors, then EU 
President, help build the EU (1993a). It is possible to regard Holland's ideas as 
moving between the two poles of thought on regionalism mentioned above. In the 
early 1980s he regards regionalism as a conveyor belt for the influence of 
84 'Regionalism' here is meant looselY to denote both the formal projects and the processes of 
regional integration. For a discussion see Schulz, Sbderbaurn and Ojendal (200 1), pp. 5-7. 
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multinational monopolies and neoliberal ideas. In the 1990s he advocates support 
for regionalism as a strategic riposte to the powers of global capital. 
Holland's analysis of European integration and arguments for a European 
strategy were first elaborated in the early 1970s and progressed through various 
phases until the late 1990s. Table 4.1 (below) outlines how Holland's political- 
economic analysis of European integration and strategy changed fundamentally 
after the mid- I 980s. Row 1 summarises his: 
(a) European International Analysis: from the 1970s to the mid 1980s. He argued 
that the institutions, methods and context of EC integration inhibited the 
prospects of 'socialism' as he defined it (i. e. industrial policies, worker 
participation, welfare reform and parliamentary democracy). Unilateral action by 
nation-states had proved ineffective against the forces of multinational capital 
and internationally mobile financial capital. 
(b) European International Strategy. Therefore he advocated a dual track strategy (0) 
of multilateral, co-ordinated European-wide national strategies coupled with 
efforts to try and reform the European Community. The objective was to 
establish a hegemonic social-democratic regime (Thompson 2002, p. 257). The 
multilateral strategy advocated reflation, restructuring and redistribution. These 
are the subject of this chapter. 
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1993a, 1993 b 
polices 
" Europe is held back by unequal 
structural, spatial and social 
distribution. 
" The EC cannot be a vehicle of 
progressive politics. To change it 
required a 'fundamental 
transformation of European 
capitalism'. 
" Nation-states cannot act 
unilaterally to deal with the 
'multinational threat'. 
" Nation-state power can be 
augmented through joint action. 
" Nation-state political economies 
are threatened by the rise of 
multinational companies 
'European International 
Analysis', 1970s to mid 1980s: 
The EC is an influential 
supranational force, but without 
prerequisites of being a 
superpower 
The EC is regarded as a purveyor 
of neoliberal integration. 
The EC is dominated by a triad 
of forces: supranationalism, 
MNCs and negative integration 
'European Regional Analysis', 
late 1980s to present: 
" Global markets and finance 
have undennined the ability of 
the nation-state to act 
unilaterally in its economy. 
" The nation-state, therefore, no 
longer has the requisite powers 
to radically act against NINCs 
independently. 
" Radical political action must 
focus on where sufficient 
political-economic power 
resides. 
" EU has or can have powers to 
advance progressive causes 
" Policies imply state-building of 
EU. Implicit acceptance of 
European Union institutions 
Strategy 
International Strategy, early 
1980s: 
" Objective: democratic 
internationalist and socialist 
community of European states. 
This required a fundamental 
transformation of capitalism. 
" Policies: an international/ 
European regime of states 
committed to social democracy 
and reflationary policies. 
Therefore action has to be co- 
ordinated on two planes: the 
national and the international. 
The focus on joint initiatives of a 
number of governments. 
" The co-ordination of a package of 
national reflationary measures 
advocated at a national 
governmental level in some or all 
West European states. 
" Multilateral action would 
facilitate political reform of EC 
based on a national sovereignty 
principle 
European Regional Strategy, late 
1980s: 
" Objective: EU state-building 
" Advocates that political strategy 
be focused at the regional leveU 
European Union; 
" Calls for political, social and 
economic and reforms. 
" He supports Monetary Union. 
" Advocates policies of European 
social cohesion and a Competitive 
Policy. 
In the next chapter I look at the material outlined in the second row of Table 4.1. 
This surnmarises Holland's views: 
- 168- 
(c) European Regional Anal sis: Switched focus from his earlier analysis. Y 
Holland lost confidence in the nation-state, or a regime of nation-states, being 
able to deliver his preferred economic and social reforms and argued that the new 
centre of effective power was the European Union and it was to this that political 
mobilisation should be addressed (Thompson 2002, p. 196). 
(d) European Regional Strategy. Holland moderated his criticism of the 
institutions and the context of integration, supported the European Union and 
urged support of the reforming process that had accelerated with the Delors 
presidency. These policies promoted 'economic and social cohesion' of the EU. 
Holland became committed to building a European state. 
The chapter is divided into four main sections. Section one outlines the context of 
Holland's ideas on Europe in the early 1980s. Section two outlines Holland's 
political economy of the European integration process. Section three outlines 
Holland's European international strategy. Section four contains the critique. It is 
divided into two main parts. The first part (4.4.1. ) discusses Holland's analysis of 
the European integration process. Holland claims to analyse this integration 
process within a class perspective, this is questioned. It is argued that Holland's 
analysis of European integration is inconsistent from a class analytical point of 
view and in fact draws on other analytical frameworks, such as neo- 
institutionalism, to explain the processes and problems of integration. An 
alternative class model is proposed, which is considered more consistent and 
coherent from a class analytical point of view. The second part (4.4.2) of the 
chapter, which is shorter, briefly deals with the strategy that Holland developed 
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out of his analysis. This strategy is subject to a critique from the class analytical 
viewpoint too. 
In order to facilitate both a clear summary of Holland's political economy of the 
European integration process and his strategy and to contrast this against the 
perspective of my critique which is bloc imperialism political economy, I present 
table 4.2 below. 
Table 4.2 presents two models of the political economy of the European 
integration (EI) process. The models represent that of Stuart Holland contrasted 
against a model of bloc imperialism's in the two main columns. The models, for 
the sake of conciseness and clarity, are classified along seven dimensions: the 
first outlines the different conceptions of the origins of the European integration 
process. 85 The second outlines the objectives of the process as viewed from the 
alternative perspectives. The third outlines the causes of the dynamic of the 
European integration process. The fourth presents the contradictions (or 
problems, tensions) within the process. The fifth outline's what is termed the 
cmode of integration' or the policies through which integration is conducted. The 
sixth highlights illustrate 
how the contradictions of El are seen to be resolved in the process. Lastly, the 
seventh presents the strategy that each model would necessitate from their 
respective point of view. 
85 On classification with comparative methodologies, see Burnham et al (2004), p. 68. 
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Table 4.2 : Two Models of the Political Economy of the European 
Integration Process 
Dimension Holland's Model (based on 1980) Bloc Imperialism Model 
(presented in this thesis) 
Origins of Primarily political: prevent return to pre- Political-economic: facilitate capitalist 
European war nationalism; avoid beggar -thy- accumulation through inter- imperialist 
integration neighbour protectionism (Chap. 1) struggle; role of state supported 
Process integration 
Objectives Promote economic integration; rebuild Increase economic and political power 
European industry (Chaps 3-5) of European imperialism 
Cause of Institutional Cause: based on distribution: Systemic Cause: based on production: 
Political unequal structural, spatial and social Class conflict; Capital accumulation; 
Dynamic of El distribution (passim and p. 148) inter imperialist conflict (both internally 
and against USA) 
Contradictions Institutional Cause: Result of unequal Systemic Cause: 3 levels: (a) Conflict 
of process structural, spatial and social distribution with USA and other imperialisms 
(passim and p. 148) (b) Conflicts between European 
Institutional Conflicts: Supranationalism imperialisms 
v Nationalism; multinationals v 'national' (c) Conflict between European 
classes; distributive class conflicts (based imperialisms and bloc smaller states 
on institutional cause) (Chaps 5-7) (d) Production conflict with labour 
(e) Crises of Capitalist accumulation 
(f) Specific role of Multinational 
monopolies 
Manifests itself as institutional conflicts 
Mode of Neo-liberalism and negative integration Varied: both state intervention and 
European policies (Chaps. I and 3) negative integration; methods vary over 
integration time and place 
(policies) 
EC Resolution Improve competitiveness of European (a) Struggle against rivals 
of industry; Readjustment of relations (b) Changing forms of state: 
Contradictions between state and market; increasing intervention and reregulation ; build EU 
within El negative integration; increased state 
supranationalism, redistribution of powers (c) Change relations between capital 
between EC and nation-state (Chaps. 3-7) and labour: state capitalism or 
neoliberalism ; competition 
(d) accelerate integration; intensify 
exploitation 
(e) bloc imperialism and neo- 
imperialism 
Socialist Institutional Reform: European policy Both System and Institutional 
Strategy not feasible; proceed with national policy Change: Confront capital accumulation 
of state intervention; build Europe on basis and its mainstay the state 
of community of sovereign states (Chap. 7) Build Europe on new basis. 
As can be seen they exhibit different ontologies (as to the reasons/causes and 
nature of the integration process; the nature of independent and dependent 
variables): the bloc imperialism model views the integration process as a product 
of capitalism's structure, Holland's model views the process as a product of a 
mixture of political -institutional and economic (market-institutional) motives; it 
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is eclectic. The two models also highlight epistemological questions. The bloc 
imperialism model seeks to go beyond a positivist approach to uncover the 
systemic causes involved in the integration process, whereas Holland's model 
works within the realm of perceived institutional relations. 86 Differences between 
these two models will be developed in the critique of Holland. 
In this chapter I outline Holland's political economy of European integration and 
the strategy that flowed from it. I evaluate both from the standpoint of the 
relatively recent model of bloc imperialism outlined above (Mandel 1970 and 
1978, Carchedi and Carchedi 1999, Carchedi 2001 and 2002) and based on 
theories and research drawn mainly from the field of radical international 
political economy. 
4.1. The Context of Holland's Analysis of EC Polices 
Before examining Holland's internationalist analysis it is important to place it 
within the following context: 
4.1.1 The prospects for joint action in Europe. After the first direct elections to 
the European Parliament in 1979 pressures for a joint socialist approach to the 
EC were also becoming more urgent (Fella, 2002, p. 28); Holland's interest in 
Europe was spurred, at this time, due to the industrial policies adopted by 
86 Hay (2002), pp. 61-65 and See Chap. 1; Marsh and Stoker (2002), Chap. I and pp. 310-312. 
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European national governments which gave Holland optimism for European- 
wide industrial policies (Holland, 1984, p. 25 9). 87 
4.1.2 The EC and its industrial and social policies in the 1970s. In 1980 when the 
Uncommon Market was written the EC consisted of nine member countries with 
the UK joining in 1973. Europe was in deep economic crisis. The social policies 
of the EC remained low on the Community agenda until the mid-1980s 
(McCormick 1996, pp. 267-269). In relation to industrial policies, the Treaty of 
Rome had projected the 'vision of a single market governed by a competition 
policy' (Articles 85,86,92-94) which 'were intended to avoid the problems 
created by state intervention' (Wallace 2000, p. 274). Up to 1975 a European- 
wide industrial policy as such was not high on the Commission's agenda and was 
in part frustrated by the political mechanisms of the EC i. e. the requirement for 
unanimity in voting in the Council of Ministers. Member states followed their 
own industrial policies. In the 1970s economic crisis in Europe, some measures 
were taken by the Commission to 'complement member-state efforts to return 
national champions to growth and prosperity' (Wallace 2000, p. 275). 
Holland's texts The Uncommon Market (UM) (1980) and Out of Crisis (OoC) 
(1983) provide the political economy analysis and the policy prescriptions of 
Holland's European international or multilateral strategy. The former elaborates 
Holland's political economy of European integration and why the European 
Community frustrates progressive causes; the latter elaborates an all-European 
strategy for recovery, redistribution and restructuring in the context of the 
87 For Holland's interest in European political-economic arrangements see Appendix A. 
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economic crisis in Europe in the early 1980s (Callaghan 2000, p. 110). Both 
books cover many topics in many areas which we cannot hope to survey in one 
chapter but instead we will focus on presenting the key themes from both works 
that comprise the major ideas of Holland's political-economic and strategic 
thought in this period. 
4.2 Holland's Political Economy Analysis: Early 1970s to mid 1980s 
In his preface to UM Holland writes that he presents a counter vision of 
democratic internationalist and socialist community of European states which he 
compared to a 
common market [which] is unequal and uncommon in character, bureaucratic in form, and at 
present tends to neutralise political power and disintegrate national economic and social 
structures. (1980, Preface)88 
Thus the thrust of his argument is to present the common market (EC) as hostile 
to the interests of the various national segments of the European working class. 
However, he does not condemn the EC entirely as beyond reform. He sets out the 
terms upon which the EC can be reformed and the policies upon which a 
European social-democratic project could be successful in such a community of 
states. 
Holland's analysis of the EC is well surnmarised in the following conclusion he 
drew from his studies at this time. The Community's problems he argued were 
due to the: 
'objective problems thrown up by the process of integration itself, and its unequal structural, 
spatial and social distribution (p. 148) 
88 All references in this section refer to Holland (1980), unless otherwise stated. 
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This conclusion was the starting point of Holland's internationalist strategy in the 
early 1980s. This section will outline how Holland came to this conclusion. 
Holland's views of the origins of the European Community or the European 
integration process follow fairly conventional analyses (Urwin 2007). He 
portrays the process eclectically as a mix of political and economic motives (the 
desire to interlock national economies to prevent war) (p. 3), the role of 
federalists (such as Monnet) (p. 142) and US interest in reviving European 
capitalism (p. 142) and the promotion of economic integration (Chaps. 1-3). The 
objectives of such integration, as he sees it, are to overcome the malignant 
nationalism expressed in the interwar years and economically founded on beggar- 
thy-neighbour policies (Chap. 1) and to promote economic integration, to enlarge 
the market and to rebuild European industry (Chap. 3 and p. 150). 
The political dynamic of the El or the development of the EC is seen in terms of 
institutional causes. Unlike functionalism which,, for Holland, perceived 
problems on a political plane (assuming economic problems to be resolved 
autonomously through the market), Holland identifies the distributional and 
institutional problems that the EC faced in the 1970s as the result of an 'unequal 
structural, spatial and social distribution' of economic resources (passim and p. 
148). The "unequal" distribution of resources is the product of a trinity of factors: 
multinational capital, negative integration policies and a European 'state' or set 
of directly unaccountable 'supranational' institutions (passim). 89 
89 Holland uses the term 'supranational', see p. 5 and passim. 
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The institutional conflicts which occur in the EC are the product of the operation 
of this triad of institutions. Thus the nationalism, the sovereignty issues, the 
economic malaise of the 1970s, the problems of welfare, the 'neutralisation of 
state power' (p. 121-4)90 and the 'marginal i sation of political power'91 (p. 126) 
are a product of inappropriate political-institutional structures and on failures of 
economic distribution (Chaps. 1- 3 and Chaps 5-7). He noted 'the ongoing force 
of national interests in mediating the problems of uneven development, and 
opposing supranationalism' (p. 150). 
A primary factor in the failure of the latter is the EC's Commission's adherence 
to what we would now call neoliberalism or what Holland termed 'negative 
integration' policies. Holland paints a one-sided picture of the EC's commitment 
to these policies to underpin his argument that a strategy focused on the EC at 
that conjuncture was not viable. 
Multinational monopolies were another major obstacle to progressive policies in 
the EC. These were both US and European multinationals. He argued that 
4multinational capital also undermined the efforts to translate positive national 
intervention into positive international integration' (p. 62). National governments 
had found themselves having to give 'support and aid' to 'national capital' to 
build 'national champions' against foreign multinational capital through new 
forms of public enterprise' (p. 62). Once the European multinationals had 
developed they were 'concerned to avoid a strong central political authority in the 
90 By this he referred to the increasing power of big business to undermine the controls which 
governments attempted to place upon them. 
91 By this he referred to the instances where nation-state political powers are undermined by 
having to subordinate themselves to EC policy. 
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European Community' (p. 12 1). This power was also used against nation states 
(p. 122). The power of the multinationals inhibited EC policy in the area of 
industrial policy, he concludes: 
'Multinational opposition to both positive national intervention and positive international 
integration substantially explains the frustration of Community hopes on effective common 
industrial and regional policies' (1980, p. 62) 
In a sense then there was a power loss in the struggle against multinational 
monopoly capital on two counts: (a) a loss of power to the EC and (b) a loss of 
power by states and the EC to multinational companies. 92 
This position could be altered but would require a change in the 'factors in the 
power structure', in other words, a rearrangement of political institutions and the 
relationships between political and economic institutions. The European 
Assembly's limp political powers undermined the 'classic (Poulantzian-DL) role 
of the state in mediating class interests in society' (p. 132). Furthermore, socialist 
collaboration at the European level was hindered by different programmes, 
policies, principles and expectations (p. 132). Socialist majorities in one or two 
states could be outvoted at Community level (p. 133, p. 181). To conclude, the 
labour movement could not look to the European political institutions to provide 
the policies of resistance to big capital. 
For Holland, the weakness of state powers at both EC and national level had to be 
remedied if the deleterious influence of multinational monopolies was to be 
curbed. Holland recognised the realities of the EC Commission's lack of the core 
institutions and competences of state power; it had none of the attributes for 
92 For similarities of analysis see: Renaud Dehousse (1997) esp., p. 46. Also: Crouch and Menon 
(1997), p. 164. 
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'independent enforcement of any decisions, in particular a policing force' and it 
had no 'national guard' (p. 15 1). Holland proposed a po I itical -institutional 
solution to strengthen the powers of the nation-state at all levels in the EC. He 
proposed a model of 'international decision-making' where EC decisions, 
policies, etc. are subordinated to the approval of national parliaments (p. 127). 
Given the above analysis, Holland had to present a strategy for changing the 
whole nature of the EC capitalist integration process. This strategy would have, 
of necessity, to be international. His strategy runs as follows. Although Holland 
is hesitant in calling the EC a state 93 , he nevertheless treats it as if it were one 
(e. g. pp. 6,111,128,129,134,135). He presented an analysis of the classes and a 
strategy that could bring about a change in the 'political structure' or 'state' of 
the EC. To explain the 'power structures' he used a Poulantzian model whereby a 
popular alliance could be built to counter the monopolies (Wood 1983). Holland 
utilised the argument for the structural autonomy of state: a position which was 
much debated on the left at the time (Clarke 1991; Wood 1983; Carnoy 1984). 
In terms of European 'power structures', labour is weak and fragmented, being 
predominantly national, whereas capital is strong and predominantly 
multinational and therefore able to organise itself beyond the nation state, thus 
putting itself beyond labour's reach, and also able to place demands on, and 
influence, supranational institutions (p. 136). Labour, therefore, must call on 
C4 nation state intervention instead to oppose either policies of negative integration, 
or their negative effects in specific industries or regions" (p. 98). 
93 There is of course considerable debate as to how to characterise the political power of the EC 
/EU. (Cini 2007, p. 2) 
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The forces, economic, social and political, at work in the process of class 
integration in the EC are complex. They do not follow a unidirectional path to 
some sort of superstate as envisaged by Mandel (p. 103). Economic integration 
per se did not lead to political co-operation (Holland 1986, p. 221). Differences 
in capitalist models in Europe require different strategies; no single strategy will 
suit all (p. 104). The possibility of a United States of Europe, capitalist or 
socialist, is frustrated by the fragmentation of the two key classes; capital and 
labour. This fragmentation is partly reinforced by how they are served by both 
the national state power and what the EC can provide. Thus the future of 
integration depends on the different functional relationships between classes and 
their powers and ideologies (laissez-faire, intervention, welfare) and the states 
that serve them (p. 104). 
This central argument is based on a Poulantzian framework of analysis (See: 
Bridges, 1974; Wood 1983; Clarke 1977). He deploys the argument that there are 
fractions of the capitalist class and none has a particular hold or grip on the state. 
The rub of his analysis is this: 
It is not necessary to share the whole range of Poulantzas's analysis or conclusions to see that his emphasis 
on fractions of class is important. Put in simpler terms, it illustrates the way in which much of the mediation 
of the modem capitalist state (or the European Community) can challenge or restrain the activities of one 
fraction of the capitalist class while remaining in essence the defender of a capitalist mode of production and 
capitalist class relations. (p. 106) 
In other words the state (both European and national - DL) can, if the conditions 
are right, be utilised in the struggle against the monopoly fraction. Prospectively, 
therefore, the EC could be changed in line with social-democratic purposes. 
'Positive policies for the defence' of labour's interests were required both at 
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Community level and at national level (p. 139). But the primary task, in the 
present conditions, was to democratise state power at national level (p. 135). 
From this fundamental standpoint on state theory, there follows a subsequent 
train of reformist plans and strategies and Holland's remaining analysis of class 
integration in Europe is founded on that premise. The EC, as an institution 
embracing laissez-faire, promotes multinational capitalist integration on its terms, 
which in turn threatens national disintegration and brings about a reaction from, 
primarily national capital (small, medium or large) which seeks protection 
through the nation-state or positive integration measures through the EC (p. 113). 
Holland argued against a federalist response to "countervail multinational capital 
by a multinational state" (p. 113). 
At the same time, from Holland's perspective, national state power makes the EC 
open to reform. As Holland states: 
one of the main reasons for the stubbornness of national power versus Community institutions to date has 
lain in the need (Holland's italics-DL) for state power as a means for mediating the problems posed for 
different sections of capital and labour by the unequal and uneven development of capitalism. In other 
words, the reality of nation-states in Western Europe is not simply a matter of sentiment or culture, but 
reflects real roles necessary for social cohesion and the maintenance of a particular fon-n or mode of society 
itself (Holland 1980, p. 129). 
The continued existence of the nation state, therefore, is for the purposes of 
providing social cohesion. Furthermore, the role of the nation-state restrains 'the 
extent to which the Community can proceed solely to represent the interest of the 
multinational monopolies: they are, in other words, a power against multinational 
capital (contra Mandel) (p. 107). The EC, therefore, has to mediate both 
multinational and national capital interests; it is caught in a cleft stick situation, 
and can therefore be neither a supranational nor an intergovernmental body, but 
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rather is an in-between form of governance. 94 It results too in contradictory 
policies where on the one hand nation-states look to the Community to enable the 
expansion of their 'large-scale national capital' and on the other to 'prevent big 
business of other member states from penetrating and dominating their national 
economic structures' (p. 109). To conclude, Holland considered, at this time, that 
the nation state could rescue Europe from multinational capital. 
For Holland, the 'main distinction' of European capital is 'national and 
multinational capital' 95 He makes no effort to explain the differences between the 
two and takes it for granted that the concepts are clear and plain to understand. 96 
Alongside this 'main distinction' he posits a complementary (Holland's italics - 
DL) dimension: large and small scale capital or meso- and micro - economic 
enterprise. Thus in the European integration process there are at least four rather 
than two main dimensions to the structure of capital and the sectional class 
interest which it represents, i. e. instead of national versus multinational, or large- 
versus small- scale capital, there is a combination, in varying proportions, of all 
four (p. 109) . So as 
illustrated in Table 4.3 there is the following: 
94 Holland, here is providing in a sense, a class analysis of the multi-level governance concept as 
opposed to an institutionalist analysis (Rosamond 2007, pp. 128-129). 
95 Holland's lack of clarity in defining monopolies or multinationals leads to a confusion as to 
their relation to national capital and the nation-state. We will return to this point below. 
96 For a contemporary discussion see Fine (1979), p. 154ff. 
-181- 
Table 4.3: Based on Holland's Typology of 
Basic Fractions of the Capitalist Class 
Spatial Multinational Capital 
Characteristics National Capital 
Scale Large - scale Capital 
Characteristics Small-scale Capital 
This simplistic, four dimensional, typology of the capitalist class means, for 
Holland, there is no unidirectional coincidence between class and national, or 
pro-European, politics. There are 'combinations, in varying proportions, of all 
four' (1980, p. 109). Thus, Holland berates Mandel 'for identifying the national 
bourgeoisie with large-scale monopolistic capital, neglecting small-scale national 
capital and its "Poujadiste" pressure on nation states' (p. 109). 
However, although Holland argues that there may be varying combinations of 
these capitals in favour of nation-state or European level policies it is argued that 
generally, they follow different paths, so for instance: 
the national member states of the EEC are called upon to defend the interests of smaller-scale national 
capital against unfavourable takeover terms, or the negative effects of unequal competition with big business 
elsewhere in the EEC, thus restraining the extent to which the Community can proceed simply to represent 
the interests of the 'monopolies'( Holland 1980, p. 109). 
We might formulate a typology of the politics of capital in relation to the EEC as 
follows in Table 4.4: 
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Table 4.4: Typology of the Politics of Capital in Relation to the 
EEC (based on Holland) 
Multinational, large Pro-negative integration in EEC 
and small scale 
multinational capital 
National large-scale Either: pro-negative integration or more 
capital likely, pro-positive integration in EEC or 
pro-nation- state intervention (depending 
on threat from the EEC) 
Small-scale national Pro-nation- state protective policies 
capital especially if EC fails to protect it 
These are very rough and simple typologies of Holland's arguments, yet they 
approximately correspond to the positions he sets out in this chapter (1980, chap. 
6) and provide, therefore a graphic and succinct guide to them. The typology 
underpins Holland's belief, at this time, that the only successful strategy to deal 
with the multinationals will be one that relies on co-ordinated national strategies 
of positive integration to combat the baleful effects of EC negative integration 
which favours the interests of the multinationals. This strategy can be built upon 
a working class alliance with national capitals, large and small, which likewise 
seek national protection against a common enemy. In other words, a co- 
ordinated, nation-state interventionist, national capitali st- supporting policy can 
be put in place which isolates the multinational monopolies. 
As for the EC, Holland believed that labour, divided along national lines, would 
find its 'national base' eclipsed by negative policies 'without a corresponding 
integration of its interests at Community level' (p. 139). However, for labour 
interests to dominate at the EC level would require a major change in the power 
relations between capital, labour and the state, rather than just institutional 
change at the Community level (p. 139) and this would mean 'little less than the 
successful challenge of European capitalism itself (p. 8). Given the weakness of 
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a pan-European movement of labour at that time, Holland prioritised pan- 
European national strategies where labour had its traditional bases (Geyer 1993; 
97 Bailey 2005, p. 17) . 
An integral element of his analysis was the conjunctural relationship between 
imperialism and European integration. Holland maintained that there were two 
aspects to the relationship between imperialism and the EC. On the one hand 
there was the external expression of imperialism in the relation between Europe 
and other major powers, especially the US (pp. 141-147), and the relation 
between the EC and 'Third World' countries (Chap. 9). On the other hand there 
was the internal relation of imperialisms of the states that constituted the 'nine'. 
Prime among them, for Holland, was West Germany. The model he applies to 
describe such 'internal' imperialism is Arrighi's (1978) concept of informal 
empire i. e. 'the informal empire of free enterprise" or a "zone of economic 
domination" (p. 152-153). 
Holland doubted that the EC would become a superpower on the lines of 
Galtung's thesis (1973). The reason being that the EC lacked what Holland 
described as the 'quality of power' or a combination of political, state, 
ideological and economic relations (p. 148). This was missing 'because of 
objective problems thrown up by the process of integration itself, and its unequal 
structural, spatial and social distribution' (p. 148). 
97 This perspective was the subject of debate in the New Statesman in 1982 and Holland's views 
were supported by others such as Bob Rowthorn and Francis Cripps and T. Ward (Callaghan 
2000, p. 109) 
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4.3 Out of Crisis: The Multilateral Strategy 
98 Out of Crisis (OoQ (1983) presented a strategy for a 'Euro AES' . It was a 
response to a crisis, which he regarded, was caused by deflation that occurred due 
'to cuts in spending and demand' (Holland 1983, p. 18) Holland in the 
introduction claimed that it derived 'from a process of convergence in thinking 
and policy in the main parties and institutions of the European Left' (Holland 
1983, p. 14). 99 The proposals were for Western Europe as a whole rather than just 
'Community Europe' (Holland 1983, p. 15). Holland states the OoC made the: 
'case for joint action international rather than simply national, ... [and. .. an extension ofl the 
alternative economic strategy to an 'Alternative Economy and Society'(1986, p. 216). .. in the 
era of the dominance of 'multinational industrial and financial capital' (Holland 1986, p. 215). 
The failure of the Alternative Economic Strategy in Britain with Labour's defeat 
in 1979 combined with the failure of the Mitterrand reforms (including 
nationalisation) in France in July 1982 had led him to this position (Callaghan 
2000, Holland 1983, p. 58 and 2004b; Featherstone 1988; Fella 2002; Sassoon 
1997). France had failed due to its attempt to 'go it alone' during an international 
economic crisis and without an uptum in world trade (Holland 1983, p. 58). 
Moreover the EC was 'stalemated both by their ideas and institutions' (Holland 
1986, p. 22 1). What were necessary were joint policies against monetarism and to 
harness multinational finance capital (Holland 1986, p. 224). Joint action should 
be based on 'identification of specific common problems. .. rather then the 
assumption that all problems are common, demanding comprehensive 
integration' (Holland 1986, p. 226) . 
98 This work was a product of the Forum for International Political and Social Economy and 
edited by Stuart Holland. 
99 Holland (1986, p. 215) states that its arguments became 'part of the new thinking of the 
European Left' and were endorsed in the opening statement of the joint manifesto of the 
Confederation of the Socialist Parties a the European Communities in 1984. 
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So Holland was proposing a multilateral strategy or a 'coordinated' response to 
the crisis based on reflation, restructuring and redistribution (Holland 1983, pp. 
57-63). He counterposed the principle of cooperation against that of integration 
(Holland 1986, p. 223). Within the multilateral strategies Holland identified two 
courses of action: (i) was a 'cumulative' strategy of a number of 'key' countries 
which were financially strongest 'would have to pull the hardest' (Holland 1986, 
p. 216). Holland was particularly optimistic about the roles of France, Greece, 
Spain and Scandinavia (Holland 1986, p. 230). This course of action would take 
place in stages or waves and would progressively draw in more states. The choice 
of macroeconomic policies used to pursue recovery was left to particular national 
states. He recognised that some states might exclude themselves from 
participation e. g. the UK and West Germany (Holland 1986, p. 227). 
Redistribution of wealth, power and working time, between classes; and between 
the public and private sector was crucial (Holland 1986, p. 216). (ii) A general 
strategy which might be termed an inclusive strategy drawing in all capitalist 
states. This would be the hardest course of action to take as it would be difficult 
to get consensus on the distribution of benefits and burdens over so wide a range 
of states. Holland's preference is for a cumulative strategy where a few states can 
co-ordinate more easily the policies required. 
OoC stressed the social and political foundations for economic recovery (Holland 
1986, p. 216). The short-term Keynesian recovery programme was complemented 
by a call for a shift of resources 'through redistribution and a restructuring of the 
prevailing imbalance between unaccountable private and accountable public 
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power' (Holland 1986, p. 216). It was envisaged there would be some form of 
monetary organisation to promote stability between different currencies (p. 46) 
The strategy thus provided a stepping stone to building a European movement of 
labour on a scale envisaged in the Uncommon Market, for it promoted joint 
action between Left parties and govermnents in Europe, injected a consciousness 
that it was only through common action in Europe that labour could become 'a 
European left rather than a left within one country' (Holland 1984, p. 263) and 
'take the case from the national base to the international joint agenda' (Holland 
1984, p. 258). 
This had the effect of- 
(i) Providing a vehicle for action to complement and assist unilateral strategies 
(the French unilateral strategy had failed). 
(ii) Raising the issue of co-ordinated action across Europe based on multilateral 
actions in the context of a poor consciousness of the need for a European 
movement. 
4.4 Critique 
This critique is divided its two parts; part (4.4.1) deals with issues arising out of 
Holland's analysis of European integration. Part ( 4.4.2) deals will issues arising 
out of his multilateral strategy. The analysis will be reviewed and evaluated 
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primarily in relation to thought in radical international political economy and 
primarily, concepts of bloc imperialism. 
4.4.1 Commentary on Holland's Analysis of the EC and the EI. 
4.4.1.1 Holland's Analysis and Neo-Gramscianism 
First, Holland must be praised for using certain concepts of historical materialism 
in order to comprehend the political developments which have taken place within 
the El. In this attempt he was one of the first British left political thinkers to do 
this in an extended study; studies such as this, in English, have been few and far 
between as Hazel Smith has commented (2002, p. 264). In fact, Holland's 
contribution in this field is rarely recognised, and it is interesting that Smith in 
her brief overview of historical materialist approaches to the El overlooks his 
contribution. One commentator on European integration theories who has 
appreciated his efforts in this sphere and categorized them as 'Marxist' is Ben 
Rosamond (2000, p. 83). Rosamond wrote that Holland's work: 
4represented an unusually direct interrogation of orthodox theories of economic and political 
integration from a Marxist standpoint' (Rosamond 2000, p. 83). 
In the only journal review that was found on the Uncommon Market, Peter 
Holmes (1982, p. 806) describes correctly Holland drawing on the works of 
continental Marxist writers (such as Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas and 
others) for the theories developed in the text. Perhaps this is why Holland has not 
been given his due, as he was not original in his theories. However the 
interdisciplinary eclecticism of Holland's work based on radical and certain 
Marxist concepts in economics. sociology. politics and international relations 
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makes his work of note in the field. Holland was amongst the original few British 
Left theorists in utilising the explanations of continental historical materialists for 
an in depth analysis of the European Community. As Smith (1994, p. 142) 
lamented in her overview of Marxism and international relations theory there is 
4no significant body of literature which has integrated Marxist insights with the 
IR literature in English'. That Holland sought to utilise Marxist insights, in a 
limited way, in analysing European integration is much to his credit. His analysis 
of the relationship between class, international political economy, ideology and 
political institutions was ambitious and bold, if not a little sweeping, but to date 
no other British left thinker, to the knowledge of this author, has paralleled his 
vision and scope in writing so extensively about European integration in the 
1970s. ' 00 
Holland could well lay claim to be the first British neo-Gramscian or proto-neo- 
Gramscian to interpret West European integration at length. Some of the insights 
he makes about the relationship between the 'supranational' EC and nation-states 
and the role of MNCs and labour strategies in the policy-making process are now 
being taken up today theoretically and empirically by neo-Gramscians and others 
(Van Apeldoorn 2002; G. Strange 2002a). 
Both he and the neo-Grarnscians have been influenced by West European 
Marxism (particularly Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas). This leads them to 
fairly similar perspectives on Europe but with some slight differences (not 
100 For a summary of such works which is very brief see Hazel Smith (2002). 
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surprising given that roughly ten to fifteen years divides them), especially on the 
role of the nation state. 
Holland and the neo-Grarnscians have a broad three part concept of the social 
structure namely, a production base out of which two major classes emerge, 
capitalists and workers; an intellectual strata which provides ideologies, and a 
political sphere in which operates both the state and the political process (Bieler 
and Morton 2001, Gill and Law 1988). Both reject the determining role of the 
economic base upon the other spheres which they prefer to see as autonomous. 
This is regarded as a means of avoiding the economic determinism of 'vulgar' 
Marxism. Where they differ is in the role of globalisation and transnational forces 
which the neo-Gramscians add to their analysis. In the 1980s Holland used 
instead the role of multinationals. 
It can also be argued that Holland adopts a structurationist approach to Europe 
(Strange 2003, p. 5). On the one hand, he stresses the imperatives of the EC and 
the multinationals but on the other rejects any sense of economic determinism. 
Social forces, if successfully mobilised, can bring about a rearrangement in 
institutional relations. He seeks to illustrate how a triad of social forces: namely 
state, 'national' capital and labour can transfonn the institutions and policies of 
the EC and provide the basis for an internationalist strategy. 
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4.4.1.2 Problems of Holland's Method o Analysis )f 
Holland in his analysis of the European Community uses certain Marxist 
analytical terms e. g. capital, class (see: 1980, Chap 5), to provide the critique of 
conventional academic explanations of European integration. ' 01 
However, what is also interesting is the sort of Marxist concepts he omits from 
his analysis. Prime among them must be a lack of any overall theory of capitalist 
accumulation and the scope and limits that result for states, their interactions and 
state's policies (Smith 2002, p. 266; Clarke 1988,1991; Holloway and Picciotto 
1978, p. 6). 
Holland does not ground the origins of national opposition to the EC in such a 
theory, or the origins of the growth of the EC, but rather he seeks to find the 
origins of such within the political sphere. The origins of the national struggle 
against the EC are thus primarily attributed to institutional causes: the struggle 
against a particular political form of integration and the political response of the 
nation-state to those policies and to the form of their imposition (through 
directives), and the political problems of building a left social democratic 
opposition in the Assembly. Maldistribution of resources is another factor but its 
redistribution rests on rearranging political relations. Thus although the Marxist 
category of social class is deployed, it is deployed in a manner in which the main 
motivating forces behind those struggles are primarily political/ institutional and 
not economic/ class related (for more on this: see Holloway 1976; Smith 2002, p. 
101 Smith has noted that those who do not share the institutional bias in analysing European 
integration have difficulties in being heard (2002, p. 266). 
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265). This serves two purposes for Holland: one, is to argue that the political 
problems are not derived from the EC itself but from the policies that it follows 
and that with a changed balance of 'power' factors different progressive policies 
which are not capitalist (in Holland's opinion) could be won within the EC (in 
time). The second purpose is that although formally Holland recognises the role 
of monopoly in undermining integration he avoids developing the argument that 
the fundamental problem with the EC and its structures and policies are derived 
from the capitalist system itself Rather he views the origins in conflicting 
institutional relations (e. g. Multinational s-EC, Assembly- EC, nation-states and 
supranationalism). 
Holloway and Picciotto (1978, p. 6) made this point in their criticism of the 
methods of Poulantzas' theories. The separation of the economic, social and 
political spheres (as Holland does in his analysis) into relatively autonomous 
structures which can be interpreted independently of one another has its 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it facilitates the opportunity to 
study their interrelations in more depth but on the other hand it weakens the 
overall understanding of their connections. This structuralist method has a 'fatal 
immunising effect' (Holloway and Picciotto 1978, p. 6), as the laws of the 
accumulation of capital can be dispatched to an economic sphere and the 
activities of the state and political processes can be developed apart from the 
context of the operation of the laws of capitalist accumulation and the operation 
of capitalism as a whole. 
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Holland's use of Poulantzas's theory as the basis of this method of analysis is not 
unproblematic. Holloway and Piccotto have drawn our attention to the methods 
of the 'Poulantzians' of whom we may consider Holland one. They comment that 
the methods used are akin to 'a kind of political pragmatism', and the 
prescription depends on the 'content' supplied by the analysis of political class 
relations which is often dictated by the tactics and expediency of the political 
moment. As a result there is a neglect of basing the analysis of class struggle on 
the actual dynamic of capital accumulation. It is 'characteristic of a Toulantzian' 
approach that... the global patterns of capital accumulation are either ignored or 
granted no real effect on the political, so that the bourgeois nation-state is always 
accepted as the defacto political field' (Holloway and Picciotto 1978, p. 9). This 
very much characterises Holland's method and analytical conclusions. 
Thus, Holland abstracts elements of the relationship between the EC institutions 
and monopolies and affirms that the relationship is of one fixed mode or form i. e. 
negative integration (much in the vein of structural dependency theory). The 
nation states play the role of points of resistance. This becomes his 'model' 
which provides the basis for his policy prescriptions for state capitalist 
intervention. 
The 'political' sphere, he maintains, is not determined by the economic, there are 
no limits to the state's role within capitalist accumulation 
102 
, the state can 
reposition itself in relation to the capitalist accumulation process to manage the 
power-house of the capitalist economy - the multinational monopolies. Therefore 
102 On these limits see Clarke (1988,199 1). 
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there are no barriers for it to act in the way he prescribes, given the right 
conditions. There is no consideration given to the analysis of class struggle, no 
consideration is paid to the 'actual dynamic of capital accumulation' (in its three 
modes: national, regional and global) which conditions the development of the 
EC. There is no relationship made between the development of the EC and its 
central, crucial position in inter- imperialist struggles. 
Consequently, under the conditions prevailing in Holland's model, the nation- 
state is held to be the focal point within the political process. It is its activity 
which is crucial to the maintenance of the system and it 'mediates' the impact of 
the negative integration processes imposed by the EC and NINCs. 103 The state 
becomes labour's defence against the constraints of El. Moreover, the nation- 
states themselves appear to be apart from any capitalist accumulation processes; 
the state's actions are presented as a site of defence against capital accumulation 
rather than participants in the attempt to manage such accumulation (Burnham 
1999). 
Here, in a sense, Holland slips back into the neofunctionalism he seeks to reject. 
Problems to be remedied are 'spillovers' of the form of the political integration 
process i. e. supranationalism and negative integration. His analysis ends up in a 
4 superstructural limbo'just like functionalism. The economy works on one level, 
politics on another. 
103 On the similarity of concepts between this idea and contemporary progressive nationalism see: 
Radice (2000a). 
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There is another angle from which we can approach Holland's method of 
analysis. There is a similarity between Holland's and Cox's portrayal of the state 
in the global political economy (Cox 1987, pp. 253-65). For Cox, states were 
traditionally the 'buffers and bulwarks' that protected national economies by 
sustaining domestic welfare and employment from the power of the 
disintegrating global political -economic forces (Cox 1987, p. 254). Holland has a 
very simi ar v ew. Just as Cox saw pressures on the nation-state to change its 
policies due to 'external' pressures so did Holland. The EC plays the role for 
Holland that the 'global order' plays for Cox in his model. It appears as an 
external constraint. 
Burnham has criticised this perspective for its conceptualisation of the global 
system. He writes: 
In short, by viewing the state and market as opposed forms of social organisation (with 
globalisation tipping the balance in favour of market against the state), Cox [and this applies to 
Holland-DL] and most other IPE approaches follow implicitly the liberal and realist positions 
which separate social reality into rigid categories and look for external linkages between 
artificially disaggregated phenomena (Burnham 1999, p. 39). 
And he argues later that states should be viewed within the social relations of 
production (although a differentiated form) and that their 'power' derives from 
their 'ability to reorganise labour-capital relation within (and often beyond) their 
boundaries to enhance the accumulation of capital, both domestically and 
globally' (Burnham 1999, p. 41). States, therefore, manage the capital-labour 
relations both within the domestic capital accumulation process and the global. 
The capital accumulation process is not external to the state; the state is an 
integral part of it in the capitalist system. Holland has no understanding of this 
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concept in his writing; for him the state is external to the capital accumulation 
process. His approach is influenced by mainstream economics where the state 
intervenes to remedy imperfect markets. 
4.4.1.3 The Theory of European Bloc Imperialism and Holland's analysis of the 
European Community (EQ and the European Integration Process (EI) 
The formation of the EC is usually presented as the product of some idea of 
community (Urwin 2007, p. 18), or in conventional economic theory is the 
product of institutions to overcome market failures or to solve coordination 
problems (Gilpin 2001, p. 345) or in the new political economy is the product of 
interest groups politics (Gilpin 2001, p. 345). In political theories it is presented 
as the product of ideas such as federalism, or interrelated political, economic and 
technological developments as in functionalism or neofunctionalism, or as the 
result of the creation of institutions in solving economic and other problems as in 
neoinstitutionalism, or the product of intergovernmental arrangements driven by 
domestic groups as in intergovernmentalism, or the product of supranational 
forces forming cultural, political-economic blocs as in the case of transnational 
neo-Gramscianism (Gilpin 2001 Chap. 13; Bieler and Morton 2001; Van 
Apeldoorn 2002). Holland presents an eclectic account of the origins of European 
integration based on ideas, institutions and intergovernmental agreements and 
supranational forces (N1NCs). It is evident from the analysis presented below that 
I do not agree with these perspectives. 
As argued in Chapter Two the perspective offered here is a Marxist one but not 
within the traditional framework offered by the transnational capital functionalist 
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theorists such as Cocks (1980), nor that of certain proponents of Open Marxist 
theory who ground themselves on a capital relation theory of the state (Holloway 
and Picciotto 1980), nor the transnational class theories of authors such as Van 
Apeldoorn (2002). The perspective developed here in the critique of Holland 
grounds itself on the historical materialist theory of imperialism developed by 
Lenin and recently developed by Mandel (1970 and 1978), Carchedi and 
Carchedi (1999) and Carchedi (200 1; 2002) and others (Cypher 1992; Beitel 
2005; Freeman 2004, p. 73ff. ). Furthermore, the focus on inter-imperialist 
relations between blocs does not deny that nation-states have their own inter- 
imperialist relations aside from those between blocs or that states retain their 
relevance (Carchedi 2002, p. 156; Panitch 2000, p. 5). As Carchedi has observed: 
Each imperialist country has its own imperialist relations with other, dominated, countries and 
each state still performs an economic, political, ideological and military role which is 
indispensable for the reproduction of capitalist relations (and thus for the operation of the 
multinational enterprises). However, besides nation-centred imperialist relations, there are also 
bloc-centred imperialist relations that are a new feature of imperialist development (Carchedi 
2002, p. 156. ) 
It is this 'new feature' of imperialist development which forms the core of this 
thesis' arguments about Holland, and which partly comprises the thesis' 
originality: it assesses Holland's from the standpoint of the recent developments 
in the bloc imperialist of European integration (Carchedi 1999,2001 and 2002). 
Chapter Two has discussed various theories of the state and monopoly capitalism 
and set out the general theory of bloc imperialism. Here I apply that theory to 
Holland's regional political economy and associated strategies as a means to 
develop my critique. The internal contradictions which drive the European 
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economic integration process can only be clearly understood if founded upon an 
analysis of social class and the production and distribution of value (Mandel 1970 
and 1978, Holland 1980, Carchedi and Carchedi 1999; Smith 2002; Poulantzas 
1974; Carchedi 200 1; Burnham 1995). Europe from the very beginning was 
'capital's Europe'. Its basic thesis is that three crucial factors both 'delimit and 
inform Europe's economic integration and thus unification process' Carchedi 
(2001, pp. 1-2). These are: 
o The process has been driven by European oligopolies under the hegemony 
of German oligopolies. This has influenced the new type of imperialism 
Europe now exhibits. 
* The El process has produced a 'new powerful economic bloc' with its 
own imperialist ambitions. This will lead to an exacerbation of tension 
with its major rivals, the US and Japan. 
* The European working class, although marginalised in the process, has 
nevertheless, through its struggles made its presence felt. The whole 
project, has been shaped by 'the need either to appease it (e. g. the 
Common Agricultural Policy, Social Europe) or to make it pay for the 
process of integration (e. g. the Economic and Monetary Union) (Carchedi 
2001). 
The set of institutions that comprise the EC/EU in the model of bloc imperialism 
play a pivotal role. They facilitate and organise the various national imperialisms 
into a multilateral bloc and then through various networks and institutions mould 
a common policy for European capital against its rivals (Cini 2007, parts 3 and 4 
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for the political institutional processes). 104 As Heffernan has stressed sovereignty 
was pooled to 'enhance, through collective action, their control over external 
forces' (Heffernan 2001, p. 183). The EC's role has grown over the last 50 years 
but its purpose remains the same: to develop the scope and intensity of capital 
accumulation of the various European imperialisms and client states against its 
rivals (Mandel 1970 and 1978, Galtung 1973; Beitel 2005; Carchedi 2001; 
Cypher 1992; Albo 2003; Drache 2000). Furthennore, it was the act of the 
European nation states (with US participation: Lundestad 1998; Cox and 
Skidmore-Hess 1999) to build this institution and to remain committed to it 
(Holland 1980, Urwin 2007). 
It should be noted that European bloc imperialism is far from cohesive. It is 
fractured by the competing national imperialisms that compose it: so there is a 
constant tussle and struggle between these 'national' imperialisms for advantage, 
preference, hegemony and gain (Anderson 1997, pp. 56-57; Holloway and 
Picciotto 1980, p. 142 and p. 152 n. 3 1; Carchedi 200 1, pp. 129,116,117,129). 
European economic and political integration is a product of the processes of the 
national imperialisms - involving both state and economic forces - in Western 
Europe forming a bloc after the World War II in the pursuit of capital 
accumulation against the US (ironically, with US aid at first) and in the drive to 
sustain capitalism against the perceived threat of Communism (Carchedi 2001, 
pp. 1-2; Bonefeld 2002, p. 118). Carchedi's work on European bloc imperialism 
is extensive, empirically rich, theoretically cogent and the most systematic and 
104 Realist commentators have assayed this trend to regionalism in bloc terms e. g. Gilpin (1987), 
p. 407 
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thoroughly argued from a Marxist perspective but others have adopted the bloc 
concept of imperialism, although in varying versions, including: Mandel 1970 
and 1978, Cypher 1992; Callinicos 2003, pp. 122-123: Greg Albo 2003, p. 97; 
Beitel 2005. 
Of course, there have been detractors from the theory, not least Leo Panitch who 
has argued for the contemporary relevance of the Poulantzian conception of a US 
superpower over subordinate powers (Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin 2003, p. 20). 
Furthermore, Panitch has doubted the concept of 'rivalry' between blocs as it 
"inflates economic competition between states far beyond what it signifies in the 
real world" (Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin 2003, p. 24). This viewpoint has been 
challenged by Cypher (1992), Greg Albo (2003, p. 90) and Beitel (2005) who 
have strongly argued the rivalry thesis. 
However, the bloc imperialism thesis does present an alternative perspective on 
European integration to that of Holland's (See Table 4.2 above). It presents an 
alternative in terms of conception of origins, objectives, causes of the economic 
and political dynamic, the origins of the political and economic contradictions of 
the process, the variety of policies adopted, how and why the contradictions 
within the process of EI are resolved and consequently the types of strategy that 
are required to deal with the problems. It does so from a consistently historical 
materialist position rather than the eclectic perspective of Holland. 
Holland's institutional analysis (which is ultimately what it is - despite 
similarities with neo-Gramscianism) of the EC/EU does not recognise there more 
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fundamental structural mechanisms at work with the EI process and because it 
does not recognise such a level ultimately has consequences in the weakness of 
his strategic perspectives. 
4.4.1.4 The EC as a 'State' 
Significantly, Holland implicitly treats the EC as if it were a state, even though he 
did not consider it as having the qualities of a state yet. He recognises that it does 
have powers and institutions given to it by the Treaties of Rome and subsequent 
treaties. He called this complex of political institutions and powers the 
6supranational' element within the EC which due to its structure and weak 
democratic institutions both was a vehicle for policies favouring MNCs and 
frustrated opportunities for social-democratic interventionist policies both at the 
EC level and level of the nation-state. 
Of course the issue about the EC/ EU has been much debated in European studies 
and international political economy (George and Bache 2001; Cini 2007; Schultz, 
Sbderbaum and Ojendal 2001, p. 254). What has been noted is the transitional 
nature of EU institutions: no longer purely an intergovernmental organisation but 
not quite a supranational state. The conventional explanation of this phenomenon 
is an institutional one that Holland offered: a clash between the supranational 
principle of organization and the nation-state principle (George and Bache 2001, 
p. 19). The theory of bloc imperialism sees a deeper meaning behind such 
institutional forms, i. e. the uniting and yet competition between imperialist states. 
The situation is not just a product of the conflict of ideas or principles, it is a 
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product of the relations of different 'masses' of capital with overlapping and 
diverging interests (Carchedi, 2001). 
Another interesting point, too, is that Holland does not object to the EC in itself 
but only to the policies followed and the structure of the institutions of decision- 
making. At the start of my analysis of Holland I noted that his vision was for 'a 
democratic internationalist and socialist community of European states'. 
Holland's vision is of independent, sovereign states work together on a common 
basis of state intervention to overcome the unequal spatial, social and structural 
distribution of resources. It is a vision of a group of state capitalist countries 
jointly managing the contradictions of capitalism. He had no objection to a 
supranational authority as long as it operated on the basis of consensus rather 
than the denial of sovereign right of non-compliance (Holland 1980, p. 126). He 
had no objection to capitalism as long as MNCs did not abuse the market. He was 
prepared to accept the EC if it operated on the basis of 'international decision- 
making' (Holland 1980, p. 127) and state intervention policies. It was this 
conception that guided his strategy in Out of Crisis (1983). 
From the perspective of bloc imperialism presented above the vision of 'a 
democratic internationalist and socialist community of European states' is idealist 
(in the political sense) on two counts: (a) it is not realistic about the European 
imperialist states commitment to the EC and their fundamental reason for 
forming such an organisation which was to collectively advance their interests 
against rival imperialisms as they realised they had interests in common; (b) it is 
not realistic about the embedded economic and political drives that imperialist 
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states have to capture markets, export capital, advance financial interests, etc. 
against their rivals. The vested interests that have to be confronted to bring about 
a simultaneous socialist policy of Europe across a few or more countries would 
be powerful. We will return to this when examining Holland's strategy. 
Holland's policy is tantamount to asserting the position of Hilferding and 
Kautsky that the state management of monopoly capitalism without crisis is 
entirely possible (Harclach, Karras, and Fine, 1978). This goes against the very 
grain of capitalism's drive to accumulation and the consequent anarchy that 
results out of capitalist production (see Chapter 2). Holland's vision asserts the 
supremacy of the political over the economic. The image projected is of a 
European state cartel or trust: managing the West European capitalist system (and 
in conjunction with other blocs too). Holland writes: 
Europe... dominates nearby industrial markets, in Europe itself, in Africa, the Middle East and 
trade with Comecon. They have largely been pushed out of other markets in America and the Far 
East; these could not be difficult or impossible to retake... But it is sensible to assume that space 
must be left for other parts of the world to increase their share of the world industrial markets in 
the long run if not at Europe's expense. Some solution other than aggressive and destructive 
competition must therefore be found ... 
(1983, p. 75) 
However, the contradictions of capitalist accumulation are such that that they 
cannot be overcome without a fundamental expropriation of private property, as 
it is from this that the entire dynamic of the contradictions of capitalism derive, 
namely: the disproportions of production, the origins of crisis, the drive to 
accumulation and competition, the struggle to dominate markets, and the rise of 
monopoly, etc. No amount of state management of capitalism could remove these 
inherent dynamics of capitalism without having to undermine the very basis of 
the system itself This would put the state in fundamental opposition to the 
system it is obliged and designed to maintain and upon which its concepts of 
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justice and law are established - the principle of private property - this makes 
Holland's argument a logical and practical contradiction. Thus Holland's theory 
of the state management of capitalism comes up against the limits of what it can 
achieve (Burnham 2001; Clarke 1988 and1991; Holloway and Picciotto 1977). 
4.4.1.5 Holland and the Characterisation of EC Policies 
Holland views on the EC changed rapidly. In 1975 he represented the EC 
Commission as the "biggest paper tiger outside China" (1976a, p. 317). Five 
years later he was presenting it as a formidable obstacle to progressive politics. 
By the late 1980s he was ready to assist Jacque Delors, then EU President, and an 
associate. 
In the Uncommon Market he presented a one-sided picture of the EC: that of a 
force for negative integration, a handmaiden for the MNCs, an opponent of all 
things national and hostile to the policies of social reform or as a 'negative 
integration bloc'. In many ways it can be compared with the concept of the 
4neoliberal bloc' that Van Apeldoorn (2001; 2002) utilises in his analysis of the 
European Union in the 1990s. Holland using different terms, but a similar 
concept, was establishing the existence of such a bloc in the 1970s. This raises an 
analytical problem of its relation to that of the 'neoliberal. bloc' in the 1990s. 105 
Coming back to Holland, his representation of the EC as committed to 
neoliberalism alone is weak (Dolan 1992, p. 118). The EC, like nation states, is 
105 This highlights the lack of a thorough Marxist history of the EC. 
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more complex than this. The EC was not only bound by Articles which favoured 
negative integration but also had within it articles which enjoined it to improve 
the conditions of labour within its purview (Newman 1983, pp. 286-7). Empty 
articles of intent they may have been, but they carried the seeds of what was to 
become the social and economic policies of the Delors era. In the early years 
social policies remained the province of nation-states but in the treaties there 
some measures of social reform granted under the 'influence of interventionist 
delegations' e. g. equal pay for both sexes, and the establishment of a European 
Social Fund (Falkner 2007, p. 273). The latter has increased in importance as 
integration progressed. The Social Action Programme was approved in 1974 
although leading to few formal concrete actions (Nello 2005, p. 296). Moreover, 
as Holland declared, the CAP was also about social and regional support through 
its payments to millions of peasants and small-holders especially in France 
(Holland 1980, p. 33). My point is that the EC had to fulfil both capital 
accumulation and capital legitimation purposes. 106 The capital accumulation 
purpose was its negative integration policies, which Holland correctly indicates, 
allowed multinational monopoly capital to expand. On the other hand, the EC had 
the potential to carry out legitimation functions as well and did so in some areas 
but in this it was hindered by the existence of established nation-state practices 
and the problems of finding policies which would suit all (Streeck 1996; Scharpf 
1999). These purposes were not separate from its capitalist accumulation function 
but formed an integral aspect of its overall goal of sustaining the capitalist system 
(Holloway 1976, p. 13). Thus the growth of European integration embodied both 
tendencies of capitalism simultaneously, to enable and sustain its growth. 
106 Of course as Holloway (1976) points out the two are interrelated. 
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Holland also presents the EC's relationship with nation-states in a one-sided way 
too. It appears that the nation-states' political elites never had an input into EC 
policies if we accept Holland's arguments. However, as Holland pointed out it 
was nation-states that formed the EC and helped give it the principles and 
policies that the organisation operated upon (Holland 1980, pp. 3-4). Nation- 
states established the EEC as they saw it would be beneficial to the growth of 
capital and hence capital accumulation. 
Also the EC bore the same dual character in relation to capital as Britain did: it 
was both a home and a host to capital (Poulantzas 1974). It was a home to 
distinct national capitals that exported commodities and capital abroad and whose 
interests the EC promoted in relations with other states abroad. At the same time, 
it played host to capital (at this time US capital) which meant it had to keep its 
policies relating to capital open and hence its emphasis on multilateral ism. 107 
This aspect resulted, as Holland correctly points out, in policies which were 
contradictory: on the one hand trying to encourage the merger and growth of 
European capital whilst at the same time keeping open doors to US multinational 
capital which undermined that growth through competition and domination of 
markets. This is why he was so frustrated at the failure to establish a European 
Company Statute and a lack of a European industrial policy. ' 08 This failure 
allowed US multinational monopoly domination and hindered the European 
accumulation of capital and its concentration and centralisation. 
107 This did not mean that the EC did not follow protectionist policies too (Nello 2005, pp. 76-82) 
108 Van Apeldoorn views the failure of a European industrial policy as a defeat for 'Europeanist 
fraction of capital' (Bieler and Morton 2001, p. 211). 
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4.4.1.6 Holland's Characterisation of the El Political Dynamic 
Holland subtitles his book "capital, class and power in the European 
Community". What were the tasks of a class analysis of the EC? One would 
expect a consistent application of the concept of class to the origins of the EC, its 
dynamic, its motive forces, its internal institutional and political relations and its 
external relations, in other words an attempt to explain the phenomena that is the 
EC from the standpoint of class or historical materialism in all or at least most of 
its manifestations. Unfortunately, Holland's analysis fails this test and his 
application of class analysis is never consistent and is applied mainly in the 
context of an analysis of the relation of social forces to power which is 
Poulantzian in approach (Poulantzas 1974). The sole purpose of this is to use 
such analysis to illustrate the 'class' alliances that can be brought to bear in 
relation to state power in order to break the grip of the multinationals upon it 
(Wood 1983). In other words, it is the use of the concept of class for pragmatic 
purposes. Holland's neglect of the theory of capitalist accumulation and his 
preference for the Poulantzian framework of 'base- superstructure' of analysis 
leads him to separate out national struggles from their basis in class struggles. 
However, as Burnham has pointed out from a Marxist standpoint political, 
ideological and economic forms of struggle have to be viewed within a class 
struggle context if we are not to lapse into 'pragmatic pluralism' (Burnham 2001, 
7 5). 
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Why is Holland unprepared to use Marxism in the way Burnham suggests? 
Holland cannot ground his concept of class in a wider Marxist framework of an 
understanding of the nature and dynamics of the capitalist system, because if he 
did his analysis of monopolies would have been different, the politico-economic 
origins of the EC and its character would have been very different, his analysis of 
the state's role within capitalist accumulation would change and this would have 
undermined his strategic goals of promoting the theory of a progressive Europe if 
only the forces could be mobilised. A Marxist analysis of the EC, in the mould of 
Maximova (1973), Holloway (1976), Holloway and Picciotto (1980), Carchedi 
(2001), would reveal the EC as an outcrop of the European states drive for capital 
accumulation in rivalry against other imperialist states. Instead the political 
relations are discussed within an institutional framework where the main 
problems are the relations between supranational and national institutions and the 
structure of market relations. 
4.4.1.7 Holland's Characterisation of the Nation-state in EI 
There is an element of truth in Holland's criticism that internationalisation of 
capital arguments do not specify the complexity of class power and class 
relations (historically); and that they tend to neglect the other complex class 
conflicts (besides the central capital-labour conflict) in EI (Holloway and 
Picciotto 1980, p. 152, n. 3 1); and that there are simple assumptions about the 
determinism of the base with the superstructure. In other words they make a 
complex, contradictory process too uniform and too one-dimensional. They tend 
to stress the harmonising aspects of the integration of capital, the formation of a 
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European bourgeoisie (Murray 1971, Mandel 1970; Holman and van der Pijl 
1996, p. 57) and the functional response of the state, at an international level, 
without recognising at the same time the conflicting aspects of multiple sites of 
state-capital accumulation processes (i. e. imperialisms) within the integration 
process (Carchedi 2001; Bumliam 1991). 109 
Two examples come to mind: one, is the role of the national struggle against the 
EC authority which Holland refers to; the other is how to account for the 
struggles within Europe between state-capital complexes (or imperialisms) and 
the fluid relations between them"O By this is meant the struggles amongst the 
dominant powers (and lesser powers) in the EC i. e. Britain, France and Germany 
and which is documented so well by intergovernmentalist theorists of the EC 
(e. g. Moravcsik 1991, p. 54 writes of 'firm-level business pressure at the 
domestic level'; see also: Moravcsik 1999) and bloc imperialist theorists 
(Carchedi 2002). 
Holland tries to present these conflicts as national struggles. He ignores the 
interimperialist debate that took place in the I 970s (See: the collection edited by 
Radice 1975). This presents the struggles which take place within the El as 
driven by the conflict of the separate, state-bound, capital accumulation processes 
in the trend towards the merging of European capital i. e. interimperialism 
(Carchedi and Carchedi 1999, p. 122; Carchedi 2002, p. 156; Callinicos 2003, pp. 
119 ff, Rowthom 197 1, Holloway 1976). This results in the contradictory process 
which is El. On interimperialist rivalries Burnham (199 1) asserts: 
109 This is similar in some ways to the concept of ultra-imperialism of Karl Kautsky 
110 Holland partly touches upon this when discussing West Germany and how it seeks to dominate 
Europe but he does not develop this point 
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The international restructuring of accumulation occurs in a context of inter- imperialist rivalry in 
which nation states struggle to overcome the contradictions of the capital relation. In obscuring 
this point the professed strength of neo-Gramscian analysis is in fact its greatest weakness (p. 83). 
This point is overlooked by Holland who perceives it as a political struggle 
between the supranational and the national. Picciotto (1991 a) in contrast has 
argued that 'interstate conflict continues' and that 'changes in the international 
system involves a contradictory and conflicting process of internationalisation 
both of capital and of the state' (Picciotto's italics) and 'that the crisis of 
international capital is also a crisis of the interstate system' (Pieciotto 1991a, p. 
216). However, he does not develop this into an interimperialist analysis: of the 
struggles of rival capitalisms seeking advantage within EI. Holland likewise fails 
to make the connection because he regards the MNCs as separate from states and 
unified in their approach to the EC. It is only the "national" bourgeoisie plus the 
44national" labour movements which offer struggle against the EC. 
The integration process can be understood, in Marxist terms, not just a product of 
the growth of productive forces but as a result of an imperialist political economy 
that chose a course of integration in Western Europe after World War II (Mandel 
1970 and 1978; Carchedi, 2001). 
Western Europe's situation after the war provided the impulses to integration 
(Dell 1963). The process of European integration has proceeded unevenly as the 
result of the interaction of the national, regional and global political economies. 
A historical materialist approach places the origins of the EEC in its proper 
material context and avoids the Poulantzian idealist tendency to which Holland is 
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prone (i. e. viewing the development of the EC from within the 'political level' 
and the result of political ideas primarily). 
4.4.1.8 Holland's concept of Nation-states and "National " Capital 
Holland asserts that there are national capitals in individual nation-states that can 
provide the basis for an alliance for the working class against multinational 
capital. As we have seen, Radice (1984) had argued that was no longer the case 
and Spence (1985) and Carchedi (2001) argued that capitals, in countries like 
Britain, were imperialist. The character of capital's relationship with the nation- 
state was and is the central issue of debate. Each had a different understanding as 
to the characteristics of capital within the contemporary nation-state and 
consequently in El. This conflict of analysis has widespread implications and 
fundamental ramifications on how we perceive states within El. Each presents a 
different understanding of the social forces operating within the EC. Table 4.5 
illustrates this analytical debate. 
Table 4.5 Analytical Debate over How to Characterise Capital's Relations 
with the Nation-state 
Author Position on Nation-state capital State Role 
Holland National Capital exists and still The national state is a site of 
(1980) powerful; multinational capital is struggle against multinational capital 
external and operates through the 
EC. 
Radice National capital no longer The nation state is of subordinate 
(1984) meaningful importance to the international state 
Carchedi Capital is based on nation-state and The nation state is embedded in the 




Although this debate applied only to Britain it is possible to extend these models 
to the nation-state capitals of other major European powers such as France and 
Germany (Overbeek 1992, p. 146; Holland 1980; Story 1983; Lipson 1985, p. 
185 ff. ) The model one chooses will have considerable implications for the 
understanding of the role of the nation state in relation to capital and the scope 
and limits of state action vis-a-vis capital. This in turn affects how one perceives 
Europe, European politics and the El and the strategy one adopts. 
Let us look at each in turn. Holland's position opens up the opportunities for 
progressive nationalism (Radice 2000a) and multilateral ism. It is upon this 
perspective that his multilateral strategy rests. Holland strategy is based on the 
premise that there are "national social forces" (a territorial definition of capital, 
i. e. nation-based capital and national working class) with common economic and 
political interests against the multinational monopolies that can be co-ordinated 
to provide the basis of European wide-coordination of positive integration 
policies against the multinational supported neo-liberalist policies pursued by the 
European Community. However what this perspective overlooked, from the 
viewpoint of the imperialist perspective, was that nation-states were 
combinations of both smaller-scale national capital and large-scale, home based 
NINCs which provide the base of imperialism in the state. Thus the socialist task 
in the national state is to confront the state which ultimately supports these 
NINCs which meant more radical action than Holland was prepared to 
countenance. Also given the nature of inter- imperialist states it would be more 
difficult to co-ordinate them on the basis of progressive policies. 
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Radice makes his focus an international strategy. He considers that the nation 
state no longer has the basis for a socialist strategy as both capital and a national 
bourgeoisie have been integrated into international capitalist circuits of 
production. He defines capital not by its property relations and where those 
relations are based (i. e. the 'home' or domicile state) but by the territorial 
multinationality of the production process. 
The last focuses on the nation-state but asserts that the capitalist state cannot be 
disembedded from the capitalist accumulation process without fundamental 
change. Monopoly capital operates on the basis of the national state (where the 
property relations are embedded, (see: Kozul-Wright 1995) and the major 
objective of socialist strategy is to challenge the imperialist state where it is 
based, in the home state of monopoly capital. The monopoly capitalist state has 
not yet become European-wide. 
In Europe we get a mixture of structures in the EC: monopoly capital operating at 
the national level and the supranational level; diverse forms of political 
institutions, known as multilevel governance but the EC/ EU is not yet a state or, 
as Holland correctly puts it, having the 'quality of power'. This absolutely 
fundamental point relates to the criterion of socialist strategy: where is the locus 
of the political power that maintains capital? (Radice 1971, p. 51; Looker and 
Coates 1983). 
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4.4.1.9 The National Bourgeoisie 
The prime Marxist tool of analysis Holland deploys is the concept of social class. 
The purpose of using this analytical concept is to explain the power relationships 
within European integration and the consequent political ramifications (in the 
same manner as Poulantzas (1974). Holland, in opposition to Mandel's position 
(1970) that there was a coalescence of national monopoly bourgeoisies at the 
European level, argued that the political-economic struggles in El included 
national "medium-sized" capital reaction to 'supranationalism'. Holland partly 
bases national resistance to the EC on smaller-scale, nationally-based capital. 
Holland also disagrees with Poulantzas over the concept of the 'interior 
bourgeoisie', which the latter had defined in relation to US capital, by arguing 
that that a national bourgeoisie can have "effects" in seeking to defend their 
national interests against both American and European multinationals (Holland 
1980, p. 106). 
What the theory of emergent bloc imperialism theory presented in this thesis 
asserts is that the national bourgeoisie has still an element of the national 
monopoly bourgeoisie within it, which is the mainstay of both national 
imperialism and a European imperialism. The national monopoly bourgeoisie is 
not strong enough to act on its own against more powerful bourgeoisies such as 
the US but is not yet merged into a transnational class as argued by the 
transnationalists (e. g. Bieler and Morton 2001; Van Apeldoorn 2002). Hence we 
get imperialist bourgeoisies that both seeks unity within Europe and seeks its own 
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advantage e. g. the British (Gifford 2007; Martel 2000) but the same applies to the 
French (Martel 2000) and the German (Holland 1980; Carchedi 200 1). 111 
Holland is quick to see all national opposition to the EC as the product of a 
'national bourgeoisie' and a national working class: the social base of social 
democracy (Geyer 1993, Wickham-Jones 2000). What he was failing to 
recognise was that within the nation there is still a national monopoly capitalist 
bourgeoisie; the same error he made in his national strategy. 
Holland's narrow definition of 'national bourgeoisie' gives him the opportunity 
to express the resistance to the multinational monopolies and the EC as a 
national, anti-monopoly struggle and to argue for the possibility of building broad 
alliances against multinational capital which is useful. It is Holland's lack of 
clarity and unspecific use of the tenn which creates confusion (see Fine and 
Harris 1979) and forgets that part of the national bourgeoisie is a monopoly 
bourgeoisie which is imperialist. So drawing out this argument, Holland by 
promoting the "national" actually promotes the national monopoly bourgeoisie; 
thus making the same error as in his national strategy. 
4.4.1.10 Holland and ANCs Operations within the ECIEU 
Holland considers MNCs to operate on the EC level' 12 but does not recognise 
their operations at national level in the sense that MNCs have a home base from 
... Generally on this see Mandel (1970 and 1978). 
112 Holland's position on this issue appears at odds with recent research on the role of MNCs at 
regional level: Coen (1997) and Cowles (2003) both date MNC activity at European level from 
the mid-1970s. It seems that Holland is referring to the activity of US and British NINCs before 
the early 70s and thereafter to both these and European based MNCs (Holland 1980: Chap. 4). 
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which they also operate (See Chapter Two). Cowles (2003) has noted the role of 
the firm has been under-theorized in IR and IPE theories in general and that there 
is a need to incorporate firms into an account of the EU, for far too often the 
literature marginalises them which is inconsistent with their roles in EU 
integration, governance and policyrnaking (Cowles 2003, p. 103). The essence of 
her analysis is that N4NCs "can participate simultaneously in international and 
domestic politics" and those domestic and international groups can be one and 
the same (Cowles 2003, p. 105; see Coen 1997, P. 94). MNCs began mobilising 
themselves at EC level in the 1970s, according to conventional theory (of course 
excepting US NINCs-which is Holland's point (1971)) whereas before they had 
been active at the national level (Cowles 2003, p. 105). The relevance of this 
research for our argument is that Holland fails to perceive MNCs operating on 
two levels: the national state level and the EC governance level. In other words 
MNCs advance their interests through national governments and through 
European governance; Holland's portrayal of MNC activity in Europe appears to 
omit this perspective. From the bloc imperialism thesis perspective, they promote 
national imperialism and European imperialism. 
4.4.1.11 The Question of a European 'State' and the 'Quality ofPower' 
The 'quality of power' question is important because it goes right to the central 
point of this analysis. The EC is weak, according to Holland, as it does not have 
the necessary combination of political, state, ideological and economic relations 
to unify it. The implication is that it is not a state in the traditional meaning of the 
term. In 1975 he wrote it had no state power (1976a p. 317) The EC is 
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undermined by negative integration and the dominance of multinationals: this 
prevents political, social and economic cohesion; and cohesion underpins unified 
power. How is this cohesion to be achieved? For Holland it is evident that he 
believes that the policies of state intervention against the multinational 
monopolies or positive integration will make the EC united and more 
economically successful and therefore, a force or a power that will no longer be a 
4 supine partner' (Holland's term) of America. Holland's strategic aim turns out to 
be rivalry against the US through the EC-1 13 The state management of European 
integration would be a step in the competitive rivalry against the US in the search 
for markets. How he seeks to go about this forms the substance of our next 
chapter. 
4.4.2 The European Social-Democratic Multilateral Strategy 
The key focus of this chapter has been Holland's analysis informing his 
multilateral strategy: its origins, the analysis, and its strengths and weaknesses. 
We turn now to the strategy itself It has been described as "almost utopian" by 
Grahl and Teague 1988, p. 76) 
For Teague one omission in the OoC was 'a lack of discussion on the European 
Monetary System' for this was the cornerstone of a reflationary strategy and the 
report failed to specify what would be the instruments of such a system and who 
would control it (Teague 1985, p. 56). This aspect of the strategy would present 
the greatest difficulty both on the question of control (especially with the power 
of Germany) and on the question of opposition to such an idea, especially at that 
113 This was the point of Holland's credo in 197 1. This is a point I return to in the next chapter. 
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time, in the British labour movement (Teague 1985, p. 56; Tindale 1992, p. 284; 
Kaelberer 2001, p. 202). Another lacunae in the report was the lack of discussion 
on the EC. Teague comments or this: 
Failure to confront such a central question can only give credence to the argument that a 
European strategy is naYve and unworkable. (Teague 1985, p. 57) 
As we have noted above, the commitment of European imperialisms to the EC 
was fundamental in this strategy to enhance their standing in the global political 
economy. Holland in his denunciation of the EC in the UM and its dismissal of a 
positive ro e for it within his alternative European strategy had made his 
'strategic discussion abstract and unconvincing' (Teague 1985, p. 59; Grahl and 
Teague 1988, p. 78). Furthermore, the power of the EC presented 'enormous 
barriers' to the development of alternative economic institutions (Teague 1985, 
pp. 59-60). Holland's strategic reliance on "national bourgeoisies" to lead the 
way against the multinationals which favoured the EC was thoroughly misplaced. 
The national bourgeoisies were either the monopolies which favoured the EC or 
the smaller firms which were heavily reliant on the MNCs and European markets 
(EC) for business. 
Holland's strategy was a strategy for the co-ordinated management of capitalism, 
an attempt to establish a social-democratic regime an a European scale, which 
although praiseworthy in terms of its internationalism, was not realistic about the 
problems that were presented to a co-ordinated strategy by the existence of 
different national states (imperialisms) with different capital accumulation 
strategies that existed in Europe and which led to substantial differences in terms 
of policies, ambitions, goals and solutions to the crisis (Van Apeldoorn 2002, P. 
69-70; Grahl and Teague 1988, p. 77-78; Scharpf 1991, p. 245; Cooper 1994, p. 
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289-291; Albo 1994, p. 167; Albo 1997, p. 22; Dolan 1992, p. 115). These 
continued to exist despite the impact of European integration which united them. 
Holland's project was never taken up by right-wing or left-wing governments. As 
Palmer agued it was a strategy dependent on the coming to power of like-minded 
left-wing governments and even though there was a prospect of that it never 
materialised (Palmer 1983, p. 17). The French Socialist government under 
Mitterrand had appealed for simultaneous reflation but non-cooperation 'was as 
complete from the Social Democrats in Germany as it was from Conservatives in 
London and New York' (Tindale 1992, p. 283). The Mitterrand government 
embarked on an austerity programme after the failure of the reforms in the early 
1980s (Callaghan 2000, p. I 11). So at government level Holland's project had 
little impact in Europe. However, its impact may have been more in adding to the 
pressures for social democracy, especially in Britain, to change policy on Europe 
and thinking about how to proceed with economic change (See Callaghan, 2000, 
p. 211; Camiller 1989, p. 11; Landesmann. 1986, p. 126; Radice 1984). Certainly 
others on the left in Britain such as Francis Cripps were moving to a position of 
support for coordination of policies within the EC (Tindale 1992, p. 284) Holland 
has claimed that the 'pillar of social cohesion' in the Single European Act was an 
indirect result of the 'Out of Crisis' programme (Holland 2004b, p. 18 1). 
There were attempts before to set up such alternative regimes' 14 as Holland 
proposed, one good example was the attempt to establish a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) by Third World states in the 1970s. Krasner, a realist, in 
114 Regimes are institutions which are based on principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations occur (Krasner 1985, p. 4). 
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his survey (1985) of the attempt to build this alternative regime noted that all 
"struggles over regimes are a struggle over property rights" (Krasner 1985, p. 4). 
In other words, existing property relations are sought to be changed and this 
involves power, which is the case with the OoC strategy in the early 1980s. 
Krasner further noted that success in building such alternatives depended on the 
international structures available, coherent strategies and power (Krasner 1985, 
pp. 8-10) and on all three counts Holland's strategy fell. It offered no realistic 
intemational structure through which the strategy could be realised, its strategy 
was poorly specified in terms of the class forces to be involved and lastly it had 
no clear grasp of how to deal with the question of the power of existing vested 
interests. 
With the dashing of hopes of international or collective management of capitalist 
accumulation Holland's next step was to turn back to the European Community, 
a Community which he had dismissed in 1983 but now offered new hope with the 
rise to power of an old associate Jacques Delors to the Presidency in 1985, and 
with him offered hope of new opportunities of economic management on a 
European scale. This is the subject of our next chapter. 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined the analysis and the strategies of Holland's 
European internationalist strategy from a Marxist perspective of capitalist 
accumulation and the theory of emergent bloc imperialism. From this approach 
some important issues were raised around Holland's analysis of EI that was the 
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foundation of his strategy in Out of Crisis. Questions were expressed about 
Holland's selective use of Marxist tools of analysis which in turned raised 
questions over the coherence of his analysis of El. In particular it was indicated 
that Holland's schema of analysis did not enable him to link changes in ideas 
with changes in the material base of integration. This is a fundamental problem of 
the neoGrarnscian approach to the international political economy (Burnham 
1991, p. 79). 
We also raised questions over his depiction of the 'supranational' v. 'nation-state' 
debate as one which revolved around 'MNCs' against 'national bourgeoisies'. 
We questioned his notion of a 'national bourgeoisie' and we noted that at least 
the major powers in the El process were imperialist states given the definition of 
such states in our last chapter. Also based on studies within international political 
economy we highlighted the operation of MNCs at both EC and nation-state 
level. Thus an element of the national struggle against the EC was conducted on 
behalf of MNCs and not a 'national bourgeoisie'. This would therefore qualify 
the analysis of Holland and provides an alternative analysis of European 
integration from within an interimperialist framework as the Carchedis (1999) 
have done and Burnham (199 1) suggested. 
Simultaneously, utilising Holland's argument of national struggle against the EC, 
we questioned the internationalisation of capital argument that there was the 
trend towards the establishment of a cohesive European bourgeoisie and 
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European state. 115 Our analysis, made in this chapter, would suggest that it there 
was not such a development in the 1980s. Rather the perspective offered here 
intimates that there also remained strong differences between European 
bourgeoisies based on interimperialist rivalries. The research from international 
relations and realist perspectives in IPE suggest that differences between nation- 
states had not been eradicated. However we have tried to illustrate that these 
differences were not necessarily based on the concept of 'national bourgeoisies' 
but could be better explained from within the concept of the major states as 
imperialist powers. Furthermore the struggle between national and supranational 
can also be illuminated by the role of N1NCs within Europe where they operate 
on a supranational and national level at the same time playing off one level of 
political organisation against the other. 
We have illustrated the reasons why Holland turned to an internationalist strategy 
after his national strategy in the 1970s. This was for two reasons: (i) the failure of 
his national strategy and (ii) the role of the supranational EC with its commitment 
to negative integration. 
Holland's contribution to a radical understanding of the EC in the 1970s must be 
appreciated. He attempted to utilise the thinking of Continental Marxism to 
provide the foundation of his analysis. In doing so he can in many ways claim to 
be a predecessor of modem day theorists of neo-Gramscian thought on European 
integration. However in sharing some of the premises and methods of analysis of 
contemporary neo-Gramscians he shares in the strengths and weakness of their 
"' Mandel discusses the prospect of a European state from a Marxist point of view (in 1970 p. 
WE and 1978 Chap. 10) 
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standpoint. The strength is the analytical insight they bring to political relations, 
their main weakness is to be able to link those political insights to class and class 
relations and how in turn these are related to the contradictions and conflicts of 
capital accumulation in the system as a whole. 
In order to win support for his position Holland had to present the EC in a one- 
sided manner which stressed the role of an EC-NINC bloc based on negative 
integration. This characterisation of European Integration based on a model of 
structural constraint allows him to present the image of state reform as a victory 
for labour rather than merely a switch in tactics by the powers that be in order to 
broaden the basis of legitimacy for the increased opportunities for capital 
accumulation. 
It is ironic that Holland, a Europeanist, should view as crucial to his 
internationalist strategy that the nation state as a bulwark against the MNCs and 
the EC as an expression of those social forces that had common interest in 
opposing their policies. As we have argued, there is another way of interpreting 
national struggles within the EC which is that of an interimperialist struggle with 
MNCs utilising both their home state and the supranational EC to advance and 
protect their interests. 
Lastly we have raised the problem of the focus of socialist strategy and whether 
the EC was worthy of such mobilisation. The answer we gave was that, at that 
time, the EC did not constitute a state and that the focus of a socialist strategy 
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must inevitably be upon the state which upholds private property relations within 
its domain. 
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Chapter Five: European Regional Political Economy and Regional Strategy 
In this chapter I criticise Stuart Holland's European regional political economy 
and regional strategy from the standpoint of the theory of bloc imperialism. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. I outline the context of Holland's 
writings, focussing mainly on one text the European Imperative. This is followed 
by summaries of Holland's ideas on regional political economy and strategy (5.1 - 
5.4.2). They are then subject to a critique mainly from the standpoint of the 
theory of bloc imperialism (5.5.3). Holland's policies are regarded as a variety of 
4strategic rationale' policy and as complementary to the ideas of big business 
(5.5.4.1-2). Holland's policies on Social Europe, Monetary Union, 
Competitiveness Policy and the Japanese model of flexibility are subjected to 
analysis and criticism (5.5.4.3-5.5.4.4). Holland's political strategy is also 
discussed with a particular focus on the idea of EU state-building and the 
implications of his ideas for European social democracy. 
5.1 The Context of Holland's Writings on the European Regional Strategy 
It is essential to understand Holland's writings in the following threefold context: 
5.1.1. Holland and his workfor the European Community. 
116 
In the mid- I 980s Holland had been focused on a multilateral strategy based on 
his work Out of Crisis (1983). In the 1987 he was Shadow Minister of Overseas 
116 See Appendix A 
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Development in the House of Common but by the early 1990s Holland's situation 
had changed. Holland was invited by Delors 117 in 1989 to make a "reality of the 
cohesion pillar of the Single European Act" (Holland 2004b, p. 181). So, firstly, 
Holland had become a bureaucrat of the EC and held broad ideological and 
political sympathies with its President Jacques Delors (Strange 2006; Holland 
2004b, p. 181). Secondly, his commission was to develop proposals for social 
and economic cohesion in the European Community after the creation of the 
single market in December 1992.1 18 These proposals became the substance of 
Holland's work the European Imperative (1993a) which was written and edited 
by Holland but was based on the contribution of a galaxy of leading academic 
lights across Europe including Francis Archibugi, Francis Cripps, Paul Ormerod, 
Enrico Wolleb, G6ran Therborn and Robert Wade amongst others. Thirdly, there 
was the prospect a new vigorous European industrial policy which held out the 
promise of a strong EC industrial base or a 'powerful and concentrated bloc of 
Eurocapital' (Ramsay 1992, p. 24); a vision which had always been high on 
Holland's agenda. 
119 
5.1.2. The Single European Act (SEA) or the Relaunching ofEurope. 
This, according to Van Appeldom, 2002 (p. 69) came in the wake of the failure 
of divergent national strategies and was intended as a relaunch of the European 
transnational capitalist project. 120 As Van Appeldom (2002, p. 70) states: 
; national strategies (by states) were to a large extent abandoned in favour of a 
European (Van Appeldorn's italics) strategy, laying the basis for a relaunching of 
117 Delors had become President of the European Commission, in 1985 
118 On the opposition to Social Europe see Lambert (1991), p. 19. 
"9 See Chapter 4. 
120 There is a debate around the significance of the Act: see Dolan (1992). 
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the integration process. ' This relaunch was a response to the crisis in European 
industry caused by the intensifying global competition and led the European 
elites to rethink their position in the global political economy (Van Appeldorn 
2002, p. 70; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989, p. 95; Lambert 1991, p. 18; Ramsay 
1992, p. 25). The cornerstone of the SEA was the creation of a single market by 
December 1992 and was complemented by the new measure of qualified majority 
voting (QMV) for decision-making within the Council of Ministers. Although it 
implicitly had wider aims than just a single market, not least to kick start the 
European integration process, "a process which was ultimately to be as political 
as it was economic" (Cini and McGowan 1988, p. 12). Palan and Abbott have 
described the Act as a momentous phase in modem history as a 'conscious 
strategy was adopted by states to create the conditions within which collectively 
their economic and political power could be enhanced. With the creation of the 
European Union, sheer market size became a strategy of competition' (Palan and 
Abbott 1999, pp. 55-56) 
5.1.3. Demandsfor a European Dimension to Policy 
The dominance of neoliberal ideas, right-wing governments in the US and UK, 
the resurgence of the EU in the late 1980s and the increasing activity of mobile 
finance capital placed the national strategies of social democracy under stress in 
the 1980s and early 1990s (Palmer 1986; Callaghan 2003a, p. 137; Hermann and 
Hofbauer 2007, pp. 126-7; Sassoon 1997, Chap. 24; Leys 2002). The central 
questions of left political economy and strategy intensified: to what 
focus of 
power should strategy be directed? Specifically, was it appropriate to make the 
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EU the focus? Had the nation-state weakened to the degree that it had lost its 
power of socialist transformation? 
As European integration developed the debate within European (especially 
British) social -democracy around the EU became more intense (Geyer 1993 p. 1, 
Tindale 1992; Haahr 1992; Grahl and Teague 1994; Strange and Worth 2007, p. 
2). Also, as the EU accrued more powers a perception grew in some quarters of 
the narrowing in the scope of the autonomous powers 121 of the nation state 
(Duina 2003). European regionalism was considered by some on the left as a 
possible route out of the "crisis of national social -democracy" (Strange 2006, p. 
197; Geyer 1993). By the late 1980s it became a commonplace for some on the 
Left and farther afield to hold that globalization of economic activity had 
undermined the power of the nation-state, national sovereignty and the ability of 
national governments to be the arena of autonomous economic and social 
policies. Nation-state democracy, from this perspective, was under challenge 
from the operation of global forces (Fella 2002; Ladrech 2000; Lemke and Marks 
1992). Initiatives, some urged, were required on a European plane (Lambert 
1991; Held 1988; Glotz 1985; Kinnock 1984, p. 232; K. Coates 1985; Morrell 
1985; and Palmer 1983 and 1986; Heffer 1982; Geyer 1993). 
12 1 For traditional, useful discussion on the concepts of autonomy and sovereignty and the nation- 
state in relation to Europe see Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon (1996) and Wallace (1997), pp. 
22-23; for critical perspectives see: Hoffman (1988,1995 and 1998). 
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5.2 The European Imperative (1993a) 
The main text of this strategy is Holland's The European Imperative (1993a). 
This text is the reciprocal of the critique that Holland made of the EC in 1980. 
Whereas Uncommon Market stressed one-sidedly the negative integration aspects 
of the EC, this text stresses one-sidedly the benefits for the EU of positive 
integration policies. In the European Imperative Holland elaborates a defence of 
the EU and a vision of policies which will strengthen it in the future. It sets out 
the grand plan to integrate the EU; the success of the single market and currency 
union depended on policies of social and economic cohesion and political reform 
which in turn would make the EU competitive against its global rivals the US and 
Japan. 
5.3 Holland's Regional Political Economy 
So far we have seen how Holland's national strategy met with defeat at home; we 
have seen how his multilateral strategy met defeat in the competition between the 
nation-states in the 1980s and given that he was not prepared to accept a more 
radical form of national strategy the only way forward for Holland was to look 
for a regional strategy. Holland's long-tenn cherished goal of a Europe in control 
of its destiny now seemed within his grasp (Holland 1971). Thus the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s marked a watershed in Holland's political economy. He had 
moved from a multilateral national strategy to a European one in the space of 
less 
than seven years. He began to offer a British contribution to social democratic 
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projects at a new level 122 : European 'state' management of capital or European 
Social Democracy. 
Holland wrote in 1992: 
Keynes is dead, Beveridge is dead, and the national economy of which they wrote has been 
transformed by a multinational trade and payments system.... The response cannot be simply 
national ... The days of British or French economic alternative strategies are over. What we now 
need is an Alternative European Strategy that can realise the principles of Keynes and Beveridge 
in the new multinational environment. (Holland 1992a, p. 24). 
In other words, the national basis of social consensus (Keynes and Beveridge) 
had been eroded. The nation state no longer had the scope of powers to determine 
its own social and economic policies. Holland had finally reached the conclusions 
that Robin Murray had twenty years earlier (Murray 1975; Wickham-Jones 1996, 
p. 57). There was the prospect of the class compromise, which had been the basis 
of social democracy within the nation state, becoming unravelled. The 
consequences of this were clear; Holland sought to find a new base for the re- 
establishment of social -democratic class compromise. 
Neither a national nor a multinational strategy was any longer valid. In the new 
circumstances, the increasing financial influence of the EC/EU 123 and global 
financial markets over financial affairs and the power of MNCs to negate the 
benefit of exchange rate change meant that nation-states which acted 
independently on fiscal and monetary policy would find themselves subject to the 
constraints of financial markets which could force national governments to 
abandon expansion programmes for employment or social expenditure (Holland 
122 For examples in Europe see Featherstone (1988). 
123 The title 'European Union' was formally adopted in Nov. 1993 when the Treaty on the 
European Union or the Maastricht Treaty came into force. Hereafter we will use 'EU'. 
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1993a, p. 16, p. 46; 1992a, p. 24). National export-led recovery strategies were an 
4outdated illusion' (Holland 1992a, p. 24). 
Familiar themes were rehearsed: trade was now multinational rather than 
international (Holland 1995, p. 92). Global competition could not be met by 
devaluation (Holland 1995, p. 92). The national welfare state was challenged by 
the multinational nature of production (Holland 1993a, p. 130). The international 
and multinational trend in the European economies tended to qualify the 
effectiveness of national monetary, fiscal or exchange rate polices as instruments 
for maintaining trade in maintaining full employment (Holland 1993a, p. 130). 
National tax concessions to the business sector designed to increase national 
competitiveness collectively reduced the tax base for social spending in 
Community countries (Holland 1993a, p. 130). Sovereignty had leaked from 
national parliaments to multinational institutions which were 'mainly 
unaccountable multinational companies and financial institutions rather than the 
Commission' (Holland 1993a, p. 16). MNCs could transfer price their payments 
in such a way as to avoid the tax through which jobs and welfare could be 
promoted (Holland 1993a, p. 16). In an open world economy of multinational 
investment, trade and finance it was increasingly clear that in key policy areas, 
joint or collective sovereignty exercised by member states through the 
Community was more effective than unilateral action by individual states on their 
own (Holland 1993a, p. 17). Holland recognised that the Community was not a 
state and was without the normal instruments of state power (Holland 1993a, p. 
36). 
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5.4 The Regional Strategy: Building a Regional Political Economy 
The main aim of Holland's regional strategy is the elaboration of policies for 
political, economic, social and regional cohesion. Its premise was to "assess the 
problems and prospects of achieving social and economic cohesion in the 
Community in the perspective of the 1992 Treaty of the European Union 
(Maastricht Treaty) and the current proposals for economic and monetary union" 
(Holland 1993a, p. 1). It argued that negative integration 'negated the power of 
national institutions' without adding new powers at the Community level. 
Freedoms of states to manage trade, capital movements and tariffs were inhibited 
by the Treaties of Rome and independent monetary or exchange rate policies 
were denied to member states by monetary union (Holland 1993a, p. 12). The 
treaties enforced open economies for capital. In the light of this it was crucial 
both for cohesion and for economic and monetary union that the Community 
shifted the balance from negative to positive integration (Holland 1993a, p. 13). 
Holland's purposes of building the European Union as a new base for social 
democracy should be shown through: its use of both the internal market and the 
project for economic and monetary union to deliver social as well as economic 
and financial gains; making itself more relevant to the people then 'independent 
and uncoordinated national alternatives'; reinforcing social rights while up- 
grading skills and reinforcing competitivity; promoting industrial success and 
maintain Europe's position at the 'global innovation frontier'; reducing the 
democratic deficit (Holland 1993a, p. 13). 
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5.4.1 Holland's European Regional Political Strategy 
On the EU Political Reform. - Holland held that the strengthening of the 
democratic institutions and procedures of the Community and inter-governmental 
decision-making is imperative if legitimacy is to be maintained (Holland 1993a, 
p. 16). Sovereignty should be defended by extending it i. e. reinforce the 
objectives of parliaments by joint action - on currency stability, employment and 
welfare. Subsidiarity should be more clearly defined and operated (Holland 
1993a, p. 17). Tripartism should be established at the Community level (Holland 
1993a, p. 18). Discussion on Community draft budgets should be held in national 
parliaments so that opinion may be expressed (Holland 1993a, p. 19). Council of 
Ministers Meetings should be made more transparent (Holland 1993a, p. 19). The 
European Parliament should have a representative on the European Council and 
reports from the European council and the Council of Ministers meetings should 
be made to parliament (Holland 1993a, p. 19). 
5.4.2 Holland's European Regional Economic and Social Strategy 
The Competitiveness Strategy: Holland's premise is that the global economic 
challenge relies on international comPetition between country and multinational 
competition between companies (Holland 1993a, p. 70). The need for Europe to 
compete with USA and the Far East has a major impact on thinking about 
industrial and social policy within Western Europe (Holland 1993a, p. 70). 
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Ja an as a model. - The EU should reinforce its already networked relations 
between public agencies and private enterprise, governments, social partners and 
interest groups and adopt aspects of the 'development-rational' state, e. g. 
Japanese state interventionist economic model (Holland 1993a, pp. 37,96,107), 
which Holland prefers, rather than the 'regulatory state' US model. 124 
Flexibility Policies: 'FlexibilitY' policies should be adopted in production due to 
various advantages in costs and production (Holland 1993a, p. 60). Holland 
identified weaknesses of the 'Fortress Europe' strategy particularly with the 
presence of Japanese (and US) firms in Europe (Holland 1993a, p. 67). EU 
pursuit of lower wage costs was to no advantage due to the advantages of product 
quality under flexible production techniques (Holland 1993a, p. 68). The global 
context of economy meant there was a need for increased efficiency and 
competitivity (Holland 1993a, p. 70). He writes: 
The need for Europe to compete with the USA and the Far East has a major impact on thinking 
about industrial and social policy within Western Europe" (Holland 1993a, p. 70) 
European Macroeconomic Instruments and the Recovery Programme: Holland 
notes the advantages of public expenditure increases or reflationary policies in 
Japan - at that time (Holland 1993a, p. 36ff. ). Using this as an example, Holland 
argues that the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) should utilise their powers under Articles 2 and 3 of TEU 
124 Holland utilises Chalmers Johnson's distinction: a regulatory state has regulations concerning 
the antitrust implications of the size of firms, but does not concern itself with what industries 
ought to exist and what industries are no longer needed. The development or plan-rational state, 
by contrast, has as its dominant feature precisely the setting of such substantive social and 
economic goals (Holland 1993a, p. 107). 
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to provide funds for policies of economic and social cohesion (Holland 1993a, 
pp. 20-21); that this could be supplemented by the development of new financial 
instruments and the European Investment Fund (EIF) to fund policies (Holland 
1993a, p. 46) that would be a counter-cyclical instrument (Holland 1995, p. 91) 
and would enable recovery, redistribution and restructuring policies (Holland 
1995, p. 45 and p. 50). 
Monetary Union: Holland advocated monetary union on the economic grounds 
that devaluation as an economic tool was weakened in an age of multinational 
production and any unilateral action within the Union harmed cohesion due to its 
repercussions (Holland 1995, p. 93). Politically, it was advantageous because it 
was a 'decisive answer within Europe to speculation against exchange rates' 
(Holland 1995, p. 94). Internationally it 'should help', he believed, 'stabilise 
world exchange rates' (Holland 1995, p. 94) and offered a 'better balance 
between the Triad of the US, Europe and Japan' (Holland 1995, p. 94). This 
would provide the basis for a new European macroeconomic policy. Backing the 
power of the EU over nation-states Holland maintained that states could not be 
allowed to ignore the budget and debt criteria of monetary union as it would open 
up the prospect of EU disintegration (Holland 1995, p. 96). Holland's 
counterargument to those who considered the deficit and debt conditions of 
monetary union too onerous was that the countervailing use of the EuroPean 
Investment Bank (EIB) and Union bonds be expanded to compensate for the 
contraction of national budgets and borrowing (Holland 1995, pp. 96-7). Also the 
EIF could be used as part of a joint investment strategy to create jobs (Holland 
1995, p. 118). This could then be used to offset unemployment (Holland 1995, p. 
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98). Later, in 2004, Holland wrote that member states took advantage of the ElB 
- as this did not count against national debts and therefore the ýpotential to avoid 
deflationary pressures by a social investment-led recovery programme financed 
by the EIB is vast' thus holding out the hope of new forms of deficit-financing of 
budget expenditure (Holland 2004b, p. 182). 
Social Europe: Holland also proposed a range of social policy and welfare 
reforms which would both 'equalise rights and raise equality of opportunity' 
(Holland 1993a, p. 135) and provide more flexible education, training and health 
care which would make for a move 'efficient society' (Holland 1993a, p. 134). 
Welfare policies were 'crucial to consent and support for the institutions of 
democracy itself (Holland 1993a, p. 128). The EU through growth and raised 
productivity could afford to finance new employment and expenditure 
programmes (Holland 1993a, p. 134). 
Holland appraised his programme thus: 
"In effect, the 'New Left' case in Britain in the 1970s has gone European and has reinforced a 
Europe-wide social agenda.... Social Europe ... remains an 
inspiration... in demonstrating that 
the EU can and should aspire to being more than a free trade area with reduced social rights 
(Holland 2004b, p. 183). 
5.5 Critique 
5.5.1 Holland's Analytical Framework - the Substitution of Federalism and Neo- 
functionalism for 'Class'Analysis 
Holland in his work the European Imperative changes his analytical framework 
for comprehending the European integration process. Instead of the mixed partial 
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class and institutionalist analysis he employed in his analysis underpinning his 
European International Strategy we get a federalist and neo-functionalist 
perspective on EU political institution building and social and economic 
cohesion. Different frameworks ask different questions and provide different 
answers. This difference in perspective carries with it implicit assumptions; not 
the least is the acceptance of, and commitment to, the European Union as an 
agency of progressive causes. It is only through the EU that macroeconomic 
adjustments can be made and sufficient funds generated for welfare and social 
policies. The EU is regarded as supplementing the nation-state in having the 
power to deliver social -democratic policies. 
Holland's jettisoning of a class analysis of the EU results in an abandoning of a 
critique of the EU within economic and social structural terms. The EU is 
explored not as a product of the social relations of European capital/s but as an 
4autonomous' set of institutions that can be moulded in any direction by various 
political agents without limit. This switch of analytical framework diverts 
attention away from class structure and onto the arrangement of political and 
economic institutions. The intrinsic link that the EU has with the development of 
European capital/s is lost and therefore the scope and limits of its actions 
recede. 125 Within Holland's new framework, models of institutional arrangements 
become more relevant and analysis of capital and its consequences less relevant 
(on this see Coates 2000, pp. 145-156). 
125 Clarke (1977) elaborates on the consequences of adopting non-Marxist analytical frameworks 
for the state. 
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This has an impact on strategic thinking too. Within the new framework 
institutional reform becomes the central focus of political action rather then 
fundamental socio-economic transformation. The problems of capitalism are 
considered to stem from malfunctioning institutions or obstacles in the market 
place rather then from the inherent contradictions of capitalism. 
This has an obvious bearing on evaluating the plausibility and validity of 
Holland's regional strategy as socialist. Holland fails to answer questions such as: 
what is the class character of European regionalism? What role does it play 
within the global political economy? What does it mean for the nation-states 
involved in the process? 
To answer these questions from a class perspective, as Holland did to a degree in 
Uncommon Market we have to seek to analyse the reality from a Marxist 
perspective. It is significant to note that Holland patently fails to do this in his 
writings on the EU. 
This rapid change in Holland's political position indicates something about 
Holland's political economy. His political economy was not informed by 
conceptions of structure whereby the solutions to the political problems that arose 
would have to be directed towards a reconfiguration of the structural basis of a 
political economy but was instead premised on the relationship between political 
and economic institutions and the influence of individuals and ideas. Thus the 
crux of his political economy approach was how to transform ideas and the 
arrangements of institutions of capitalist society, a rebalancing of their 
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relationships, rather than the uprooting of capitalism. It was a political economy 
guided not by principle but by pragmatism. 
5.5.2 Holland's Political Economy of the European Union 
Table 5.1: Summary of Holland's Political Economy of Regionalism- 
Comparison of the Political Economies of the Nation-state and the EU. 
Political Political Economy of the 
Economy EU 
Nation-State 
Powers to control exchange Ineffective Effective 
rates, f iscal policies and 
monotony policy 
Powers to develop Competitive Ineffective Effective 
policies 
Bargaining Powers vis-d-vis Ineffective Effective 
MNCs 
Strength of Political and Ineffective: Strong: strength of 
Economic Sovereignty dependent on collective 
unilateral 
strength 
Power to implement social Ineffective Effective 
policies 
Power to build and maintain Ineffective Effective 
social consensus 
Ability to be base for social Ineffective Effective 
democracy 
Table 5.1 summarises Holland's perspectives on the political economy of the EU 
compared to the nation-state. The table is divided into two columns, representing 
the political economies of the nation-state and the EU. The terms "ineffective " 
and "effective" relate to economic and political power capacity. There are seven 
rows each representing dimensions of comparison between the political 
economies of the nation-state and the European Union. It is clear that Holland 
considers that power in the European regional space has transferred 
from the 
nation-state to the EU. It offered the new capacities for state capitalism and 
therefore the possibilities of building a new social consensus and a renewed 
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social democracy within the European Union which he believed had been 
undermined in the nation-state. 
Holland's political economy of the European Union substantially contradicts the 
positions Holland held previously. In both SC and UM Holland had the belief that 
nation-states had the powers to break the constraints placed on national 
governments through the use of radical state action which could frustrate the 
operation of MNCs. Now he jettisoned such a project. He had come to the 
conclusion that his own national ly-based social-democratic projects were futile. 
Nation-states could not tackle the combined forces of the multinationals and the 
money markets. Holland's strategic focus thus switched from 'methodological 
nationalism', based on state capitalist and macroeconomic policies at a national 
level, to a 'methodological regionalism' where such policies are sought to be 
implemented at a supranational level. 126 
Holland no longer considered that the nation-state or any 'national' classes had 
the capacity to be able to confront and resist multinational forces with state 
interventionist policies. Viewed from the class perspective of the UM, Holland 
cannot foresee the 'national bourgeoisie' having the resources to resist 
multinational capital. Holland was not prepared to recognise any form of 
revolutionary socialism in a national context. PersPectives of a unilateral, 
socialist state conjured up images of autarchy and exclusion from the world 
economy. This perspective having been marginalised, the only way forward for 
Holland is to develop the regional alternative. 
126 On methodological nationalism and methodological regionalism see: Clift (2005), p. 467 and 
Strange (2006) p. 224. 
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The regionalist strategy is advocated by Holland as the means of salvation for 
socia emocracy in an age of global capitalism (Geyer 1993, p 91 ff. ). This 
perspective is shared by many thinkers within the Social Democratic tendency 
(Delors 1989, p. 32; Cafruney 1997; Cuperus and Kandel 1998; Strange 2006, p. 
197ff.; Glotz 1985; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Sassoon 1999). Sassoon stated 
prophetically: "European social democracy, shall be European or shall not be" 
(Cuperus and Kandel 1998, p. 23; Wilde 1994; Barratt Brown 1995). 
Of course this position was a controversial one within social democracy itself, 
another strand of social democracy continues to adhere to strategies pivoted on 
the nation-state (Pooley 1991; Baimbridge, Whyman and Burkett 2007, p. 71 ff.; 
Garrett and Lange 1991; Martell et al., 2001). Lemke and Marks (1992, p. 15) 
argued against Sassoon that European 'integration is antithetical to social 
democracy'. Their belief was that 'national bargains' could still be achieved 
between a national bourgeoisie and a national working class. 
We have already argued in Chapters Three and Four that a national monopoly 
bourgeoisie continued to exist. Holland, from the author's perspective, is 
exaggerating his case about the 'nation-state' being exhausted as a platform for 
social democracy. The theory of bloc imperialism is built on the concept that 
national monopoly capitalisms remain and have formed a bloc in Europe. 
Holland grasps the latter but not the former. This is a position which he shares 
with transnationalists e. g. Bieler and Morton (2001) and G. Strange (2006) and 
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those Open Marxists such as Radice (1984) and Picciotto (1991) who argue that 
the national economy cannot be such a platform. 
It is important to refine our presentation of Holland's perspective on regionalism: 
he considers the EU an opportunity rather than a constraint. He perceives the EU 
as providing a positive response to globalisation (Strange and Worth 2007, pp. 3- 
4). It provides the opportunity for effective sovereignty to be asserted; it enables 
state intervention in industry; it re-establishes the opportunity for effective 
macroeconomic policies founded on sound and stable monetary arrangements; an 
economic basis for extended fiscal policies and welfare policies; it is a 
counterbalance to the power of monopolies and a vehicle for parity in economic 
rivalry with the US. His vision is very much of a traditional Keynesian 
interventionist rather than a modernising 'Third Way' social democrat. For this 
latter group regionalism is seen as a stepping stone to globalisation in which the 
state should channel institutions and individual behaviour in ways that 
encourages and supports their position within the market (Baimbridge et al 2007, 
Worth 2007, pp. 93 ff. ). Although there are elements of this perspective in 
Holland's conception (especially in productive and social flexibility policies) it is 
a perspective which he eschews. 
5.5.3 The EU as Bloc Imperialism 
In contrast to Holland's non-class perspective of the EU political economy above 
I offer an imperialist perspective. As was discussed in Chapter Four the theory of 
bloc imperialism maintains that the EU is built around powerful imperialist states 
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that operate both individually and as a bloc. The manifestation of this can be seen 
in a number of ways: in the operation of capital across Europe, in the operation of 
capita w thin nation-states and in the operation of capital overseas (Mandel 1970 
and 1978; Carchedi 2001; See also Chapter Four). 
Palan and Abbott help draw out the class nature of the EU in their concept 
'interest group rationale' (1999, p. 66 ff. ). Although a pluralist perspective it, in 
part, returns to the partial class analytical one that Holland held in the UM. It 
delves deeper into the class structure of the EU and regards bloc formation, not as 
an act to the benefit of all, as Holland portrayed the EU, but as evidence of state 
response to problems of capital accumulation in the world economy (Burnham 
1995, p. 109, Van Apeldoorn 2002, pp. 84-86, Palan and Abbott 1999, p. 66). In 
this perspective, a crucial aspect of European politics and institutions is the 
dynamic of multinational businesses in their drive for capital accumulation, 
especially after a period of slowdown as the late 70s and early 80s had been. This 
slowdown was particularly apparent in the high-tech industries where, for 
example, Europe's share of the world production of electronic goods had fallen 
from 26 per cent to 21 per cent; industries which had felt competition particularly 
from the Japanese (Palan and Abbott 1999, p. 68; Hart 1992, Chap. 1). These 
industries, in turn, were particularly active in the Roundtable of European 
Industrialists (ERT) (Palan and Abbott 1999, p. 68, Van Apeldoorn 2002, p. 86). 
It is worthwhile noting how multinationals in the ERT envisaged the European 
integration (EI) process. The role of El was primarily about "strengthening 
European industry in the face of growing competitive pressures from Japan and 
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the USA" and a necessary condition of this was the relaunching of the European 
project itself As the ERT stated: 
The emphasis of the group's work is on developing ideas and taking initiatives to promote the 
European scale in industrial and market development - strengthening European industry's 
competitiveness ... by promoting competition and co-operation on a European scale" (quoted in Van Apeldoorn 2002, p. 86). 
Contemporary imperialism theory highlights the role of contending centres of 
accumulation commonly known as the Triad (the EU, Japan and the US). The EU 
and the Far East have begun to make the US vulnerable to the economic shifts 
taking place in the global political economy. At present there are emerging three 
spheres of geo-economic influence centred in the US (North America, but also 
the Western Hemisphere and, to some significant extent, the rest of the world, the 
German-France partnership (the EU and Eastern Europe, North Africa and the 
Mediterranean) and Japan/China (East Asia). The EU, in so far as it promotes the 
interests of major multinationals headquartered in member states, is a potential 
competitive threat to US capital. Although not yet able to mount a full-scale 
challenge to the US at the moment there is developing fault-lines of issue 
contention between the US and Europe. One of these is the euro which threatens 
to become a source of US-EU conflict. The euro has far-reaching implications for 
the structure of US imperial power which poses a threat to US seignorage 
rights 127 and the ability of the US to manipulate the price of the dollar in the 
pursuit of its national interest. Should there be a shift from the dollar as a major 
reserve currency, and a move by OPEC off the dollar combined with robust 
Europe-zone growth then the future of the dollar could reach crisis proportions 
127 This is the advantage accruing to the hegemonic economic power, due to the use of its 
currency as the international one (Carchedi, 2002, p. 159) 
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with massive repercussion for US-European relationships (Beitel 2005, p. 184; 
see also Carchedi 2002, pp. 159-164; Freeman 2006, p. 292). Thus the euro plays 
a strategic role in interimperialist rivalry, an issue on which Holland is silent. 
This analysis of the European Union as an imperialist bloc casts a very different 
shadow over Holland's social -democratic regional project (Cypher 1992; Albo 
2003; Carchedi 2001; Drache 2000). 
5.5.4 Holland's European Strategy 
5.5.4.1 The Concept of 'Strategic Rationale' and Holland's Perspective on the 
Role of Regionalism as the Basisfor Future Class Compromise Policies 
Holland's outlook can be described as 'macro -nationalist' i. e. the EU as a 
defence measure against the forces of globalisation (Scholte 2000, p. 147). This 
trend towards regionalism is the 'strategy of size' which is justified in terms of 
competitiveness based on a strategic rationale (Palan and Abbott 1999, p. 56 and 
Chap. 3). The 'strategic rationale' was a radical alternative to the neoclassical 
paradigm that had become dominant in the 1980s. It was based on 'new trade 
theory' or 'strategic trade theory' which maintained that a government's 
economic policy could still have effect (Palan and Abbott 1999, p. 63; Gilpin 
2001; Holland 1993a, p. 70). The state's role is to facilitate competitiveness of 
firms mainly by supplying the context in which that can take place. 'Size' as a 
strategy is regarded as the means of 'both providing such a conducive 
environment and as a superior instrument for asserting the strategic trade interests 
of these states' (Palan and Abbott, 1999, p. 63). Thus the strategy is intended to 
increase member states' power and influence in the international political 
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economy and strengthens regional blocs in their struggle with rivals (Palan and 
Abbott 1999, p. 64). It increases bargaining power within the multilateral system 
in both the relational and structural sense. Thus it can be used in relational terms 
against other great powers or in structural terms in negotiations with weaker 
states to achieve goals in the interests of the larger power (Palan and Abbott 
1999, pp. 65-66). Holland's Regional strategy can be seen in this light: a strategy 
with which to confront rivals and a strategy through which advantages could be 
imposed on the weakest (De Martino 2000, p. 175). 
It was a strategy, in other words, to increase the wealth and prosperity of Europe 
through power rather than socialist change. Power in the global economy was the 
means to sustain the social -democratic task of managing capitalism and forging 
social and economic cohesion. Thus Europe's successful interimperialist rivalry 
was to be the future bed of social democratic class compromise. 
It should be remembered at this point that Holland did not consider territorial size 
as a means of combating the power of MNCs. In the UM, he states clearly that 
market size was not a sufficient barrier to the creation of monopoly e. g. the USA, 
which had the world's most powerful monopolies. 
5.5.4.2 Holland and the Big Business Policy of "Embedded Liberalism " 
We have noted above the ERT's goal to unify the European 'home' market as a 
4 springboard for the world market'. Another aspect of their policy was to move 
on to the strengthening of 'European government' and 'deepening of the 
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Community's institutional structure' (Van Apeldoorn 2002, p. 87). This was 
linked to a vision of an 'embedded neoliberal' project which promoted 
competitiveness through deregulation and labour market flexibility-based more 
on German industrial policy (Van Apeldoorn 2002, p. 87 and pp. 163-164). 
It worth exploring the concept of 'embedded neo-liberalism' a little more to 
understand both its relevance to European industry and to Holland's European 
political economy. Van Apeldoorn argues that this concept represents the 
interests of transnational industrial capital. Although it favours neo-liberalism it 
recognises that pure laissez-faire would damage its own direct economic interests 
(as it still requires an educated workforce, social and political stability, material 
infrastructure, and sound macroeconomic policies that encourage growth and 
investment) and in the absence of which would lead to social and political 
instability and the possibility of the rise of socialist movements. Thus with 
embedded neo-liberalism there is a hesitancy in fully unleashing the market from 
post-war social and political institutions. Restructuring along competitive lines is 
accepted but in the context of policies in which a degree of 'social consensus' is 
maintained (Van Apeldoorn 2002, p. 160). Within continental Europe, Van 
Apeldoom argues, the neo-liberal project 'had to be articulated with some 
elements of opposing projects in order to become hegemonic' (Van Apeldoorn 
2002, p. 160), in other words, neo-liberalism had to meld itself with social 
democracy. Capital was searching for a means to incorporate the working class in 
their project. The point of contact between the European industrialists and social 
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democracy in Europe at that time was Jacques Delors and it was through Delors 
that Holland became involved in the European capitalists' project. 128 
This has great bearing on Stuart Holland's regional political economy. As we 
have seen Holland was employed by the European Commission in the wake of 
the formation of the Single European Market to enhance that project with policies 
for social and economic cohesion. Holland was, therefore, providing support in 
the implementation of the very project that the European multinationals within 
the ERT desired. Holland came to the ERT project from the social -democratic 
side, his role was to frame the neoliberal project within a social democratic 
strategy for Europe. Relevant here is a point Wickham Jones has made in the 
context of New Labour in the global economy: social democratic parties may be 
better placed to provide the collective goods that capitalism fails to Provide 
because of their close links with workers. He continues: 
They are equipped to know the training and infrastructure needs of the economy and, working 
closely with unions that can discipline and co-ordinate their members, they promote co-operation, 
reduce strikes and ensure wage moderation. (Wickham Jones 2000, p. 14) 
In other words reformist leaders and reformist parties can help support capital in 
its aims of increased competition and economic rivalry. They can implement a 
strategy of supplying the 'collective goods (including social stability) that 
employers desire' (Wickham-Jones 2000, p. 22). It is this policy that Holland is 
promoting in his regional strategy. De Martino (2000, p. 174) has described such 
policies as 'the best strategies for romancing capital'. Wickham-Jones welcomes 
128 On Delors and the Social Democratic Project in Europe and his views on the market and 
relations with European business (see Van Apeldoorn 2002, passim; Ross 1995 passirn and Grant 
1994, pp. 86-87. ) 
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them as grounds for optimism for social democracy. However, from the point of 
view of an independent socialist perspective, such a course can only be fuel to the 
capita sts' desire to intensify exploitation and create the conditions for sharpened 
competition in world markets which underpins inter-imperialist relations (Albo 
1994; 2003, p. 95ff. ). 129 What is apparent also is that there is a symbiotic 
relationship between capital and social democracy. On the one hand capital needs 
to legitimate its projects among the working class, on the other social democracy 
offers to compromise with capital to gain "progressive" refon-ns (Hermann and 
Hofbauer 2007, pp. 128). In the case of Stuart Holland, he becomes the ideologue 
of such a relationship in the context of the European Union. He wanted to turn 
the EU into a 'welfare capitalist club' (Tindale 1992, p. 293). 
It is true as Wickham-Jones argues, and is supported in an oblique way by Van 
Apeldoorn in the analysis above, that capital under conditions of intense rivalry 
does not close the door on the reformers' path but offers to social democracy a 
compromise. One, which Wickham-Jones has indicated, that social democracy 
willingly assists capital in; the revitalising of capital and the creation of new 
opportunities for capital accumulation. Whether this is a socialist policy is the 
point of the debate. 
It is also a point on which I differ with those who see capitalist rivalry only 
working through one tendency, acting as a constraint (Strange 2006, p. 215ff. ): 
the tendency to push down on workers' wages and conditlons and to constrain 
reformist parties in offering and delivering reformist policies. There is a second, 
129 For a critique of such perspectives from a normative, egalitarian viewpoint see De Martino 
(2005). 
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cross-cutting tendency. Capital, as Van Apeldoorn has shown, has a number of 
strategies towards the working class. One is to attack its living conditions and 
wages but another is the desire to legitimate itself in the eyes of sections of 
workers by providing them with superior conditions and general improvements in 
employment, either domestically or overseas (Watson 2005 pp. 181-5; Camoy 
1984, Chap 5; Cameron 1984; Garrett 1998). It seeks to build alliances with 
sections of the working class. This is how imperialism operated in Lenin's day, 
when he discussed its impact on the working class and the formation of social 
democracy (Lenin 1964a), and this process still operates today as discussed in the 
example Van Apeldoorn gave above. It is possible for the advanced capitalist 
countries to seek to concentrate production on the high-tech and skil Is- intensive 
production processes which shields workers to a degree from the competition of 
countries that are not so developed. This highly-skilled workforce gains the 
benefits of the policies of 'new growth theory' and is able to protect its position 
in the global market to a degree and temporarily (Dicken 1998, Chaps. 3 and 4). 
It cannot rest on its laurels, though, and must compete to stay at the frontier of 
high-tech industries. Holland advocates government policies to ensure this for 
Europe. This forms one part of the basis of a European support amongst British 
workers (Strange, 2002a, pp. 352-355). 
Thus capitalism must be viewed as a system that has two trends within it. One is 
the accumulation of capital but the other is the tendency of capitalism to seek 
stability and legitimacy, largely as a result of worker resistance to such changes, 
130 
and the prime means of this is the state and its interventions. Again as 
130 On this see M. Watson (2005), p. 187ff. 
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Wickham-Jones writes: 'reformist parties offer policies that are either attractive 
or acceptable to capital persists in a global [... economy -DL]. Indeed 
globalisation adds to political demands for social democratic- style interventions 
in the economy' (Wickham-Jones 2000, p. 7). This brings us to our next point the 
critique of progressive competitiveness. 
5.5.4.3 Holland's Regional Progressive Competitiveness Policies 
Competitiveness has been one of the major legitimating arguments of neoliberal 
reforms in the EU (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007, pp. 130). One theory situates 
the origins of regional progressive competitiveness within the context of social 
democratic questioning of the goals, instruments and efficacy of industrial policy 
during the European economic downturn of the early 1980s (De Martino 2000, p. 
162). Competitiveness became a new discourse for European social democracy as 
a means to 'salvage state intervention' in the cause of social reform (De Martino 
2000, p. 162; John Palmer 1987, p 178; Leys 2002; Sassoon 1997, chap. 24). 
Within the range of theories informing the competitiveness perspective Holland 
emphasises that of flexible specialization. 
131 
It is noticeable in Holland's regional economic and social strategy that the 'Old 
Labour' policies of public enterprise and planning agreements that informed the 
core of his national policies are absent. Holland also has a new view on 
multinationals; they no longer are the major threat to social democratic reformist 
policies, the main barriers now are market- institutional and relate to productive 
13 1 De Martino highlights, amongst others, three theories: flexible specialisation, corporate 
governance and human capital approaches (De Martino 2000, pp. 162 ff. ). 
-251 - 
activities and the management and perfon-nance of labour: industrial practices 
have to be reformed and made more 'flexible', Japanese political and industrial 
models become the exemplars to be copied; policies must be put in place to make 
both Europe and European industry more competitive. These changes had to be 
embedded with 'flexible' welfare and social policies that provide cohesion and 
consensus. In other words, the new competitive order must be stabilised and 
legitimated within the European framework. 
Holland in adopting these policies is both continuing and changing policy 
positions he has held previously. As we have seen in Chapter Three the essence 
of Holland's Alternative Economic Strategy was state intervention to compete, to 
stimulate economic growth. His international strategy was informed by the same 
conception: Europe in the slough of depression needed co-ordinated action to 
collectively manage the crisis and restore dynamism to European capitalism. 
Holland's regional strategy is no different it continues the same objective. The 
change in Holland's policies come in the adoption of new means and methods to 
make capitalism competitive; public intervention is still embraced but this time it 
is in support of the multinationals and not threatening them. The 'flexible' 
production and 'new growth' policies adopted altogether reveal a new approach 
to the monopoly multinationals. No longer are they the obstacle to progress but 
are allies in a joint competitive struggle against capitalist rivals. Holland's 
position has moved from being radical critic to supporting mentor of NINCs. 
We have mentioned how the state's relationship with MNCs is one of 
contradictory unity; there are two sides to this relationship, the state expresses 
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MNCs interests yet appears in conflict with them. Holland's political economy 
has moved within these contradictions: on the one hand, in his earlier writings his 
perspective is from the pole of conflict; in the European Imperative his 
perspective is from the pole of advocating their interests. In the latter sense he 
can be said to be a member of what Mandel might term a nascent 'European 
State' (1978, Chap. 10): for Holland is acting as a European bureaucrat 
promoting European policy to manage European capitalism. 
Holland's use of the Japanese model of flexible production was typical of 
progressive competitive strategists who were subject to what Curry has called the 
'flexibility fetish' in the early 1990s (Curry 1993, p. 98). Flexible production and 
flexible specialisation were touted as the cure for the 'sclerosis of big firms' and 
was promoted as the progressive altemative to fordism (Curry 1993, pp. 99-100; 
Coates 2000, p. 233). The focus on flexibility was symptomatic of a left that had 
abandoned old formulas and sought alternatives in the 'politics of technical 
adjustment which is ultimately a politics with little real popular or democratic 
political content' (Curry 1993, p. 121). It neglected the class relations of 
production at the root of the industrial crisis (Vercellone 1993, pp. 181-187). 
Those who attempted to construct a progressive political-economic project on the 
basis of a 'non-holistic and ahistorical interpretations of the key underpinnings of 
Japanese competitiveness' have been criticised as 'methodologically flawed' and 
also 'politically dangerous'. It has contributed towards a liberal-left consensus 
that created a picture of capitalism that was capable of being reformed into 'a 
humanized and socially progressive system' and posited progressive capitalist 
-253- 
competitiveness as the only alternative for the foreseeable future (Burkett and 
Hart-Landsberg 1996, p. 80-81). 
This type of capital i st-cum- social democratic admixture or left-liberal consensus 
of the variety Holland prescribed has relied on technocratic solutions and 
undermined popular mobilisation around the socialist change which required a 
'transformation of the state'. The latter was required rather than a rightward drift 
under the 'intensifying competitive pressures of capitalist globalization' (Burkett 
and Hart-Landsberg 1996, p. 80-81). By accepting capitalism's basic structure 
and its competitiveness imperatives Holland submits to the contradictions of 
capitalist accumulation. Holland's promotion of a model of "efficient" capitalism 
becomes a substitute for a struggle for a socialist society. 
Holland's use of the Japanese model raises issues related to the neo- 
institutionalist debate about the varieties or models of capitalism in comparative 
political economy. These different models of capitalism became a battleground 
between the right and left after the end of the Cold War (Radice 2007, p. 35). The 
objective of both was to provide a model of capitalism which would convince 
4political elites that some specific variety would generate superior results in terms 
of desired outcomes imputed to a given society' (Radice 2007, p. 35). Holland's 
promotion of the Japanese model is one example of this trend. Later, for others 
on the left, after the Japanese economic slump from the mid-1990s Germany's 
social market was substituted (Radice 2007, p. 35; Crouch and Streeck 
1997, p. 
4; Coates 2000, p. 234). Whereas, previously the conventional economic 
explanation had argued that the economic competitiveness of a state stemmed 
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from macroeconomic explanations in the early '90s this perspective was 
challenged (Hart 1992, p. 28; Radice 2007, p. 36). The varieties of capitalism 
authors stressed an additional factor which was the 'state- societal' arrangements 
or the 'effectiveness of institutions in managing a country's economic responses 
to the challenge of international competition' (Hart 1992; Radice 2007). The 
political significance of this was that these models became banners of political 
partisanship and were paraded in defence of a particular strategy or policy (Van 
Apeldoorn 2002, p. 78; Hermann and Hofbauer 2007, pp. 134). The models are 
the expression of different social classes or changing class attitudes in the 
struggle to realise their particular strategies (Van Apeldoorn 2002, pp. 69-79). 
Holland's construction of a 'European social model' (ESM) in his work the 
European Imperative, where he recommends the combining of the 'best 
elements' of European and Japanese practices can be seen as part of the Delorist 
vision of a 'European model of society', which represented an attempt to attain a 
social democratic vision of a united, European capitalism (Van Apeldoorn 2002, 
p. 79). The fact that this model was not adopted reveals, for Van Apeldoorn, how 
the interests of transnational capital had moved towards neoliberalism in 
subsequent years (Van Apeldoorn 2002, Chap. 4; Hermann and Hofbauer 2007, 
pp. 125). Today, the ESM has become a political battleground for the 
future of 
Europe (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007, pp. 13 5) 
Holland's policies have been defended stoutly by Gerard Strange as both a 
rearticulation of social democratic regulation around the 'competition state' and 
at the same time a 'shifting [ofl the balance of market power 
in favour of labour 
and social democracy'. He regards Holland's policies as exemplifying an 
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'optimistic neo-Gramscian' perspective as opposed to the 'negative, pessimistic' 
views of those such as Stephen Gill and Bastian van Apeldoorn (infonned by a 
4pessimistic neo-Gramscianism') and the structuralist dependence theories of 
Coates and Radice who all share a sceptical assessment of the 'progressive' 
(social democratic) potential of European integration (Strange 2006, pp. 198- 
201). Strange's main argument is that the EC's commitment to neo-liberalism 
and tight monetary policy is contestable and open to challenge and that Holland's 
policies offer a way forward for a viable progressive policy. It is Strange's 
objective to highlight the potential of the role of agency against structure and to 
assert that through 'conflict and contestation, alliance-building and compromise' 
a social-democratic inspired Europe based on progressive competitiveness rather 
than progressive austerity (as Coates prefers) can be established on the lines of 
Holland's prescriptions (Strange 2006, pp. 198 ff. ). 
The problem with this perspective, and by implication Holland, is that it fails to 
take into account the context and ideas that have informed the agent and the 
social content of the ideas that constitute the agent's worldview. It fails to explain 
how and why Holland and others that support him, such as Strange, have adopted 
such positions in the first place. We have tried to do this above: to show how the 
materialist context (in the broad Marxist sense) in which Holland found himself 
led him to adopt a regional perspective, to recast his former policies for industrial 
intervention into policies for embedding capitalist competition, and to lend his 
support to European big business in their project to intensify competition within 
the European market under the flag of 'flexibility' and to beef up their global 
competition against their capitalist rivals. This was done, in Holland's terms, to 
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save social democracy. All in all, Holland's policies have but one result, the 
intensification of interimperialist contradictions on the basis of building working 
class support for the European project. Structural causes can not only be 
conceived as constraint but can also conceived as the foundation of the ideas that 
the agent possesses - surely this is the contribution of Marx in his writings on 
historical materialism. Moreover, structure should not be conceived of as 
uniform, the structure of capitalism is dynamic and bifurcated around the central 
class struggle of bourgeoisie against the working class. What gives shape to the 
ideas that social agents possess is precisely the product of that conflict in its 
historical conjuncture and their understanding or consciousness of it. Holland's 
regional strategy is a product of that class struggle in the context of the 1990s and 
his own intellectual development and social and political position within that 
struggle. 
5.5.4.4 Holland and Social Europe 
It may be remembered that in our last chapter Holland was pessimistic about the 
EC adopting strongly interventionist social policies. As late as 1986 he was still 
campaigning for his multilateral, international strategy (Holland, 1986). These 
policies were frustrated, according to Holland, at the Commission level by the 
dominance of laissez-faire ideas, negative integration policies and the opposition 
of multinational monopolies. Within his Poulantzian framework the provision of 
such policies would remain the function of the nation state. The political situation 
had changed for Holland, however, following Delors plan for a 'Social Europe' 
-257- 
announced in 1988.132 By 1993, in support of a social -democratic, federal project, 
Holland advocated EU welfare policy intervention as the basis for building 
"consent and support" for the European integration process. This intervention 
was to complement the national welfare programmes which should receive 
favourable treatment by being excluded from the budget limits of the Maastricht 
Treaty (Holland 1993a, p. 138). The obstacles to progress, in Holland's view, 
were no longer the NINCs and the EC Commission; and the political opportunity 
of winning a "progressive competitiveness" policy within the EU suddenly 
seemed promising (Thompson 2002, p. 258). A policy, it must be remembered, 
that intrinsically tied workers to a European struggle for markets including the 
internal market (as Holland was against the 'Fortress Europe' concept). The 
foundation for such policies, as Holland conceded, required economic growth and 
raising 'productivity through flexible production' along with enhanced 
redistribution of wealth (Holland 1993a, p. 134). 
Holland's rapid conversion to optimism on the prospects of a Social Europe was 
founded on the changes of the individual composition of the personnel in 
authority in the EC (i. e. Jacques Delors), the presence in government in some 
countries across Europe of govermnents favourable to developing and extending 
European integration (mainly France and West Germany) and European Trade 
Union support (Van Apeldoorn 2002, p. 147). In Britain the dominance of the 
neoliberal Thatcher government appeared to offer no prospect of the changes 
Holland envisaged (Fella 2002, pp. 25-27). 
132 Hermann and Hofbauer attribute the invention of the European social model to Jacques Delors 
(2007, pp. 126). 
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Did Holland's policies have influence? Holland claims that they did. His ideas 
became the basis of the 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and 
Employment which gave the rationale for the first employment targets of the EU. 
His Union bonds ideas were endorsed at Luxemburg in 1997.133 Euro bonds are 
now issued by the EIB and states do not count borrowing from the Bank against 
national debt and the potential for recovery programmes financed by the EIB is 
4vast'. The European Investment Fund is operational on a basis Holland 
advocated; and Union Structural funds incorporate human resources objectives. 
Trade union involvement in democratising the market is accepted as pluralizing 
power within the EU (Holland 2004b, pp. 182-3). 
A more critical approach is not so positive. Although there have been plenty of 
declarations and proposals especially at the Lisbon Summit in 1999 "little has 
been done in the way of concrete actions" (Giffen 2001, p. 89). Furthermore the 
creation of the single market did not take place with the accompanying social 
protections Holland advocated. The social dimension remained sidelined and the 
social -democratic strategy unsuccessful (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007, p. 127). 
The competitiveness concept adopted was not the extensive social democratic 
version that Holland advocated but a more restricted neoliberal concept (with an 
emphasis on the deregulation) combined with the demand that the 'conditions of 
competitiveness' be created (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007, pp. 125 and p. 127; 
Van Apeldoorn 2002, p. 173). Inequalities in social provision among states 
remain (Giffen 2001, p. 90). Obstacles to a fully fledged EU social policy remain, 
including the: diversity in the conditions of member states; the contentious nature 
Blackburn (2005 p. 89); Hennann and Hofbauer (2007, p. 129) point out that this was after 
huge demonstrations in Europe against unemployment. 
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of social policy issues; the variety of national social policy regimes; the 
reluctance of states to give up management of social policy; and the degree of 
budgetary transfers necessary for an EU social policy (Nello 2005, p. 304; 
Leibfried and Pierson 1992, pp. 356-357; Scharpf 1999, p. 187fo. 
The prospects for a Social Europe have also been made more difficult by the 
adoption of monetary union which has place restraints on EU member states' 
ability to develop welfare spending policies (Hermann and Hofbauer 2007, pp. 
128) 
5.5.4.5 Monetary Union 
Holland in the Uncommon Market condemned the idea of monetary union on four 
grounds: (a) that such union undertaken in the context of monetarism or tight 
monetary policies would result in attacks on wages, public spending and public 
enterprise combined with the inability of governments to reflate; (b) it would 
deprive individual member countries to pursue independent development policies 
(Holland 1980, p. 82); (c) it would act to the benefit of the strong - whether big 
business, social classes or countries (Holland 1980, p. 154); (d) it would establish 
German dominance over the EEC (Holland 1980, p. 155). 
By 1993 he held that monetary union would benefit all by providing stable 
exchange rates and hence the context of greater fiscal and macroeconomic 
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freedom. His volte-face on monetary union 134 could not illustrate better his 
inconsistency in terms of political economy. His rationale was: (i) although he 
accepted that monetary policy would be tight under the new regime nevertheless 
there opened up compensatory benefits of a European currency regime primary 
amongst which was the opportunity for greater fiscal freedom at European level. 
Nation-states however could not do this, he argued, as this would lead to an 
undermining of monetary union. In other words, he was prepared to sacrifice 
nationa macroeconomic policy for a European one. (ii) National governments 
were undermined in their macroeconomic policy by global and European 
developments. Van Apeldoorn adds another dimension which is that it would 
help pave the way to a political union which would make the EU stronger (Van 
Apeldoom 2002, p. 149). 
Economic and Monetary Union, due to both its significance for European 
political union and for democracy, has proved to be one of the fiercest centres of 
debate for those in radical international political economy (e. g. G. Strange 2006, 
pp. 202-215; Gill 1998; Whyman, Burkitt and Bainbridge 2000; Carchedi 2001). 
Debate has revolved around three aspects of EMU: (a) the impact and effects of 
EMU; and (b) criticism of the institutional design of EMU (c) the class analysis 
of EMU (Verdun 2007, pp. 334-5; Van Apeldoorn 2002, Carchedi 2001). 
Whyman, Burkitt and Baimbridge (2000) have argued that EMU and the 
associated Maastricht Convergence Criteria (1993) and Growth and Stability Pact 
(1997) impose heavy burdens on nation states and constrict their choice of 
macroeconomic instruments to deal with various problems. They maintain that 
134 Tindale notes that there was a change of position on the left towards monetary union in the 
early 1980s; it was now seen as 'a step on the road to controlling international capital' (Tindale 
1992, P. 284). 
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nation states can still have an effective national economic policy outside of EMU. 
Strange (2006) argues that the ECB is subject to democratic accountability or 
political pressure and that its legitimacy depends on its contribution to EU 
macroeconomic treaty objectives including growth and employment. Moreover, 
the negative aspect of its monetarist policy is balanced by the new fiscal 
flexibility at EU level that has been gained through monetary union. Critics of 
this viewpoint argue that the conditions of monetarism are deflationary (Gill 
1998; Van Apeldoorn 2002) and the convergence criteria have been too tough. 
The Maastricht caps on fiscal deficits created pressures on welfare provision 
including pensions and on public sector expenditure (Hermann and Hofbauer 
2007, pp. 129). This is limiting the scope of social democratic options at the 
national level. This is one of the social -democratic dilemmas in supporting the 
EU (Baimbridge, Whyman and Burkitt 2007, pp. 74 -75). Baimbridge, Whyman 
and Burkitt are sceptical about both Holland's and Strange's claim that the new 
fiscal powers of the EU are a counterbalance to monetary union. They highlight 
the point that the budgetary requirements of EU intervention an a European scale 
would require a sizeable increase an current levels which would in turn lead to 
increased political tensions as to who was to bear the burden (Baimbridge, 
Whyman and Burkitt 2007, p. 75). This would intensify the conflict between the 
various national imperialisms within the EU. 
A Marxist analyses of EMU highlights how it works to the benefit of advanced 
capital and particularly the most powerful sector of that capital in Germany. But 
capital as a whole benefits from the renouncing of inflation and devaluation as it 
results in increased surplus value at the point of production. European goods both 
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in the external and internal markets have to be produced more efficiently to be 
competitive i. e. at the expense of labour. 135 Flexibility of labour is a means of 
raising surplus value while at the same time increasing the output of labour and 
remaining competitive. Deregulation of labour markets and reregulation of social 
welfare help this intensification of the exploitation of labour that is required by 
capitals under conditions of stable or fixed exchange rates. Thus we see how 
flexibility, monetary union, and competitiveness are joined together as different 
elements of one goal - the increased accumulation of capital in the European 
space. The institutional 'independence' of the ECB serves the purposes of 
4 relatively autonomous' supra-national financial capital in imposing these 
conditions on industrial capitals in Europe so that in turn greater sums of surplus 
value is turned out increase, in part, the returns to financial capital whilst at the 
same time forcing European industrial capitals to be more competitive. However, 
this exposes the myth about ECB 'independence'. It is independent of political 
parties and national governments but is irrevocably dependent on the interests of 
European capital (Carchedi 2001, p. 129 ff., p. 140; Bonefeld 2002, pp. 132-135; 
Bumham 1999 pp. 51-52). 
Furthermore, the forging of Monetary Union does not just have internal European 
repercussions; it also has external interimperialist repercussions. This was 
explored in our section on bloc imperialism. 
135 A similar point is made by Burnham in relation to Britain's participation in the ERM 
in the 
late 1980s. (Burnham 1999, pp. 49-50). 
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5.6 Holland and the Politics of the EU 
5.6.1 EU State-building 
The logic of Holland's position is to build the EU as a state. If the nation-state is 
powerless before multinational capital and cannot fulfil the purposes social- 
democrats require of it then that state, from their point of view of state 
management, has to be found elsewhere. However the EU is not yet a state (Cini 
2007, p. 2) 136 and the crux of Holland's European project, which is entailed from 
its implicit assumptions, is to lay the foundations for one to be built. The 
preliminary building bricks are the policies of economic and social cohesion. As 
Holland stated in UM-. 
It is only when Europe has a state structure, with its own budgets, projects and contractual power 
that it will be able to countervail multinational capital by a multinational state (Holland 1980, p. 
115). 
This functions to further tie in interest groups i. e. capitalists, small business and 
workers, to the benefits the EU can offer. This was an integral element of the 
Delorsian project which Holland continues. As Ross has written: 
The backbone of Delors' strategy was to promote state-building programs on the back of market- 
building success' (Ross 1995, p. 109). 
Cafruney, too, has commented upon the implications of such a project as 
Holland's (2003, p. 300). He considers it would require a 'central authority to 
compensate for the loss of national autonomy'; it would require a substantial 
136 The state question remains contested (Cini 2007, p. 2) 
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increase in budget; a single fiscal policy including taxation and considerably 
higher levels of interregional redistribution; and a common foreign policy and 
defence policy (Cafruney 2003, p. 300). He adds as an afterthought that such a 
programme would 'certainly trigger a strong U. S. reaction' and the 'political 
conditions... do not exist at the present time' (Cafruney 2003, p. 300). 
The state Holland is building, however, as we have tried to illustrate in this 
chapter, is also a capitalist and imperialist one (Mandel 1978; Van Apeldoorn 
2002; Carchedi 2002, p. 166; Cypher 1992; Albo 2003). Holland's project is 
therefore the social -democratic counterpoint of the project of the European 
bourgeoisie. However the project is riven by inter- imperialist contradictions. 
(Carchedi 2002, p. 38 and p. 167). 
Holland in the Uncommon Market offered an alternative to the political structure 
of the EC built around the concept of national sovereignty and accountability of 
internationally agreed decisions and policies within the EC. It was an attempt to 
make the 'supranational' EC accountable to nation states. This was Holland's 
solution to the perennial political problem of the EC / EU; what is now called the 
'democratic deficit' (Chryssochoou 2007, p. 360). 137 In the European Imperative 
the concept of national sovereignty has gone. Holland's antagonism to federalism 
and supranationalism which he made one of his key arguments against the EC 
was dropped and replaced by an acceptance of the EU as a de facto reality; in 
other words he elevates the European interest over the national interest. 
137 There are various definitions given to the 'democratic deficit': see Chryssochoou (2007, p. 
360). In turn this depends on the concept of democracy one has. In this thesis the view adopted is 
that democracy means more than elections, plural political parties and public accountability of 
some form. It is seen primarily in terms of popular participation in the organs of power (See 
Carole Pateman 1975). 
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Consequently, national sovereignty is no longer a central demand in Holland's 
political strategy; it is replaced by the concept of 'effective sovereignty' which is 
cast in the form of defending 'sovereignty by extending it' (Holland 1993a, p. 
16). By this Holland refers to EU support for measures taken at a national level. 
It is justified on the grounds of the developments within the global economy 
(Holland 1993a, p. 17). It is, for him, the only way governments can have effect. 
He adopts a multilevel governance approach where interactions and joint actions 
at different levels occur (Holland 1993, p. 17). This is similar to the situation 
which Rosamond describes where 'national policy-making and European policy- 
making become 'blurred to the point of insignificance' (Rosamond 2007, p. 129). 
His proposals for a the President of the European Parliament to attend meetings 
of the European Council and more accountability through reporting of voting and 
decisions of the Council are meek when compared to his tirade against the 
'figleaf powers of European Parliament he made in the Uncommon Market. It is 
rather ironic that the thinker who started out his public career in berating the 
multinational corporations and the EC in denying national economic sovereignty 
and negating national democracy (Holland 1986, p. 228) should come to the point 
where he accepts that national sovereignty can be effective no longer and has to 
subordinate itself to the EU without a stronger vision of how democracy can be 
made real in the context of supranational authorities (cf. Held 1995, pp. II 1- 112 
and pp. 254-255). 
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5.6.2 The Implications of Holland's Political Economy for European Social- 
Democracy 
Within social democracy, in the contemporary era, there is a movement of two 
trends: the one, advocates an alliance with European monopoly capital in the 
project of creating a European managed capitalism, the other advocates an 
alliance with national monopoly capital in the project of national social 
democratic management of capitalism (Martell 2001, passim). 138 
These two trends are but the obverse expressions of a single process of the 
contradictions of capitalist accumulation within Europe. In other words, capitalist 
accumulation in Europe expresses itself in two ways: on the one hand, the desire 
for each "national" based monopoly capitalism 139 to extend its own accumulation 
against the others but on the other hand, the realisation that such "national" 
accumulation is undermined by the competition against more powerful capitals 
within the existing global political economy, this latter trend reinforces the 
tendency for "national" monopoly capitals in Europe to attempt to unifý 
themselves into an imperialist bloc to compete with its global rivals (Mandel 
1970 p. 55ff. and 1978, Chap. 10; Carchedi 2001, pp. 116-117; Palmer 1986, p. 
52). Two tendencies are at work in a contradictory unity. Peter Burnham (1995) 
hints at this dynamic when he writes that the 
44 national form of the state is increasingly unable to function as an integrated unit supplying the 
political stability which is the prerequisite for global class relations. ... the most powerful 
national states ... are turning to seek regional solutions... 
the prospect of a simple transfer of 
authority from the national to the regional is most unlikely. " (Burnham p. I 10) 
138 A third level may be identified with the global, but it is beyond the bounds of the thesis to 
explore in depth this route (Stammers, 2001; Shaw 2001). 
139 The countries referred to here are primarily France, Germany and the UK. The relations 
between these states and the others cannot be entered its here due to limitations of space. 
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national social-democratic project in the contemporary global political economy. 
This estimation was founded on well-rehearsed arguments of Holland. 
Furthermore Holland believed that international co-ordination of national solicit- 
democratic' project to be impracticable. These two premises, combined with a 
refusal to embark upon a more radical national strategy, i. e. building socialism in 
one country, led Holland to the conclusion that the European Union, or the 
regional political economy was the way forward. 
The essence of Holland's analysis of the European Union's political economy 
was that it held out the prospect of a new, revived social consensus. The outlines 
of such a consensus were elaborated in the European Imperative. The object of 
the strategy was: to build the European Union as a state; to enable it to conduct 
policies of the state management of capitalism; to cement the alliance of 
European big business and the European working class around that state through 
policies of social and economic cohesion; to intensify the competitiveness of 
European capitalism against its rivals; to enhance that competitiveness through 
monetary union; and to modify the political institutions of the EU to make them 
more accountable to the European Parliament; and to legitimate the whole 
European Union in the eyes of the European, but particularly, the British working 
class. 
The criticisms of such a project presented from the standpoint of the theory of a 
European imperialist bloc were that: the strategy locked the working class of 
Europe into the strategies of the imperialist European bourgeoisie. Holland's 
policies, overall, follow the interests of the European bourgeoisie 
in building a 
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In social-democratic terms this process expresses itself in the conflict of 
strategies. Which set of institutions, national or European, offers more hope of 
state management or regulation of capitalism? This is one of the key social- 
democratic dilemmas that 'globalization' confronts for strategy (Thomson 2000; 
Thompson 2002; Maitell 2001 ). 140 
Moreover Holland's political policies do not overcome a central contradiction for 
social democracy in its attitudes to the EU. As Geyer (1993, p. 104) and Bailey 
(2005) point out national social -democracy has derived its power from its ability 
to mobilize and organise progressive social forces within the nation-state. Social 
democrats, such as Holland, by giving support to the European Union and linking 
policies to it undermine their base in the national 'community' and weaken the 
'social solidarities' which have fonned the organisational base of traditional 
social democracy (Geyer 1993, p. 104; Bailey 2005, p. 16). Holland's policies 
undermine his fellow national social-democrats. Social democracy, in the light of 
Holland's European strategy, is caught in a dilemma (Thomson 2000; Holmes 
and Lightfoot 2007, p. 155). 
5.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined Stuart Holland's European regional political 
economy and strategy. The basis of the political economy and strategy was his 
pessimistic estimate of the national political economy to be able to sustain a 
140 This, of course, is a problem that applies to parties other than social -democratic. 
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European 'state' or power base (Schnabel 2007; Haesler 2004; Van Apeldoorn 
2002; Carchedi, 2002, p. 167). It was on their initiative that Europe was 
relaunched in this form and their purposes were the further intensification of the 
exploitation of the working class through flexibility, which Holland promoted, 
combined with a new assault on overseas markets. Holland's promotion of the 
policies of competitiveness did not serve the interests of workers. The policies of 
monetary union and its impact are much debated; however, the viewpoint taken 
here is that monetary union further moved economic power into the hands of 
financiers and industrial capitalists. EMU compelled industrial capitalists to 
compete either through greater productivity or cutting costs, both of which were 
inimical to workers interests. The argument was also made that capital aware of 
the negative consequences of its project want to collaborate with social 
democracy in its project. This served the purpose of ensuring social stability, 
providing the trained labour required for production flexibilities, and creating a 
pool of workers who supported the European project. This, it was pointed out, 
was the part of the two cross-cutting tendencies of capitalism. On the one hand, 
capital seeks to accumulate capital at the expense of labour, on the other capital 
has to make itself legitimate before the working class. This provides the social 
base for imperialism. It is one of the purposes of role of social democracy to fulfil 
this role as was illustrated through Holland's policies. Further, the promises of 
'Social Europe' that Holland suggested might be the fruit of competitiveness 
were questioned. 
Lastly the logic of Holland's position leads to support for a European imperialist 
state. The implicit assumptions of his project are federalist. This explains his 
-270- 
attitudes towards the political reforms that Holland proposed for the European 
Union as a pale shadow of these that he recommended ten years earlier in the 
Uncommon Market. The problems of the 'democratic deficit' would still remain 
within Holland's model of political Europe, for instance, he makes no 
recommendation regarding the democratic power of the European Parliament 
over the European Commission other than its President should sit on the 
Commission. 
Social democracy's problems would be intensified not resolved by such a project 
as Geyer (1993) indicated. Furthermore, Holland's policies, far from bringing the 
working class closer to socialism would only intensify its own exploitation and 
interimperialist rivalries as Beitel and Carchedi argue. Furthermore Holland does 
not elaborate how the European working class will assert its interest through the 
current institutions of the EU (Carchedi 2002, p. 167). 
Holland does not make a coherent or plausible case for a socialist strategy 
focused upon Europe. He readily admits that Europe does not have state power; 
that state power which is capitalist state power still resides in the nation-state. If 
Europe should accrue to itself those powers which make it a state, i. e. the 
ý4 quality of power" that Holland wrote about in the UM then the focus of socialist 
strategy should, and would inevitably, be focused upon it. However while those 
'qualities of power' remain with the nation-state and it is that state power which 
sustains capitalism then it is socialism, s task to confront that state power so that a 
new socialist state power can be built. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
It was argued in Chapter One that Stuart Holland provided 'a convenient 
opportunity to enter into a debate with a representative of left social democracy 
about how to analyse the changes in global capitalism and to discuss the political 
strategies open to the left. ' The research aims of the thesis went on to ask: (a) In 
what ways did Holland's theories of the changes in the political economy of 
capitalism, specifically, in relation to the British political economy and the 
European political economy, differ from Marxist analysis (Holland 1976a, 1980, 
1983 and 1993a)? (b) Related to the above, to what degree are the various 
strategies he promotes a break with capitalism? 
To some, Holland's theories were consistent with Marxist tenets, and his 
strategies were viewed as socialist. Marxism, like socialism, has incorporated 
different trends of thought within it which have embraced theories similar to 
Holland and yet defined themselves as Marxist rather than social-democratic 
(e. g. the New Left, NeoGrarnscians, and Eurocommunism, see Kolakowski 1981, 
pp. 487-494; Prior and Purdy 1979; Townshend 1996, Chap. 12 and 14; Strange 
2006; Holland 1979c; Barratt Brown 1972a, 1972b, 1976; Williams 1968, Held 
1988, Wood 1983 and 1986; Tsakalotos 1991). So even though Holland did not 
call himself Marxist this did not mean that he did not share ideas and theories 
with certain Marxists. In fact, he quite clearly did. 141 Marxists of various 
persuasions, in a similar vein to Holland, rejected elements of Marxist 
economics; regarded multinational monopolies as the major obstacle to state 
141 It should be noted that Holland was a participant in a Labour Party pamphlet (1980) which 
called for rapprochement with Eurocommunism on two grounds: (a) there were certain 
similarities in political outlook; (b) that a socialist programme was no longer convincing in the 
context of one country and therefore alliances were necessary in Western Europe (p. 65). 
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intervention and macroeconomic policies; advocated state capitalism, 
incorporated non-Marxist concepts into their 'Marxism'; regarded the state as 
neutral; considered it to be a post-imperial age and replaced an inter-imperialist 
rivalry by a struggle between MNCs or between MNCs and the state; and argued 
the nation-state was finished and preached support for regional politics. Holland, 
in many ways, shares these Marxist views. His left social democracy is, at times, 
difficult to distinguish from certain elements within Marxism. We have attempted 
in this thesis to argue that Holland's political thought is at odds, rather than in 
synchrony, with Marxism. 
Although Holland's works are littered with concepts drawn from Gramsci, 
Poulantzas, Althusser and Marx, the argument of the thesis has been that 
Holland's perspectives have not been influenced in any way by a consistent 
Marxism. In Chapter Two I established the theoretical differences between 
Holland's perspectives and Marxist perspectives on a variety of issues. I 
indicated that Holland's conception of monopoly capitalism was based on the 
theories of imperfect or unequal competition and power over the market rather 
than on the drives of capitalist accumulation and historical developments that led 
to stages in the development of the firm. I illustrated how his theoretical roots in 
relation to monoPolies and their multinationalisation and to macroeconomics 
owed more to Keynesian, neoclassical and welfare economics and thinking 
within the American business school than it did to Marxist economics. There 
were some influences within his thought of the Marxist internationalisation of 
capital school. It was pointed out, too, that there were influences of Marxism 
within his thought with the use of concepts like class, state power, ruling class, 
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monopoly capital, and capitalist state (I 976a, p. 15; 1976a, p. 26-27, p. 62) but he 
does not adopt any systematic approach in their use. In fact, the theory of surplus- 
value, the lynchpin of Marxism's economic theory and the foundation of Marx's 
critique of capital is discarded by Holland (Holland 1977). Without this 
cornerstone concept Holland cannot explain capitalist accumulation, class 
struggle, the nature of economic crisis or the capitalist state within a Marxist 
frame of reference. He must use tools of analysis outside of Marxism, hence his 
theoretical pluralism and hence his reformism. This fundamental flaw in 
Holland's political -economic thought leads to a pluralist, eclectic melange of 
concepts used to explain the changes in global capitalism and specifically 
changes in the British and European political economy. 
The theoretical differences with Holland were not confined to economics. 
Differences were also indicated on the theory of state capitalism where it was 
maintained that Holland did not perceive such policies as having limits within the 
capitalist system or if he does he perceives them as not insuperable within 
capitalism. The main reason for this was that he could not recognise the state's 
critical task in the reproduction of capital within the imperialist system. We 
maintained that the capitalist state could not transform monopoly capitalism to 
the degree that monopolies would no longer dominate or could be regulated and 
subordinated to the state. Monopoly capitalism, we argued, is capitalism today. 
Monopoly capital acts globally. Capitalism is inconceivable without its presence 
given the scale under which production has to be undertaken. Moreover, 
monopoly capital drives the system and given its structural power within the 
system and the state's inherent connection with it (Bridges 1974; Burnham 
1995), 
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and the impulses that derive from capitalist accumulation, the state could not be 
utilised to manage it, other then in exceptional and temporary circumstances 
necessitated by the demands of monopoly capital itself (e. g. severe economic 
crisis, war). State capitalist measures within capitalism are limited by monopoly 
capitalist needs either narrowly or broadly defined (i. e. in the sense of direct 
support, or indirectly in terms of social stability). 
One important note of praise about Holland's work is that he makes the point that 
modem monopoly capitalism is reliant on the economic intervention of the state 
(Holland 1974,1976a, 1979c, 1993a, 1994 pp. 176ff. ). This aspect of the state's 
role within capitalism is often forgotten amidst the ideology of neoliberalism. Yet 
in states across the world, including the USA, public monies are used to sustain 
private enterprise especially in the defence industries. The same is true in the 
European Union (Anderson, Gutmanis and Anderson, 2000, passim; Kolko 1988, 
190). The state, too, in many countries, has also had to be deployed to prevent 
monopolies, or groups of monopolies, from abusing a market. This role of the 
state in supporting or managing capitalism helps breed the illusion that state 
capitalism can be utilised for social purposes, to transform the capitalist system 
into socialism, through a restructuring of the relationship between private and 
public enterprise (Holland 1976a; Laux and Molot 1988; Molot 1990). 
However as we have seen in Chapter Three the possibilities of this are negligible 
without introducing broad forms of social power which insure the public scrutiny 
and public accountability of such enterprises. Otherwise the logic of capitalist 
competition will ensure that such public enterprises will follow the same route of 
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private monopolies of evading the constraint of public power. Holland's policies 
in his national strategy, therefore, were not coherent and cohesive and are 
seriously flawed from a Marxist point of view. The policies failed to address the 
issue that British imperialism had long been the character of the British political 
economy. Holland could not recognise the long standing role that British 
monopoly capital had played in the British political economy. British capital had 
moved abroad in order to extend its role in capitalist accumulation. The British 
state was committed to this imperialist perspective; it facilitated the reproduction 
of British imperialism in the world economy. A policy of state managed 
enterprises within this context could not but achieve one outcome: state support 
for that imperialist role. Public enterprise policies without confronting the nature 
of the British state inevitably end this way. This may have paid dividends to the 
British working class in terms of a higher standard of living and taxes for 
extended welfare (provided more capital is not exported or does not flee as a 
result) but it entailed collusion in imperialist policies. From a Marxist 
perspective, that would not be consistent with the objective of achieving 
socialism and ending labour exploitation. 
A criticism of Holland's policies is that they are structured in the context of 
capitalist competition. They promote progressive competition. The problem with 
such policies is the basic compositional fallacy of aggregation i. e. not all 
countries can adopt such policies to solve their individual imbalances (Albo 
1997, p. 22). The implicit assumption of Holland's national strategy is that other 
countries do not follow suit or are prepared for their markets to be flooded with 
goods. Neither is realistic. It is highly likely that such competitiveness as Holland 
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promotes will provoke a response, either counter-measures of competitiveness or 
protectionism. The former implies worsening conditions of work for labour, and 
the latter, if left unchecked, means a disintegration of the postwar order and 
return to the prewar-1945 struggles for markets. It is no wonder, therefore, that 
Holland abandons unilateral strategies for multilateral strategies and then global 
strategies of international Keynesianism and a New Bretton Woods 142 (Holland 
1994b). The logic of Holland's policies compels him, due to the nature of the 
anarchic global capitalist accumulation process, to seek to manage capitalism on 
an ever larger scale. He is caught in an upward spiral of scope of policy from 
national to regional to global due to his initial strategy of competitive public 
enterprise. 
The most important issue to come out of my theoretical critique of Holland was 
the problem of the state. The position I have adopted in the thesis is that the state 
in Britain or what is described as an 'advanced capitalist country' is an 
imperialist state. This characterisation of the state sets it in the context of global 
accumulation both within a territory and within global accumulation (Burnham 
1995, p. 150). 1 defined the state as an expression of property relations, the 
property relations of monopoly capitalism which is in a contradictory unity with 
individual monopoly capitals. Capitals are both separate from and united with the 
capitalist state. This sets my theory of the state apart from those used by other 
Marxist thinkers in radical international political economy. Other theorists define 
it simply as a class relation or in structural functionalist terms or in 
instrumentalist pluralist terms. The advantage of the imperialist concept of the 
142 Bretton Woods (1944) established an international monetary order between nation-states. It 
collapsed in 1971. 
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state is that it expresses not just its domestic class order role but also its external, 
global role in asserting property relations globally (not just the orderly conduct of 
markets). 
The antecedent condition of the circuits of capital globally is the emergence of 
private property relations and their maintenance and this is exactly what the 
imperialist state helps create and maintain (Clarke 1988). It maintains these 
private property relations through all the means at its disposal. This is the 
significance of the excellent work by the realist regime analysts Charles Lipson 
(1985) and Stephen Krasner (1985). Lipson writes of the formation and 
maintenance of an international property regime globally over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. A regime enforced by the dominant capitalist states. He also 
notes how that regime has been subject to struggles between states over the 
principles of property relations (private or public). Those struggles have been an 
expression of different class forces seeking to impose their particular property 
order against others. It is this aspect of the state's role in maintaining global 
private property relations that the concept of the imperialist state expresses. 
TI- -- 
Kxasner (1985, pp. 4-5), too, has defined regimes as a struggle over the 
distribution of property rights. Lipson (1985) has highlighted the struggle around 
an international property regime in relation to private property rights. Antonio 
Cassese (1988) has noted how international legal concepts have developed in 
relation to struggles over property rights. The European Union is founded on the 
free movement of capital (Weatherill and Beaumont 1995). In all these respects, 
then, both globally and domestically the imperialist states have the prime task of 
maintaining property or class relations. 
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There is another aspect of the state that also developed in my critique of Holland. 
This is the question of the locus of the state and state power. This is a critical 
aspect of any socialist strategy. Holland well understood this. Central to his 
strategy was a state powerful enough to confront monopoly capital (in its rival 
form i. e. US MNCs). Holland believed at first such power could be developed 
within the nation-state and when that was found wanting he looked to multilateral 
initiatives and finally European regional 'state' action. Thus for him state power 
in the contemporary age had moved its locus away from the nation state towards 
a regional body. This concept is pregnant with implications. Of course, it 
challenges notions that capital relations are tied to the nation-state as Bukharin 
maintained (Bukharin 1975). The nation-state is not the only form of state 
compatible with monopoly capital. It opens up the question how are state forms 
transmuted from the national form to the regional form? 143 Do they have the 
same attributes? How do we know when the nation-state is 'dead'? What criteria 
should socialists adopt in such situations? To what centre of power, to what 
power, should their strategies focus on? It is these types of questions that I have 
been exploring in the thesis. 144 Trying to tease out through Holland's writings 
and those of his critics what implicit assumptions they are making about the state 
and state power. 
What criteria did Holland have for judging a switch of focus in strategy? His 
answer: a lack of economic powers. It is an answer that others on the 
left have 
143 Some interesting work has been done on this by multilevel governance theorists, see Hooghe 
and Marks (200 1). 
144 These questions form the basis of avenues of future research for the political aspects of the 
theory of bloc imperialism. 
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drawn too, such as Barratt Brown (I 972a), Radice (1984), Strange (2006), Clift 
(2005) etc. Others have been drawn by the 'internationalisation of the state' 
thesis (e. g. Picciotto 1991 and 1991a, Shaw 2000; Held 1988). Recognising that 
the nation state is now caught in a web of commitments, networks and 
international and global organisations they have suggested that movements direct 
their attention away form the nation state. The weakness in all these arguments it 
seems to me is that they fail to perceive the difference in the unity. What I mean 
by this is that although there are movements towards economic, political and 
cultural globalization (Held 2000) which reflect in part the growing 
interconnectedness of capital there is at the same time another tendency towards 
fracture of the international community into blocs or even returning to 'national' 
states. This duality is not only a cultural or social phenomenon, it also reflects 
monopoly capital. Monopoly capital as we illustrated in the thesis acts both 
globally and is still anchored to the state nationally. States continue to perform 
the vital task of upholding private property. That is their primary role. Thus there 
are tensions: pressures to move beyond the nation-state and needs to stay with the 
nation-state. This is capital's dilemma. This phenomenon is revealed most 
sharply in European integration: where the need to compete with larger capitals 
has forced the imperialist states in Europe to reconsider their nation- statehood 
(Mandel 1970 and 1978; Rowthom 1971; Carchedi 2001). Europe, the centre of 
historical imperialism, has seen the strongest form of imperialist bloc formation. 
Each imperialist state struggles against its rivals within this pattern of global 
accumulation not just in the Third World but in each other's countries too. This 
point cannot be emphasised enough. Many a political thinker has argued that 
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imperialism is disproved by the fact that capital is mainly invested in other 
industrial nations rather than Third World countries but this goes to prove the 
point. Capital seeks new labour whenever it can and this means everywhere. 
What has led some into error, such as Holland, is thinking that this implies some 
sort of ultra-imperialism, that inter- imperialist rivalry has disappeared (Hardt and 
Negri 2001; Becker and Sklar 1987). Nothing could be further from the truth. 
What has occurred is that inter- imperialist struggle has had to take new forms and 
developed new means (Mandel 1978, Chap. 10). There is no doubt that US super- 
imperialism after the war helped modify these inter-imperialist rivalries as did the 
fear of Communism (Bonefeld 2002; Panitch 2000; Poulantzas 1974). 
Nevertheless, bloc imperialism managed to emerge in Europe after 1945. 
In this thesis I have contextualised my critique of Holland within the theory of 
emergent bloc imperialism. By 'emergent bloc imperialism' I mean the process 
whereby national imperialisms form themselves into a single political-economic 
bloc to further their common interests. In other words, the process which has 
been defined traditionally by a geographical term (however inaccurate that may 
have been originally) is defined instead by a class term. The notion implies that 
there has not been a simple functional relationship between economic change and 
political change as noted in Mandel's thesis (Chapter Four) and in other 
transnational class formation theories. Rather the forming of the bloc has 
involved unity but also difference expressed in the form of intergovernmental 
conflicts. Moreover, another aspect I have introduced is that as the emergent bloc 
formed, the multinational monopolies of the countries involved could operate at 
two levels: the national and the supranational as Cowles' researches have 
-281 - 
indicated (2003). The emergent bloc thesis helps to explain not just the internal 
dynamic of EC /EU but also its external relations globally. It is an expression of 
European monopoly capitals and their states seeking to improve their position in 
the domestic and global arenas of the accumulation of capital (Carchedi 2001 ý 
Cypher 1992 and Albo 2003). 
145 
The Marxist theory of bloc imperialism provides an alternative paradigm to 
social democratic models (such as Holland's) where priority in analysis is given 
to a struggle between MNCs and nation-states. The superiority of this theory over 
Holland's theory of European integration is that it can explain not only why unity 
occurred in the European integration process from the standpoint of historical 
materialism, but why conflict and friction occurred too. Holland in order to 
explain the conflict within the EC has to resort to institutionalism and idealist 
explanations e. g. the struggle between the national- supranational principles. In 
the theory of an emergent imperialist bloc these struggles can be explained within 
the context of the conflict over capital accumulation, each section of national 
monopoly capital struggling to seek advantage either at the expense of another or 
in the form of deals. Moreover, the role of the EC/EU can be explained in terms 
of an international organisation that assists in the bloc accumulation of capital 
internally and externally. This theory opens up new vistas in our understanding of 
regional formations and offers a fruitful framework for future research. 146 
145 The concept of Europe resembling medieval imperial political forms has been mooted by Jan 
Zielonka (2006). However his concept of 'imperial' Europe is different to the Marxist concept 
adumbrated in this thesis. 
146 This theory of bloc imperialism opens up new research lines: such as when do antagonisms 
between imperialism transform into the need to form blocs? How then are inter-imperialist 
relations, political and economic, transmuted in such blocs? How stable are such blocs? What are 
their internal and external dynamics? How do the institutions created in such blocs modify 
relations? How is state power affected by such blocs? Above all, what happens to state power in 
such blocs? What are the class dynamics behind other regional formations in the global political 
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This theory also puts another gloss on the building of the European Union. 
Holland regards the EU as a means of protection against capital movements. He 
holds out the prospect of improved state management of monopoly capitalism 
within the EU based on EMU and the ability of the EU to raise new funds for 
social programmes without the fear of the reaction of international capital 
markets. In one sense, he does recognise the ability of this new bloc to improve 
its capital accumulation vis-d-vis other states in the global capitalist economy due 
to its power and therefore provides greater social benefits for some as a result. 
However, as we related in Chapter Five, the other side of the coin is that this new 
entity is designed to improve Europe's position in the global economy through 
inter-imperialist rivalry and increased competition (as discussed above). Thus 
there will be renewed pressures on workers to be flexible, competitive and more 
productive and at the same time Europe will become more demanding in relation 
to other powers in terms of its interests. In other words, there will be a 
heightening of inter-imperialist conflict as a result (Beitel 2005) unless a New 
Bretton Woods is established. 
147 
A major consequence of Holland's position on the EU is the future for the nation- 
state and social democracy. In Holland's regional political strategy the role of the 
nation-state is downgraded. It serves social welfare functions but its central 
economic function of the "embedded liberal" era is ended. Its political role 
becomes subordinate to the EU. Its main political role domestically is to 
economy? On this last point, comparative regionalist studies such as Gamble and Payne's (1996) 
and Schultz, Sbderbaum and Ojendal - especially the conclusion (2001) provide a starting point 
for such a project. 
147 There is no reason it would last longer than the last. See Helleiner (1994, p. 197). 
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"mediate" class relations; it still polices private property too. Yet at the EU IeN, el 
the institutions of democratic power remain weak. Holland has no proposals to 
strengthen their powers in any major way. Holland has not solved the problem of 
the 'democratic deficit'. Yet Holland calls on labour to organise at the EU level 
rather than the national to improve their economic position. This appears like a 
no-win situation for labour and social democracy. On the one hand, the nation- 
state is weak against global economic forces; on the other hand, the movement 
has no real direct democratic input into the EU. Holland's strategy offers no real 
opportunity for social democracy to gain power that can enable it to 'command 
economic forces' and therefore build a base for itself at either level. Furthermore, 
to win support for the EU social democracy has to show that the EU offers the 
opportunity to achieve the command of economic forces for labour's benefit, yet 
the opportunities for welding power within the EU are limited. Holland's left 
social-democratic strategy although promising much can offer little. Social 
democracy in this model would have a bleak future. Perhaps this is why some 
social democrats still adhere to the national path of power (Whyman, Burkitt 
Bainbridge, 2000; Martell 2001). 
In the process of criticising Holland's political economies and strategies I have 
had to argue my own. It is to strategy that I turn next. The key to a socialist 
strategy is state power. It is state power that preserves the property regime of 
private property which forms the basis of capitalist exploitation. The abolition of 
exploitation of labour requires that private property in the means of production is 
turned into social property by degrees i. e. mainly public property. This task, as 
we have argued, cannot be achieved without challenging the capitalist state. This, 
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in turn, requires that a socialist party comes to a determination as to where the 
state is located. As we have seen different theories give different replies to this. 
Some have placed it at the level of the nation-state, some at the level of ýregional 
state', others have written of the 'global state' (Panitch 2000,2001 - Holland 
1983; Shaw 2000). In a sense all are correct. As Murray (1975) and Lipson 
(1985) have pointed out as the multinationalisation of production advances then 
the state or states have to devise multilateral forms of protection for property. 
However, although the regulation of property has become internationalised the 
possession of force, or physical power, remains in the hands of the state and this 
primarily is still the nation state. As yet, not even the EU has transformed sole 
discretion of the deployment of such force to a new state body away from nation- 
states. This ultimately must be the criterion by which a socialist party, which 
wants to end exploitation, must ultimately judge where the power of monopoly 
capitalism is situated. Holland's criterion was economic power; however I 
believe that to be too narrow. The essence of the capitalist state is its political 
force and that is a prime criterion as to where the state is located. It is this force 
which maintains capitalist private property. Therefore socialist strategy should be 
directed wherever that resides. We made the point in earlier chapters that this still 
resides in the nation-state and it is to this locus that socialist strategy should be 
located. Furthermore, the aim, again as we have argued, is not to utilise the 
capitalist state but to replace it with a state that embodies not capitalist, but 
working class power. For it is only with a truly, participative democracy that the 
foundations can be put in place to ensure the political sovereignty of the people 
over the power of private capital. 
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Overall, the conclusion of this thesis must be that Holland's opus remains at odds 
with Marxism. In his national political economy and his regional political 
economy Holland's analyses were partial, inconsistent, and pluralist in theoretical 
perspectives from a Marxist point of view. Likewise Holland's strategies in their 
goal of making capitalism more competitive offered the appearance of 
improvement for certain sections of the working class but overall they led to a 
situation, through the logic of capitalist competition, to a downward pressure 
upon those conditions. The external repercussions of such a policy would yet 
further intensity inter-imperialist rivalries and responses from competitors. The 
use of protectionism against rivals would only aggravate global political tensions. 
The hope of countervailing that with global state management (Holland 1994b) 
would only meet with the same fate as the original Bretton Woods (Block 1977). 
From a Marxist point of view, the foremost purpose of strategy, which bears in 
mind internationalist responsibilities, must be to find a route out of capitalism, 
currently, through the nation-state, to restructure the state upon new foundations, 
and not to be bound by the logic of imperialist reproduction. 
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Appendix A- Some Biographical Details of Stuart Holland 
These biographical details incorporate three aspects of Holland's life in relation 
to the thesis: (1) a brief outline of the major academic and political career 
developments; (ii) a brief summary of the influences upon him; (iii) a guide to his 
major writings. 
Holland was bom in 1940. He was an undergraduate at the University of 
Missouri 1959-60 (Downloaded 18/1/06: www. econ. uoa. grlualfilesl]960985655 
.. pdj). He won a scholarship to Balliol, Oxford to read Modem History and 
Political Theory in which he obtained I" Class Honours (1960-63). Although 
offered a job by Harold Wilson in the International Department of Transport 
House he turned that down to study for a D. Phil in Economics again at Oxford 
(his thesis was on Regional problems: 1963-72) (Beckerman 1973). He became a 
member of the Labour Party in 1962 (Who's Who). 
He was then offered a job in the Department of Economic Affairs which was in 
the process of drawing up the 1965 National Plan and needed someone with 
economic knowledge on regions. Whilst at the Department of Economic Affairs 
he approached Thomas Balogh, who was the Special Economic Adviser to the 
Cabinet, and asked for work in a wider context. As a result he worked as an 
Economic Assistant to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Office (1966-67) and 
following on from that in 1967-8 he worked as Political Assistant to the Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson. For a short time he was a civil servant with the 
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opportunity to sit on various committees in Whitehall (Mike Prior 1980 and 
Who's Who). 
It has been argued by George and Haythome that the Labour Party had 'very little 
contact with continental socialist parties and Labour's thinking owed little to 
continental socialist thought' before Britain joined the Common Market in 1973. 
(quoted in Clift, 200 1, p. 56). In the opinion of this author, on the basis of 
studying Holland's career and influence, this view needs amending. Holland's 
ideas and thus the Labour Party's economic policy were profoundly influenced 
by developments on the continent either directly through integration of aspects of 
European measures or in response to such measures. 148 His early interest in the 
State and its role in the economy led him to a study of continental models. 
Holland had been interested in European states' public policy since at least the 
mid- I 960s. According to Holland, in 1966 he briefed Wilson on developments in 
French planning, namely their move towards direct negotiations with leading 
firms and recommended that planning-by-agreement with leading firms was the 
way to relaunch the National Plan. In 1968 he resigned from his post for several 
reasons one of which was Wilson's failure to follow through on Holland's 
suggested ideas. Apparently, Wilson offered Holland leadership of the first 
Strategy unit at No. 10. Holland declined this offer (to his later regret) (Holland 
2004a). 
His resignation had opened up new opportunities for Holland; for he was now 
able to express his ideas in the public domain. His intellectual focus, partly due to 
"' On Holland's influence on Labour Party economic strategy see Wickham-Jones (1994); also: 
Hatfield (1978) 
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this career and partly due to his political commitments, led him to make deeper 
studies of the political economy of European states and the European 
Community. Holland spent ten years on the study of regional theory and policy in 
Western Europe and the United States before 1976 (Holland, 1976a, Preface). 
Holland's impressive and busy career had seen him take up appointments as a 
Research Fellow at the Centre for Contemporary European Studies at the 
University of Sussex from 1968-71 (Who's Who) and later as Associate Fellow 
and Lecturer at the same centre 1971-79 (Who's Who). He was also Lecturer in 
Economics and Contextual Studies in the European School of the University of 
Sussex, 1971-79. Following on research into regional problems in Italy he 
continued his studies of Italian models of public enterprise, particularly the IRI 
(the Italian Institute for Industrial Reconstruction), and in 1970-71 visited Italy to 
examine its work at first hand (Holland 1972a). 
In 1972 he edited The State as Entrepreneur which was subtitled 'New 
dimensions for public enterprise: the IRI state shareholding formula'. This text 
sets out extensively, for the first time, Holland's approach to public enterprise in 
the modem capitalist economy. The themes which were later to become dominant 
in his works: namely the threat of multinationals and the role of public 
enterprises in countering that threat are clearly evident. He relates how the IRI 
had become a 'model' for state agencies elsewhere globally and praised it as an 
example of 'state enterprise as efficient and dynamic as leading private enterprise 
groups'(Holland 1972a, p. Iff). In particular he paid close attention to the 
financial 'formula' of the IRI whereby the bulk of its external finance was 
secured in the open market rather than from government capital grants. This 
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formula was to be referred to later in Holland's writings in relation to the 
European Union. Another feature which attracted him to the model was that role 
that it played in achieving government policy without being subordinated to 
government diktat in terms of tactics and strategy. In other words they had self- 
responsibility for the achievement of targets. For him it was a model of state 
entrepreneurship. Another feature of note for Holland was the shareholding 
format of the IRI. First it held shares in modem manufacturing and service firms 
and not in primary industries which were in decline; and secondly, its 
shareholding was not always a majority one. The significance of the former is 
that it was public enterprise in leading, dynamic sectors of the economy. The 
significance of the second point was that it enabled state influence over private 
firms without controlling them outright. In his conclusion, he argued that the 
general applicability of the model was possible in Britain and particularly within 
EEC countries (through the means of joint ventures) where they could 'mobilise a 
more effective response to. .. US multinational companies. 
' (Holland 1972a, 
p. 265). This established another theme of Holland's later writings his desire to 
promote European enterprise against that of the United States. 
This academic interest in European affairs was reinforced by membership of 
some important European-focussed events and committees. In 1972 he, along 
with other invited scholars, attended a seminar discussion on the theme of 
problems of European society at the Centre for International Affairs and West 
European Studies, Harvard. Out of these discussions there emerged Holland's 
essay Europe's New Public Enterprises published in 1974 (Vemon 1974). In 
1973 he was appointed a consultant to the Economic and Social Affair's 
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Committee of the Council on European Regional Policy (Who's Who). In 1971 he 
co-authored with Wayland Kenny and Larry Whitty a Fabian pamphlet on the 
role of multinational companies in the EEC entitled Sovereignty and the 
Multinationals. From 1971 he became a contributor to the Fabian Socialist 
Commentary on public ownership. He also authored articles far Roy Jenkins on 
public enterprises (Holland 2004a). Hatfield writes that Holland was seen as a 
young protege in social democratic circles at this time and in Edmund Dell's 
view Holland was the "foremost of those who have argued the relevance of this 
idea [of the state holding company -DL] to this country" (quoted in Hatfield 
(1978). His work on regional affairs led to his appointment as Special Adviser to 
the Expenditure Committee of the House of Commons on Public Money in the 
Private Sector, and Regional Development Incentives 1971-72. 
In 1972 he edited The State as Entrepreneur which was subtitled 'New 
dimensions for public enterprise: the IRI state shareholding formula'. From 1972 
through to 1989 Holland was a member of various sub-committees of the 
National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, these included: finance and 
Economic Policy, Industrial Policy, the EEC Economic Planning, Defence, 
Development Cooperation and the Public Sector. According to Wickham-Jones 
(1996), between 1972 and 1982 Holland wrote over twenty-five papers about 
economic policy far the Labour Party. It was in January 1972 that a new major 
breakthrough in Holland's career was made with his appointment to the Industrial 
Policy Committee. In February of that year he submitted a paper, along with 
Richard Pryke 149 , on the State Holding Company to a conference on 
industrial 
149 Pryke had been a fellow adviser in the Cabinet Office in 1966. 
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policy held by the Labour Party. In that paper Holland argued the case for a state 
Holding Company in Britain along the lines of the IRI and reiterated Holland is 
the point made in his earlier pamphlet along with Whitty and Kenny that 
multinational companies posed a 'problem for national economic sovereignty' 
(Holland and Pryke, 1972, p. 13). The committee was to have a major input into 
the radical 1973 Labour Programme. It was in this committee that he canvassed 
his ideas on public enterprises and the note of the state holding company 
(Holland 1972b) and the need to bring to heel the multinational companies 
(Holland 1972c). 
In 1973 Holland began to associate with the Left of the Labour Party and 
attended a 'presentation' by Tony Benn (Hatfield 1978, p. 160). The proposals of 
a National Enterprise Board and planning agreements had been approved by the 
Party's National Executive Committee. Holland became active among 
constituency parties and shop stewards' meetings promoting the ideas as key 
instruments of socialist planning. An alliance with Benn offered him the 
opportunity to see them become reality (Hatfield 1978, p. 262ff. ). This was to be 
an important development and a metamorphosis, as the former Fabian, Holland, 
began to be identified as a 'left-wing' Labour Party member and a 'Marxist' by 
some. He was abandoned by the right- wing social democrats (Hatfield 1978, p. 
87). 
In June of that year, there was a prolonged debate between Wilfred Beckerman, 
who was a Professor at University College, London and Holland over the merits 
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of Labour's plans for industry in the New Statesman. 150 Beckerman described 
Holland as the "chief academic 'backroom boy' behind the proposals" 
(Beckerman 1973, p. 655). During 1973-1974 Holland wrote his most renowned 
work The Socialist Challenge published 1975. It was in this that he gave his most 
elaborate exposition of his national strategy which of course became a substantial 
element of Labour's Alternative Economic Strategy, the name given to Labour's 
economic proposals contained in Labour's Programme 1973. Wickham-Jones 
(1996) considered that it gave the 'most complete account of the... [AES's ] 
theoretical underpinnings' (Wickham-Jones 1996, p. 54). Robert Skidelsky was 
fulsome in his evaluation describing it as 'arguably the most important book from 
the British left... it puts the case for socialism in terms not of values but tasks. " 151 
Others considered it weak in its analysis of public enterprise (Feigenbaum 1982). 
Holland became a 'tireless publicist for the strategy, producing a deluge of books 
and articles supporting it' (Wickham-Jones 1996, p. 54). One of the publications 
of this tireless campaign was the short book, the Strategyfor Socialism (1975). 
In 1974 he was a member of the Department of Industry Working Party on the 
Industry Act which was to give legal expression to Labour's economic proposals. 
The draft Industry Bill was undermined by Harold Wilson's arguments against it 
(Holland 2004, pp. 296-7). It was in 1974 that he became a member of the 
Council of the Institute for Worker's Control, an organisation which promoted 
industrial democracy and an associate of the Institute of Development Studies at 
Sussex University. He was Governor of the Institute from 1983-1991. 
150 Holland claimed later that Anthony Crosland had helped get Beckerman's "assault" into the 
journal. See (Holland 2004b, p. 176). 
151 From reviewers' comments on the back page of Holland (1976a). 
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This high point in Holland's career was followed in 1974-75 by a new post 
alongside Tony Banks, as Special Adviser to the Minister of Overseas 
Development, who was an old friend, Judith Hart. From 1978-81 he was an 
executive member of the 'hard left' group the Labour Coordinating Committee. 
This was a grouping within the Labour Party formed in 1978 based on a range of 
socialist opinion who aspired to inner - party constitutional reform and greater 
campaigning work. 
From 1975-6 he served as a member, with Jacques Delors and Franco Archibugi 
amongst others, on the Expert Committee on Inflation of the Directorate General 
for Economic and Financial Affairs of the EC Commission (known as the 
Maldague Report on Problems of Inflation published in Brussels in 1976 
(Holland 1979d, p. 5) 152 ; and in English in 1977) (Holland 1980, p. 131 and 
1979d, p. 5, note). Its report proved to be controversial as it recommended 
policies which 'would amount to both positive intervention and a degree of 
positive integration, feasibly within an international planning context' (Holland, 
1980, pp. 26-7). 
In 1976 he had his two major works on regional problems published (1976b; 
1976c) whose scope covered the question of uneven development. These studies 
were the product often ten years research on regional theory and policy. A 
chapter on 'Meso-economics, multinational capital and regional inequality' in 
Lee and Ogden's volume Economy and Society in the EEC followed in the same 
year. In 1977 he contributed a significant chapter on Keynes' contribution to 
152 Members of the Study Group included Franco Archibugi, Jacques Delors, Stuart Holland, 
Robert Maldague, Dirk Dolman, and Heinz Markham 
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socialism and sought to explain the preference in the Labour Party for Keynesian 
demand management rather than Marx's theory of surplus value. He also 
indicated the limits of Keynesian policies in transforming capitalism. 
Also in 1976 he took part in a conference on the "crisis of capitalist planning" at 
the University of Sussex in which several socialists "who have been central to 
[the] new challenge from Left" in four main Western European countries took 
part. Out of this conference Holland edited the text, Beyond Capitalist Planning 
published in 1978 which examined planning problems and prospects in France, 
Italy, Germany and Britain (Holland 1979d p. 2). 153 Holland wrote in his 
introduction to the book that there was 'a degree of convergence in theory and 
policy between ideologues and activists in four European parties - the French and 
Italian Socialists, the SPD, and the British Labour Party' (Holland 1979d, p. 6). 
He also contributed a chapter on 'Planning Disagreements' in the British Labour 
Party in the early 1970s. This contains his analysis of the critical reasons why 
Labour failed to achieve its radical objectives in 1974. This was supplemented by 
a more extended analysis in the chapter on 'Capital, Labour and the State' in Ken 
Coates' edited volume What Went Wrong (I 979a). In 1977 he was appointed 
Rapporteur to the Trades Union Advisory committee of the OECD (Who's Who). 
In these activities, Holland was extending his circle of contacts with key 
European socialists and becoming more involved with socialists on the continent. 
Holland also made analyses of other aspects of the capitalist system other then 
the rise of multinational monopoly power in the market (Holland 1987a and 
153 Participants included: Jacques Delors, Jacques Attali, Franco Archibugi, Karl Georg Zinn and 
Thomas Balogh. 
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1987b). In 1979b he wrote on ideology in Britain, in the fonn of the power of the 
press. In this he set forth his ideas on how to countervail the power of the 
publishing magnates in the industry. In 1981 Holland tackled for the first time the 
issue of Britain's financial institutions in his chapter on 'New Public Enterprise 
and Economic Planning' (1981b) in a volume edited by Ken Coates entitled 
'How to Win? " which was the sequel to 'What Went Wrong? ' He also filled out 
his ideas on planning alongside his concept of public enterprises. This was part of 
an attempt to keep Labour moving in the radical direction of the 1973 
Programme. 
In 1979 his brief parliamentary career began. He was elected Member of 
Parliament for Lambeth, Vauxhall in 1979, which he held until 1989. He was 
appointed Shadow Minister of Overseas Development by Neil Kinnock in 1983. 
In 1987 he was appointed Shadow financial Secretary to the Treasury, which he 
held until he left parliament in 1989. He then resumed his academic career. It was 
about this time that he was appointed Professor of Economics, European 
University Institute, in Florence (until 1993). Following this he became director 
of a number of consultancies, namely the Associate Research in Economy and 
Society from 1993 to 1998; and of Alter-Europe from 1998-2003. He became a 
Visiting Professor at the faculty of Economics at the University of Cambria in 
2002. 
He paid close attention to Eurocommunist political strategy and economic policy, 
inevitably so, examining continental European experience. He wrote an article in 
1979 on 'The New Communist Economics' and contributed to a Labour Party 
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pamphlet on Eurocommunism in 1980. Also in 1980 Holland published his major 
analysis of the European Community entitled the 'Uncommon Market'. This text 
is a rare attempt by a left social democrat to give an in-depth analysis of the 
Community in terms of its origins, dynamics and political and economic 
ramifications. It also marked a crucial stage in Holland's intellectual 
development: a refocusing of his attention and efforts towards a European rather 
than a national strategy. In 1981 Holland was prepared to back withdrawal from 
the EEC provided that there was a refocusing on a 'broader' European and global 
level rather than the inner Europe of the EEC. He described this as a 'positive 
counter-offensive to militarism, monetarism and multinational capital on a global 
scale ... and a global project for disarmament, democracy and genuine 
development' (Holland 1981, p. 12). 
Holland was involved in the Forum for International Political and Social 
Economy (IPSE) which may be characterised as form of left-wing episternic 
community seeking international policy coordination. This was "a group of 
socialist economists in the main West European countries who met informally 
over a period of up to 10 years before 1983" (Holland, 1983, p. 13). Many went 
on to become prominent academics or to hold prominent positions in their parties 
e. g. Franco Archibugi, Francis Cripps and Frank Vandenbroucke. He initiated 
(claim by Holland 2004b) and became Coordinator of the European Recovery 
Project Out of Crisis (1981-3) which was sponsored by the French Ministry of 
Education and Research. Out of Crisis, an influential text, edited by Holland, 
resulted. Callaghan (2000) has described this as part of the process of transferring 
the AES to the European stage. The core of this approach was adopted in the 
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I March 1984 Manifesto of the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European 
Community (Holland 1984, p. 256). Holland in his chapter 'Out of Crisis - 
International Economic Recovery' (1984) held out optimistic hopes for 
international co-ordination in Europe for public policies he advocated. He also 
began to elaborate the economic polices for the left in power in Europe in relation 
to the world economy. Alongside this chapter was a call by Neil Kinnock for a 
'new Euro Bretton Woods'. 
The European focus of Holland's career intensified in the late 1980s. In 1988 he 
was appointed as Consultant to the Secretarial General of the Commission of the 
European Communities on 'A theoretical and statistical framework for analysis 
of the competitive context of corporate strategies in the internal market'. In the 
following year, he was appointed as Consultant to DG XVI of the Commission of 
the European Communities on 'A Community framework for the promotion of 
regional development agency and enterprise joint ventures'. He was a member of 
the 'Inter-Services Science, Technology and Social Sciences Research 
Committee of the Commission of the European Communities' (otherwise known 
as the 'Drafting Committee for the Fourth Framework Programme on Science 
and Technology') from 1990 to 1993. He was economic adviser to the Merger 
Task force of the European Commission DG IV over roughly the same period. 
He was made Director of the Project on 'Economic and Social Cohesion in the 
1990s' for European Commissioners Delors, Christophersen, McSharry, 
Papandreou and Millan. This lasted from 1990-92. Further posts in Europe 
included him being consultant to DG XII of the European Commission on 'The 
Contribution of Science and Technology to Global Development Needs' 1991 - 
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94. He was consultant to on the 'Macroeconornics of Reorganising and Reducing 
Working Time' to DGV of the European Commission, 1996. He held also adviser 
roles to the Portuguese Presidency and the Greek Presidency of the European 
Council, 2000 and 2003 respectively. 
This career focus was paralleled by a new European focus of Holland's writings 
and thoughts. In 1986 he reiterated his call for a broad pan - European 
Alternative Economic Strategy (alongside the EEC) (Holland 1986). This was 
followed by a reassessment of the EEC and a call to support the Maastricht 
Agreement on condition that there were measures to protect monetary exchange 
rates and extensive employment and welfare guarantees (Holland 1992a) as well 
as a call for Europe's to act globally (1992b). Arising out of his responsibility for 
reporting on 'economic and social cohesion' in the EEC (1990-92) the work the 
'European Imperative: Economic and Social Cohesion in the 1990s' (1993a) was 
published, which was edited and written by Holland and assisted by a wealth of 
academic talent from across Europe. This was the basis of Jacques Delors's 
White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. According to 
Holland it 'endorsed a plural mixed economy case written European-wide rather 
than the nationalisation case of the Common Programme of the left in France' 
(Holland, 2004b, p. 181). Holland also claimed that it was one factor in enabling 
Neil Kinnock in shifting the Labour Party's commitment to Europe (Holland, 
2004b, p. 181). The prospect of a European Investment Fund adopted at the 
Edinburgh Summit (1992) held out hope for Holland that the financing for a plan 
for economic recovery for Europe had been put in place (1993b). This was 
followed by participation with Ken Coates for a call to the European Union to 
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implement plans for full employment in 1995 (Coates and Holland 1995). In 
1996 he argued for a European-wide New Deal based on European financial 
institutions (Holland 1996, 'How to Give Europe a New Deal' 25.11.96, 
Guardian Internet Archive). 
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